Target the untargeted: essays in unconventional disclosures and policies by Tuijn, M.C. (Marcel)
Target the untargeted:
Essays in unconventional
disclosures and policies
Marcel Christiaan Tuijn



Table of Contents
Acknowledgments v
1 Introduction 1
2 Disclosure and antitrust oversight 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Institutional background and prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Price disclosures and collusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Antitrust oversight and price fixing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.3 Information content of FPI disclosures and antitrust oversight . 14
2.2.4 Civil antitrust litigation risk setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 Measuring future price increase disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.2 Future price increase disclosures and summary statistics . . . . 17
2.4 Empirical findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 Industry concentration and future price increase disclosures . . 18
2.4.2 Civil antitrust litigation risk and future price increase disclosures 20
2.4.3 Antitrust oversight and the information environment . . . . . . 23
2.4.4 Antitrust enforcement and future price increase disclosures . . 24
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Do Firms Strategically Announce Capacity Expansions to Deter
Entry? 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Motivation/Hypothesis Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3 Measure of capacity expansion announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.4 Empirical setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
3.5 Sample and variable definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.6.1 Relation Between CEAs and Capacity Expansions . . . . . . . 53
3.6.2 CEAs and Entry Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6.3 Threat Response Variation in the Cross-Section . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6.4 Robustness: Controlling for US exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.6.5 Robustness: Overall disclosure quantity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.6 Supplemental analysis: Effectiveness of Capacity Expansion
Announcements at Deterring Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Financial Intermediation through Financial Disintermediation 81
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.1 Description of the CSPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2.2 The CSPP and the ECB’s Other Monetary Policy Interventions 91
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3.1 Measuring CSPP Exposures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.3.2 Sample Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4 Empirical Methodology and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4.1 Banks’ Exposure to SMEs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4.2 SME Credit Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.3 Ruling out Alternative Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4.4 Lending Relationships and SME Borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.5 Loan Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4.6 Real Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.7 Dynamic Effects of the CSPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
References 137
Summary 147
Nederlandse Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 149
Author’s Portfolio 153
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
The ERIM PhD Series 155

Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation on targeting the untargeted examines whether economic actors’
conventional disclosures or decisions can have unconventional intentions from different
research angles. Specifically, I examine whether firms use disclosures to capital markets
to change the the behavior of (potential) competitors and whether the central banks
provide financing to large firms in order to boost bank financing for small and middle
enterprises.
In the context of financial accounting, researchers typically consider (potential)
shareholders to be the primary targeted audience of firm disclosure. Ever since Ball and
Brown (1968), which catalyzed research in accounting, researchers have investigated
the capital market effects and determinants of disclosure.1 However, firm disclosure
can also be informative to other economic actors and, consequently, help to improve
the profitability of firms. Different streams of research show that firm disclosure can,
for example, affect corporate investments and have market wide outcomes (for a
review see Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).
Recently, there has been a push to understand the role that disclosures play in
product markets. A traditional view in the accounting literature is that (potential)
competitors could have a dampening effect on firm disclosure through proprietary
costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). When firms provide information voluntarily to
the market, it could also be used by competitors in a way that brings harm to the
firm’s prospects. However, empirical evidence on the proprietary cost hypothesis is
1See, for example: Lang and Lundholm (1993); Botosan (1997); Core (2001); Healy and Palepu
(2001); Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007); Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008); Bischof and Daske
(2013); Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014); Leuz and Wysocki (2016); Dyer, Lang,
and Stice-Lawrence (2016); Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016); Schoenfeld (2017); Gow, Larcker, and
Zakolyukina (2019).
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mixed (for a review see Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). An important reason
for this is that competition could also be a driver of firm disclosure. Prior studies
show that disclosures could be used as strategic devices to improve firms’ competitive
positioning (e.g., Tomy, 2017; Bloomfield, 2018; Burks, Cuny, Gerakos, and Granja,
2018; Bourveau, She, and Zaldokas, 2019; Glaeser and Landsman, 2019; Kepler, 2019).
In this dissertation, I examine two different ways in which firms could use disclosures
in such a way.
In chapter 2, I investigate whether firms use disclosures in order to tacitly collude
with their competitors and identify an important and previously under-explored effect
that may limit this behavior: antitrust oversight. Theory suggests that firms facing
competition from only a few competitors could use disclosure to tacitly coordinate
with their competitors (e.g. Fried, 1984; Bertomeu and Liang, 2015). Specifically, firms
may use future product price disclosures to induce their competitors to raise their
prices above competitive levels (Corona and Nan, 2013). I find evidence that firms in
concentrated industries provide more future price increase disclosures, consistent with
the notion that these firms use future price increase disclosures to coordinate prices.
The results in my study suggest that antitrust oversight could be an effective way to
limit this behavior by firms. However, it may come with the unintended consequence
that it becomes more difficult for investors to be informed.
In chapter 3, which is joint work with Matthew Bloomfield, we explore whether
firms use voluntary disclosures as part of their entry deterrence strategies. Analytical
work on industrial organization suggests that firms can deter entry by investing in
capacity expansions (e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980; Tirole, 1988; Ellison and Ellison,
2011), but this is only effective when observable to potential entrants. Disclosures
may therefore have an important role as they can inform potential competitors of
a firm’s expansion before they make the decision to enter the market. We provide
evidence that firms issue capacity expansion announcements, strategically, to ensure
that potential entrants are aware of ongoing capacity investments. Consistent with our
predictions, larger firms are more likely to respond in this fashion, while more opaque
firms—that that plausibly have more private information—are less likely to respond
in the fashion. Finally, capital expansion announcements appear to be effective at
deterring entry.
The second setting in which I investigate whether economic actors can target a
particular group while seemingly targeting another is the banking industry. Small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of an economy and rely heavily
on bank financing. Especially during the financial crisis and after, SME credit access
3contracted substantially to great concern of policymaker and regulators (Ferrando,
Popov, and Udell, 2017; Bord, Ivashina, and Taliaferro, 2018; Corte´s, Demyanyk, Li,
Loutskina, and Strahan, 2018). The regular approach to encourage more lending to
SME’s is to, for example, lower interest rate, engage in risk-sharing or provide direct
credit guarantees to increase banks’ willingness to lend to small businesses by making
this type of lending more attractive to banks (Beck, Klapper, and Mendoza, 2010).
Recently, the European Central bank took a new approach by using regulator-led
financial disintermediation in non-SME credit to enhance financial intermediation in
the SME sector. The idea of this approach is that banks could extend more credit to
small businesses if large corporate loans become less attractive and the opportunity
cost of lending to SMEs decreases.
In chapter 4, which is joint work with Anya Kleymenova and Aytekin Ertan, we
study whether there are indeed are spillover effects of financial disintermediation
on the supply of credit to SMEs. We find that direct central bank lending to large
corporations induces banks to increase lending to SMEs by 8 to 12 percent. This effect
is stronger for liquidity-constrained banks. SMEs with relationship banks affected
by disintermediation borrow approximately e77,750 more relative to SMEs in the
same country and industry. We verify that these inferences are not due to changing
economic fundamentals or selection in central bank financing. Despite documenting
positive effects, we also find that they disappear in the long term, casting some doubt
on the structural efficacy of financial disintermediation as a tool to enhance bank
lending to SMEs.

Chapter 2
Shall we talk price increases?
The fine line between
disclosure and antitrust
oversight
2.1 Introduction
A vast stream of literature finds that firms facing strong competition provide less
disclosure, presumably for proprietary costs reasons (for a review see Beyer et al.,
2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). However, theory on product markets and disclosure
suggests that firms facing competition from only a few competitors could have strong
incentives to provide more disclosure, as it allows them to tacitly coordinate with their
competitors (e.g. Fried, 1984; Bertomeu and Liang, 2015). Specifically, firms may use
future product price disclosures to induce their competitors to raise their prices above
competitive levels (Corona and Nan, 2013). In this chapter, I first investigate whether
firms use disclosures in such a strategic way and, second, I identify an important and
previously under-explored effect that may limit this behavior: antitrust oversight.
0I am very grateful to Brad Badertscher, Thomas Bourveau, Jeffrey Burks, John Donovan, Peter
Easton, Aytekin Ertan, Thomas Keusch, Anya Kleymenova, Zachary Kowaleski, Erik Peek, Jessica
Watkins, Hal White, as well as workshop participants at the University of Notre Dame for their
invaluable feedback.
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Firms face a trade-off when they consider disclosing future price increases (FPIs).
There are capital market benefits for disclosing FPIs, as shareholders value and
respond to FPI announcements (Lim, Tuli, and Dekimpe, 2018). However, firms may
face adverse consequences in their product markets when making FPI disclosures
because this may reduce their ability to price discriminate and may provide proprietary
information to their competitors (Verrecchia, 1983). In concentrated industries, firms
may experience an additional benefit for disclosing FPIs. FPI disclosures may facilitate
price collusion and allow firms to “induce each other into a less competitive equilibrium
in which both can obtain higher profits” (Corona and Nan, 2013) when offering similar
products and compete on prices.
One of the main objectives of antitrust oversight is to limit firms’ ability to act
together, especially in ways that can lead to higher prices (Federal Trade Commission,
2015). In the U.S., antitrust oversight of collusive behavior traditionally focuses on
private agreements between firms. In the last decade, however, antitrust authorities
considered public statements on pricing and capacity as evidence of collusion (Steuer,
Roberti, and Jones, 2011).1 Firms may therefore have an incentive not to provide
such disclosures to limit the likelihood of an intervention by antitrust oversight.
As a consequence, antitrust oversight can hamper managers’ ability to inform the
market. Wary of these unintended consequences, antitrust authorities around the
world have differing opinions on whether to regulate public FPI disclosures. The
European Commission, for example, states that it generally allows public statements
on pricing and capacity, as it believes that the market has disciplining mechanisms to
ensure that firms refrain from making these disclosures for antitrust reasons (OECD,
2010). For example, FPI disclosures may increase the probability that new firms enter
the market (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990), or that customers decide to produce the
product internally. Given these different viewpoints among antitrust authorities, it
is important to understand whether increased scrutiny by antitrust oversight affects
the disclosure behavior of firms and whether it interferes with firms’ ability to inform
shareholders.
To address this trade-off, I develop a novel textual analysis measure of future
price disclosures to identify whether firms in concentrated industries provide more
FPI disclosures. I apply this algorithm to a large sample of U.S. conference calls over
the period from 2003 to 2013, as conference call disclosures are likely to be the least
1Even when these disclosures are made for capital market reasons and absent any anticompetitive
intent, firms still risk additional scrutiny by antitrust authorities under the concept of ‘invitation to
collude’. This legal concept allows antitrust authorities to charge firms solely for an action (e.g. a
disclosure) that may facilitate collusion on price or capacity.
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costly compared to other forms of disclosure.2 Roughly nine percent of the conference
calls in my sample contain such disclosures, which corresponds to 14 percent of the
firm-year observations. I then exploit a shock to the strength of antitrust oversight to
analyze its effects on the usage of future price increase disclosures and the information
environment.
In my first analysis, I investigate whether firms in concentrated industries provide
more FPI disclosures than firms in less concentrated industries. Theory predicts
that only firms in concentrated markets could use FPI disclosures to coordinate
price increases (Corona and Nan, 2013). Consistent with this prediction, I find cross-
sectional evidence that firms in industries with a higher Herfindahl-Hirschman index
score provide more FPI disclosures.
The above finding does not necessarily imply that firms use FPI disclosures to
collude. Firms in concentrated industries could, for example, have different disclosure
incentives or more shocks to common input prices. I, therefore, examine whether
firms in concentrated industries also provide more future price decrease disclosures.
Future price increase and decrease disclosures are likely both correlated with economic
forces that lead firms in competitive industries to discuss/disclose prices generally
(i.e. disclosure incentives), while only future price increase disclosures can be used
to collude. I do not find evidence that firms in concentrated industries also provide
more future price decrease disclosures. This finding is robust to using alternative
definitions of industry concentration. Furthermore, I find no evidence that firms in
concentrated industries provide more disclosures on future profit margin changes
or general discussions of future prices that are neither price increases or decreases.
Taken together, these results suggest that firms in concentrated industries use FPI
disclosures to coordinate future price increases.
To explore the effects of antitrust oversight on these FPI disclosures, I use a
major change in civil antitrust litigation as a plausibly exogenous shock to antitrust
oversight. In the 2007 case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court
increased the burden of proof for civil antitrust litigation and required litigants to
meet this standard when filing the lawsuit. Traditionally, lawyers could file a lawsuit
against firms based on a suspicion of collusion and then use the discovery phase to
2Given the unscripted nature of the questions and answers during a conference call, firms have
a stronger legal defense against antitrust allegations compared to other prepared disclosures that
are heavily redacted by the firm’s legal department and/or auditors. Furthermore, providing an
FPI disclosure in a conference call, compared to other types of disclosure, reduces the likelihood
that customers are aware of FPI, thereby reducing the likelihood that customers will decide to
change supplier or produce the product in-house. This is mainly driven by the higher search costs
for customers to obtain the information conveyed during a conference call compared to more readily
available types of disclosure.
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gather actual evidence of collusion by examining private communications, which made
scrutiny of indirect evidence, such as public statements by managers, unnecessary.
However, when the Supreme Court ruled that litigants had to present evidence of
collusion before the discovery phase, lawyers started to search through conference
calls for public statements on prices and capacity that could be used as evidence
to avoid the dismissal of the lawsuit (Steuer et al., 2011). Thus, after the Supreme
Court ruling, managers in concentrated industries suddenly faced an additional cost
for making FPI disclosures, namely civil antitrust litigation risk.3
Applying a difference-in-difference design, I analyze the effects of increased antitrust
oversight on the use of FPI disclosures in concentrated industries, with firms in less
concentrated markets as a control group. The results show that firms in highly
concentrated industries respond to an increase in civil litigation risk by providing
fewer FPI disclosures. This pattern is consistent with the notion that firms account
for civil antitrust litigation risk in their disclosure decisions. In a sensitivity analysis,
I find similar results when I replace the continuous industry concentration measure by
an indicator equal to one when a firm is in the top quartile of industry concentration.
Furthermore, I find that retail firms, which traditionally receive more leeway by
antitrust authorities to communicate FPI to consumers (OECD, 2010), do not decrease
their FPI disclosures as much as other firms after the new precedent was set by the
Supreme Court.
I conduct several falsification tests to confirm that the observed decrease is due
to an increase in antitrust oversight and not driven by confounding events. First, I
show that the Supreme Court ruling only affects FPI disclosures, not price decrease
or general price disclosures. If a confounding event, such as the financial crisis, more
negatively affects the future prices of firms in concentrated industries and, thus, the
economic rationale to provide FPI disclosure, one would expect firms in concentrated
industries to announce more future price decreases. When a confounding event reduces
the overall incentive of firms in concentrated industries to disclose future price changes,
one would also expect firms to disclose less future price decreases. However, the results
are inconsistent with either alternative explanation. Second, I find that analysts of
firms in concentrated industries are not asking fewer questions about FPIs following
the Supreme Court ruling. When asking questions, analysts are likely aware of all
economic reasons to increase prices, but they are presumably unaffected by antitrust
oversight. Thus, if an unobservable change in the fundamentals of firms in concentrated
industries affects my inferences, one would also expect analysts to ask fewer questions
3Firms in unconcentrated industries are unaffected, as these firms are not the target of civil
antitrust lawsuits.
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about FPIs. However, I do not find that analysts change the number of questions about
FPIs in concentrated industries in response to the Supreme Court ruling, supporting
the notion that the relative decrease of FPI disclosures is not driven by confounding
events, but rather, by antitrust oversight.
Furthermore, while antitrust oversight may be effective in limiting FPI disclosures
and, consequently, preventing collusion, the change could also affect the ability of
managers to effectively communicate with their investors. Antitrust oversight substan-
tially increases the costs for making FPI disclosure, but may thereby also discourage
firms from disclosing FPIs to inform their investors absent any anticompetitive intent.
To test whether antitrust oversight affects the information environment, I examine the
equity market bid-ask spreads for both concentrated and less concentrated industries
after the Supreme Court ruling. I find that the information environment deteriorates
in concentrated industries after the increase in antitrust oversight. My results indicate
that increased antitrust oversight has the unintended consequence that stock markets
are less informed.
Finally, I investigate whether the decrease in usage of FPI disclosures is isolated to
civil antitrust litigation risk, or if the same inferences can be generalized to other forms
of antitrust oversight. Specifically, I study a change in enforcement occurring after the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reached a settlement in the U-Haul case in 2010. In
their final order, the FTC ruled that statements made by U-Haul in their conference
calls were anti-competitive and stated that, from that moment forward, they were
going to pursue similar cases and those with “less egregious” conduct. This FTC
case, thus, puts further pressure on managers to be cautious when providing public
statements on competitively sensitive topics. The results of my investigation indicate
that firms reduced their usage of price increase disclosures regardless of industry
concentration. While the increase in enforcement appears to be effective in deterring
firms from disclosing FPI in industries where it could be used to tacitly collude, a
negative unintended consequence seems to be that firms with no anticompetitive
opportunities reduce their FPI disclosures.4 My results are in line with concerns
of both congressional leaders and the American Bar Association who warned that
the FTC provided too little guidance on what was allowable conduct (Wyatt, 2010).
Overall, the effect of antitrust oversight on disclosure seems, thus, not limited to civil
litigation risk, but also applies to antitrust regulatory enforcement.
4Due to the lack of a natural control group and concurrent event affecting the information
environment (e.g. the Dodd-Frank act), it is difficult to draw inferences from to market level tests
and are, therefore, not included in this study.
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As the FTC alleged that U-Haul was aware and specifically talked to its competitor
and not to its investors, I test whether firms stopped making FPI disclosures completely
or changed their way of communicating. I find that some firms changed their disclosure
channel, and instead relayed their FPI disclosures via analyst conference presentations.
This change of disclosure channel, presumably allows firms to defend the notion that
they are talking to investors and not to competitors, but comes at the expense of
retail investors that do not have easy access to this information. Overall, the results
suggest that firms use FPI disclosures to coordinate price increases, but are limited
in their ability to do so after increases in antitrust oversight.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, I contribute to the
disclosure literature by providing empirical evidence for the theoretical prediction
that firms in concentrated industries can use disclosures to improve their competitive
positioning. Recent work finds similar results while focusing on antitrust leniency laws
(Bourveau et al., 2019) and strategic alliances (Kepler, 2019) on disclosures. However,
this study provides more general evidence of the usage of FPI disclosures to coordinate
prices and how antitrust oversight significantly reduced this method of tacit collusion
in the last decade. This study also highlights that the competition-disclosure link
varies with the type and nature of disclosure in question. While there is a link between
industry concentration and future price increase disclosures, these conclusions do not
apply to future price decrease disclosures. Furthermore, this is one of the first studies
to document that the channel through which firms disclose information, in particular
on future pricing, to the market is relevant and that enforcement can lead firms to
substitute their conference call disclosures for analyst conference presentation to avoid
regulatory scrutiny.
Second, this study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to document that
civil antitrust litigation risk can affect firm disclosures and, consequently, also the
information environment for capital markets. Civil antitrust litigation discourages
managers from making competition sensitive disclosures, even though investors find
these disclosures informative. Furthermore, the litigation risk from civil antitrust
lawsuits is substantially different in both theory and implications from the security
regulations litigation risk often discussed in the disclosure literature. Contrary to
security regulation litigation risk, civil litigation risk may expose firms to litigation
risk even when the managers make timely and truthful disclosure about, for example,
future prices.
Lastly, this paper adds to the literature on antitrust oversight. My results show
that an increase in antitrust oversight can be effective in limiting the use of disclosures
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for anticompetitive reasons, but can make capital markets less efficient. Given that
antitrust authorities around the world have differing approaches regarding regulating
public disclosures, this study could provide empirical evidence to antitrust authorities
about the intended and unintended consequences of doing so.
2.2 Institutional background and prediction
2.2.1 Price disclosures and collusion
Firms typically weigh costs and benefits when deciding whether to disclose information.
Theory predicts that an important reason for managers to withhold information
from the market is the presence of proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985).
Prior studies have frequently used industry concentration as an empirical proxy of
proprietary costs, and found evidence that firms in concentrated industries provide
fewer disclosures (Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ali, Klasa, and Yeung,
2014).
This literature provides valid reasons to expect that firms in concentrated industries
face high proprietary costs, but it ignores another stream of literature that theorizes
that some public disclosures in such concentrated industries could be beneficial.
Specifically, public disclosures on future capacity and pricing can provide firms with
product market benefits (e.g. Fried, 1984; Doyle and Snyder, 1999; Corona and
Nan, 2013; Suijs and Wielhouwer, 2014; Bertomeu and Liang, 2015). Firms can use
disclosures to inform competitors of their future plans to either raise its prices or
reduce their capacity to induce competitors to follow their lead, depending on whether
firms compete in a Cournot (i.e. capacity based), or Bertrand (i.e. price based) type
of competition. Disclosure can thus be beneficial, especially because their competitors
learn about them.
Firms in concentrated industries can thus use FPI disclosures to coordinate price
increases with their competitors.5 When a firm increases its price, competitors have the
choice to follow or continue to compete at current price levels. If all firms successfully
commit to an increase in prices, each firm will have higher profits than it would
have if it continued to compete.6 However, if competitors do not raise their prices,
the firm could face adverse consequences for being the only firm to raise its prices
in the form of customer loss. For this reason, it is beneficial to use FPI disclosures
rather than simply increasing prices, as it allows firms to test the waters, coordinate,
5Price coordination effectiveness is decreasing in the number of firms in the industry.
6Under the condition that firms do not increase the price above the profit-maximizing price (i.e.
monopoly price).
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and possibly still withdraw the FPI before facing the adverse consequence.7 That is,
FPI disclosures are beneficial to firms, as they may induce competitors into a less
competitive equilibrium where all firms can increase their profits (Corona and Nan,
2013).
Firms do incur costs when making an FPI disclosure, even if they subsequently
decide to withdraw the price increase decision. First, an FPI disclosure may induce
other firms to enter the market (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990), or customers may
decide to produce the product in-house. Once firms have made the initial investments
to either enter the market or produce a product in-house, they may not easily adjust
their decision, even if the FPI disclosing firm withdraws the price increase. Second,
withdrawing the FPI announcement may reduce the managers’ disclosure credibility.
Lastly, investors could consider the backtrack as a sign of uncertainty and riskiness
and, therefore, require a higher rate of return. Albeit, FPI disclosures are credible
because they are costly to provide.
Managers could mitigate some of these concerns by concealing their FPI announce-
ment. Customers and potential entrants will only respond to the FPI announcement
and potential withdrawal when they are aware of it. It is therefore likely that the
firms prefer to make FPI disclosures in conference calls compared to other more easily
accessible disclosure channels. 8
However, some empirical evidence does suggest that firms use disclosures to
collude, especially in the airline industry, where there is strong evidence that firms
used public announcements to coordinate capacity decreases (Aryal, Ciliberto, and
Leyden, 2018) and price increases (Borenstein, 1999). Firms also seem to adjust
their public disclosures of, for example, product information and customer contracts
after an increase of cartel enforcement regulations (Bourveau et al., 2019) and more
revenue forecasts with common ownership within small product markets (Pawliczek,
Skinner, and Zechman, 2019). Moreover, evidence suggests that firms reduce their
public disclosures when they enter private partnerships that allow them to provide
this information in private (Kepler, 2019). Previous studies, though, do not analyze
the price coordination through forward-looking pricing disclosures.
Overall, theory provides a strong indication that firms in concentrated industries
can use FPI disclosure to improve their competitive positioning. Combined with recent
7theory shows that even cheap talk can be effective in facilitating collusion (Awaya and Krishna,
2016, 2019)
8However, firms cannot completely mitigate these costs, so firms that make the first FPI disclosure
in an attempt to coordinate prices are facing adverse consequences, while competitors could free-ride
on the price increase or temporarily benefit by undercutting the firm’s price. Theory suggests that
this could prevent any firm from making the first FPI disclosure (Pastine and Pastine, 2004).
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empirical evidence, I predict that firms in concentrated industries provide more FPI
disclosures than non-concentrated firms.
2.2.2 Antitrust oversight and price fixing
One of the most important goals of antitrust oversight is to prevent firms from abusing
their market power at the expense of consumers. To achieve this goal, both antitrust
authorities and customers monitor firms for wrongdoing. Antitrust authorities can
launch investigations into potential market abuse and discipline firms, while many
countries allow customers to file a civil lawsuit against firms to uncover evidence and
seek compensation.
In the U.S., the FTC typically focuses its investigations on price fixing through
private meetings and communication and imposes severe penalties for this type of
misconduct. Under U.S. antitrust law, the FTC does not have to prove that there
was an actual agreement to fix prices. Proposing to raise prices or taking actions that
could induce competitors to raise their prices above competitive levels is a violation of
law under the legal concept of ‘invitation to collude’.9 Traditionally, public disclosures
on prices and capacity have not been a priority for FTC, nor considered an invitation
per se to collude. However, the FTC shifted its position on public disclosure when
it charged Vallassis in 2006 and, in particular, U-Haul in 2010 for inviting collusion
through their public statements.
In addition to antitrust regulation enforcement, civil antitrust litigation is another
form of antitrust oversight that deters firms from colluding. Customers can go to
court and seek compensation and punitive damages from firms that have increased
their prices through collusion. The amounts awarded to customers are substantial:
Connor and Lande (2015) finds that firms are forced to pay, on average, 500 million
per civil antitrust case. Typically, important evidence in these cases is obtained after
the litigants go to court, namely in the discovery phase (Epstein, 2008). During this
phase, litigants can demand that the accused firm provides internal documents and
communication, which can then be used as evidence during the trial. Even if firms
are not found guilty of collusion, both the litigation costs and the cost to produce
all documents during the discovery phase are borne by the accused firm and can be
substantial (Easterbrook, 1989). A survey over the period 2004-2008 found that the
self-reported costs of discovery in civil cases was more than USD 1.8 million per case
9Although the security regulation mandates the disclosure of material information, it is unlikely
to prevent antitrust regulation from having an impact on public disclosures. Price and capacity
disclosures are not by definition considered material information and FTC rules may therefore apply
to these disclosures.
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and required firms to produce nearly 5 million pages of documents (U.S. Chamber
Institute for Legal Reform, 2010).
Given the high potential costs, firms have incentives to avoid antitrust oversight
scrutiny regarding collusion through private or public disclosures. I, therefore, predict
that antitrust oversight reduces the use of FPI disclosures by firms in concentrated
industries.
2.2.3 Information content of FPI disclosures and antitrust
oversight
Prior research shows that FPI disclosures are, on average, informative to investors (Lim
et al., 2018). FPI disclosures are value relevant because they are informative about
future customer demand, prices, and/or margins. In addition, FPI disclosures could
reduce the uncertainty about future performance and reduce the information asymme-
try between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors when sophisticated investors
have access to extensive market research. A beneficial consequence of firms using
FPI disclosures to coordinate prices could, therefore, be that shareholders are better
informed. When an increase in antitrust oversight reduces the ability of firms to
provide FPI disclosures and firms have no alternative way to effectively provide this
information, it may thus result in investors being less informed.
There are also reasons to expect that FPI disclosures are not informative in
concentrated industries. First, FPI disclosures may be too noisy to be informative
because investors are not able to determine whether firms are using FPI disclosures
to collude or due to changes in, for example, input prices or market condition. Second,
FPI disclosures may be insufficiently credible to be informative (Ng, Tuna, and Verdi,
2013; Stocken, 2000; Rogers and Stocken, 2005), because firms could still withdraw
the price increase when other firms are not responding to the FPI disclosure. If
FPI disclosures are not informative, one would not expect to see any change in the
information environment when antitrust oversight prevents all firms in concentrated
industries from providing FPI disclosures. There could even be an improvement in
the information environment when the consequence of antitrust oversight is that firms
in concentrated industries only use FPI disclosures for competitive reasons.
Overall, it is an empirical question whether an increase in antitrust oversight
affects the information environment of concentrated firms.
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2.2.4 Civil antitrust litigation risk setting
This study exploits a sudden change in U.S. antitrust oversight to investigate its effects
on disclosures. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court changed the
burden of proof to start a civil suit alleging antitrust wrongdoing.10 Before this 2007
ruling, plaintiffs in civil antitrust cases only need to meet a low burden of proof to be
allowed to search through confidential records to build their case and find concrete
evidence of collusion during pre-trial discovery (Steuer et al., 2011).11 However, the
court decided that litigants had to provide more evidence of collusion when filing a
lawsuit and thus before being able to access private communication. Consequently,
lawyers began scrutinizing managers’ public statements to support lawsuits and
companies were instructed by their lawyers to be careful with any statement on
competition sensitive topics (Dechert LLP, 2010). Thus, after the Supreme Court
ruling, firms could (substantially) reduce their exposure to civil antitrust lawsuits by
limiting the amount of discussion on topics that could be seen as anticompetitive and
thus be used as supporting evidence to start civil antitrust lawsuits.
It is important to note that the change in antitrust oversight was unexpected and
unlikely to be timed endogenously. The Supreme Court overturned a precedent that
was set in 1957 and was not intended to affect public disclosure. Given the presumably
exogenous timing of the misconduct itself and the time it took to go through the
judicial system, it is also unlikely that this change was timed to correspond with
changes in the information environment or disclosure behavior.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Measuring future price increase disclosure
This study uses a novel text-based measure that captures whether managers discuss
future price increases during their conference calls. Specifically, the algorithm identifies
those conference calls where managers use the words raise or increase in the same
sentence as the word price. The algorithm classifies the following examples as FPI
10This change specifically affects civil antitrust cases brought primarily by customers or competitors
not participating in the cartel. This change does not specifically affect cases brought by the FTC or
the Department of Justice.
11Plaintiffs only had to provide “very spare allegations to meet the pleading burdens”(Epstein,
2008) in order to start the discovery phase. In practice, plaintiffs could successfully start a lawsuit
and enter discovery by showing that the current market outcomes are corresponding to outcomes that
are driven by collusion. The Supreme Court deemed this threshold to be too low and increased this
threshold to “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Before the ruling,
litigants in civil antitrust cases were required to provide substantial evidence of anticompetitive
behavior only after pre-trial discovery.
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disclosures:
“No, if anything we are looking to increase prices in the collectible side and several of
our markets.”
“As prices rise, going back to other things we’ve talked about here, as Mills increase
their price and as we have to increase ours...”
“So we keep an eye on them, and I think, people continue to raise prices, and we
will as well.”
Several important enhancements were made to improve the quality of the algorithm.
First, the algorithm is designed in such a way that it does not classify discussions
of increases in input prices as FPI disclosures by excluding 15 of the most discussed
materials12. Second, the algorithm disregards discussions about past and current
pricing, as only the information on future pricing is truly proprietary and unable
to be obtained from, for example, financial statements. I, therefore, exclude price
increase discussions in sentences that contain regular verbs in the past tense (words
ending with -ed) or the commonly used irregular verbs such as was, had and were.
Third, the algorithm excludes price increases that are preceded by no or not. Fourth,
I also exclude word combinations that were frequently incorrectly classified by the
algorithm as a discussion on product prices. The list of words are stock, market,
share, exercise, closing, trading, offer, conversion, resulted, discounted, declining, low,
contract, realized, average, home, real, under in combination with the word price.
Using a similar approach, another algorithm used in this study detects the disclo-
sure of future price decreases by managers. To be more precise, it searches for the
words decrease, drop, reduce or lower in the same sentence as the word price while
using the same refinements discussed above.
I make several important design choices in this study. First, the main measure of
FPI disclosures is based on textual disclosures instead of other established disclosures,
such as management forecasts. FTC’s final consent orders, civil lawsuits, and academic
literature specifically refer to textual statements as the primary channel through
which firms communicate on prices and rarely discuss the use of disclosures, such as
management forecast, in this context. Furthermore, sales forecasts are a combination
of price and quantity predictions and, therefore, not as effective for communicating
future pricing choices to competitors.
12The following words were excluded: oil, gas, fuel, energy, electricity, steel, gold, silver, copper,
metal, paper, pulp, raw materials, commodity and purchase.
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Second, I opt for a bag-of-words approach instead of a machine learning approach.
Given the specificity and infrequency of FPI disclosures, a regular expression-based
textual analysis is better equipped to detect these disclosures than machine learning.
Moreover, the bag-of-words approach makes my results replicable and allows me to
apply the algorithm to other disclosure channels.
Third, the algorithm is designed to exclude the discussion of input prices, even
though prior literature does not make this distinction. I make this distinction as
antitrust authorities do not consider statements on input prices to be anticompetitive.
Furthermore, it reduces the likelihood that my inferences are driven by changes in
industry fundamentals.13
2.3.2 Future price increase disclosures and summary statistics
This study analyzes Factset conference call transcripts in the period 2003-2013. For
these transcripts to be included in the sample, I require that the transcripts have
valid GVKEY link, and the issuing firm cannot be a financial institution (SIC code
6000-6999) or operate in a regulated industry (SIC code 4900-4999). Table 2.1 displays
the consequences of these sample selection choices on the sample size. In the final
sample, I aggregate the transcripts to firm-year observations14 and combine these
with financial information from CRSP, Compustat, and Edgar. I include firm-year
observations starting in the first year for which a firm has at least one transcript
availabile in Factset15. I record the value zero for the different price disclosure variables
when no conference call transcript was available in a particular firm-year.
When looking at FPI disclosures on a transcript level, I find that the algorithm
detects managers discussing FPIs at least once during 8,684 out of 94,095 conference
calls (9 percent). Furthermore, 53 percent of the firms provide at least one FPI
disclosure during the sample period. When aggregating to firm-years, I find that
managers provide an FPI disclosure in approximately 14 percent of firm-years, as
depicted in Panel A of Table 2.2. This percentage is lower than the amount of managers
that discuss future price decreases, which occurs in 22 percent of the firm-years. The
univariate difference between price increase and decrease disclosures is significant, but
could be considered as partly driven by the overall negative economic growth during
13Changing input prices are typically affecting whole industries, and may therefore fully explain
any industry level variation.
14I aggregate to firm-years instead of, say, firm-quarters because the number of conference calls
are not equally spread over quarters.
15The start of the sample period coincides with the earliest moment that Factset provides extensive
conference call coverage, namely in 2003, and ends three years after the FTC enforcement action of
U-Haul in 2013.
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my sample period and underline that it is unlikely that all FPI disclosures are used
to tacitly collude.
The main measure of industry concentration used in the analyses is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index for Text-Based Network Industries, as developed by Hoberg and
Phillips (2010, 2016). This measure compares the similarity of firms’ product de-
scriptions in 10-K filings to find product market peers and subsequently calculates
the industry concentration based on public and private firms. This measure is more
effective in analyzing product markets than SIC or GICS based measures (Jayaraman,
Milbourn, Peters, and Seo, 2018). This variable has a value between 0 and 1 and is on
average 0.235 in the sample. Alternative HHI measures described in Table 2.3 Panel
B are calculated using sales in that particular industry subset.
Table 2.2 Panel B provides insight into the average use of FPI disclosures for every
quartile of industry concentration. The descriptive evidence shows a monotonically
increasing use of FPI disclosures. I do not find the same pattern for future price
decrease disclosures. Taken together, this descriptive evidence seems to confirm the
notion that firms in concentrated industries use FPI disclosures more frequently and
perhaps strategically. To preview the effects of antitrust oversight, I examine the
average future price increase and decrease announcements both before and after the
Supreme Court ruling (see section 2.2.4). I find descriptive evidence that only the
most concentrated firms provide fewer FPI disclosures after an increase in antitrust
oversight, while I do not find the same pattern for future price decrease disclosures.
2.4 Empirical findings
2.4.1 Industry concentration and future price increase disclo-
sures
As a first analysis, I examine whether firms in concentrated industries are using
FPI disclosures more frequently than those in fragmented industries, presumably to
coordinate price increases among competitors. Given the difficulties of determining
the intent behind a particular disclosure, I compare the disclosure of future price
increases in highly concentrated industries to the disclosure of future price decreases
that do not have competitive benefits. If disclosure incentives correlate with industry
concentration independent of competitive reasons, one would expect to see future
price increase and decrease disclosures to vary similarly with concentration. I therefore
jointly test the association between industry concentration and future price increase
and decrease disclosures using the following equations:
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(2.1)Price increase indicatori,t = β0 + β1TNIC HHI i,t + γXit + τt + i,t
(2.2)Price decrease indicatori,t = β0 + β1TNIC HHI i,t + γXit + τt + i,t
where i indexes firms and t indicates time, which, in these tests, is a fiscal year. τt
are year fixed effects. Price increase indicatori,t is an indicator variable that switches
on when managers discuss future price increases at least once during a conference
call in the fiscal year. TNIC HHI i,t measures the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for
Text-Based Network Industries. Xit is a vector of control variables that will be used
throughout the analyses. Log total words press releases is a control that proxies for
the overall level of disclosures. I also control for different firm characteristics and
size variables that prior research identifies as generic drivers of disclosures, such as
Return on assets, Total assets and Market to book. I include firm-specific stock return
during the fiscal year and industry GDP growth as proxies for overall performance
and economic outlook that are directly relevant in determining whether there are
economic reasons to expect future price increases and decreases.
I present the estimation results of equation (2.1) and (2.2) in Table 2.3 panel A.
The results show that firms in concentrated industries provide more FPI disclosures
than firms in non-concentrated industries. I do not find a correlation between industry
concentration and future price decrease disclosures. Taken together, these results indi-
cate that collusion is likely an important consideration for providing FPI disclosures.
To illustrate the economic significance, I find that, compared to the unconditional
mean of FPI disclosures, one standard deviation increase in industry concentration is
associated with 11 percent more FPI disclosures.
Next, to strengthen the inference that FPI disclosures are likely used by firms for
antitrust purposes, I further examine whether two other closely related disclosures,
future profit margin disclosures and future price disclosures without the discussion of
an increase or decrease, are associated with industry concentration. The disclosure
incentive for these disclosures are arguably similar to those for FPI disclosures, but
are less likely to be used to coordinate price increases. Consistent with finding no
significant association between future price decreases and industry concentration, I
do not find that firms in concentrated industries provide more disclosures on their
future pricing (specification 3) or future margins (specification 4).
As a robustness check, I examine the association between FPI disclosures and four
alternative measures of industry concentration. In column (1) of Table 2.3 Panel B,
I replace the continuous HHI measure with an indicator that equals one if the firm
is in the top quartile of industry concentration to reduce concerns of measurement
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error. I find that firms in the top quartile of industry concentration provide 25
percent more FPI disclosures than firms in the bottom 3 quartiles, relative to the
unconditional mean of FPI disclosures. Columns (2) to (4) show that the results are
also robust to industry concentration measures based on SIC2, SIC3, and SIC4 level
industry classifications. I find consistent results for all three other SIC-based industry
classifications, indicating that the results are not driven by an anomaly in the text
based industry classification HHI.
2.4.2 Civil antitrust litigation risk and future price increase
disclosures
Having established that firms in concentrated industries provide more frequent FPI
disclosures compared to firms in non-concentrated industries, I turn to analyzing
the effects of antitrust oversight. I start with examining the effects of increased civil
antitrust litigation risk for public disclosures after the Supreme Court ruling in 2007,
as described in section 2.2.4. I estimate the following difference-in-differences model:
Price increase indicator i,t = β0 + β1TNIC HHI i,t + β2PostSCt
+ β3TNIC HHI i,t × Post˙SC+γXit + αi + τt + i,t
(2.3)
where i indexes firms and t indicates time, which, in these tests, is a fiscal year. αi and
τt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. PostSCt and TNIC HHI i,t are the two
components of the DiD model. TNIC HHI i,t is an industry concentration measure
based on text-based industry classifications and PostSCt is an indicator variable that
is one for fiscal year 2007 until 2009.16 Xit is a vector of control variables as described
in equation 2.1. This test examines how concentrated firms are changing their FPI
disclosures in response to increased antitrust oversight relative to non-concentrated
firms.17
Table 2.4 presents the findings for the effects of antitrust oversight on FPI disclo-
sures. The results in columns (1) and (2) show that firms in concentrated industries
16The overlap between some of the post period and the financial crisis should not be a concern
for the inferences drawn from this test. I interpret only the difference-in-difference estimator, which
takes into account the difference between the pre and post period.
17The DiD is designed to compare firms in concentrated industries with those in non-concentrated
industries, instead of comparing firms that have provided FPI disclosures in the past to those that
have not provided FPI disclosures. The most important reason is that one should not expect firms
to provide FPI disclosures every year. Firms will potentially only engage in price coordination if the
price is lower than, or equal to, the price that a monopoly would charge. Any price increase above
the monopoly price would lead to lower profits. So when input prices and demand are stable, we
would not expect firms to provide FPI disclosures in perpetuity.
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reduce their FPI disclosures in response to the change in civil antitrust litigation
risk and do so more than firms in non-concentrated industries. After the increase in
antitrust oversight, one standard deviation increase in a firm’s industry concentration
corresponds with a 25 percent decrease in the usage of FPI disclosures relative to
the unconditional post period mean frequency of FPI disclosures. This is both the
case for the specification with only firm fixed effects and a PostSC indicator variable
and for the more stringent specification that includes both firm and time fixed effects.
I repeat the same analysis after replacing the FPI disclosure indicator with a con-
tinuous variable of FPI disclosures in column (3) and (4). The inference based on
these specifications is similar to that of the indicator variable: the higher industry
concentration, the more firms reduce their FPI disclosures after the increase in civil
antitrust litigation risk. Previous findings also implicitly provide additional support
for the notion that firms in concentrated industries use FPI disclosures to collude,
as increases of antitrust oversight would otherwise likely not affect the usage of FPI
disclosures.
Next, I substantiate the finding in Panel A that antitrust oversight reduces firms’
usage of FPI disclosures by using two more treatment and control groups. First, I
replace the truncated industry concentration measure TNIC HHI i,t with an indicator
variable that is one if the firm is in the top quartile of industry concentration in
column (1) and (2) of panel B. Using a top quartile indicator can be especially
effective in narrowing the potential impact of measurement error in TNIC HHI i,t and
is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Consistent with prior findings in Panel A,
I find that firms from the 25 percent most concentrated industries are 41 percent less
likely to disclose FPI after the Supreme Court ruling, relative to the unconditional
mean occurrence of at least one FPI disclosure. As an additional robustness, I verified
the parallel trends assumption for both the top quartile indicator and the TNIC HHI
measure and provide yearly coefficients in Appendix B.
The prior analyses were all based on industry concentration. In the following
test, I take a different approach by utilizing a known difference in antitrust oversight.
Antitrust authorities and courts give firms that sell directly to consumers more leeway
in providing FPI disclosures, as they acknowledge and value that FPI disclosures
could help to reduce the search costs for consumers (OECD, 2010). Lowering search
costs can in itself lead to non-negligible increases in consumer surplus and making
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more informed decisions may lead to increased competition among suppliers.18 The
results in columns (3) and (4) show that non-retail firms indeed reduce their FPI
disclosures more than retail firms in response to increased civil litigation risk.
So far, the results indicate that especially firms in concentrated industries reduce
their FPI disclosures after an increase in antitrust oversight. However, if the reduction
is driven by antitrust concerns, one would not expect to see any changes in other
disclosures that are not considered to be anticompetitive. As a falsification test, I
therefore replace the dependent variable of equation 2.3 with two other forward-
looking price disclosures: future price decrease disclosures and neutral future price
discussions. Columns (1)-(4) of Table 2.5 show that firms in concentrated industries do
not alter their usage of other price disclosures any differently than firms in fragmented
industries after the increase in antitrust oversight. The results, therefore, provide
additional support for my prediction that antitrust oversight can reduce issuances of
FPI disclosure in industries where firms can use these disclosures to collude.
Prior results further indicate that the relative change in the usage of FPI disclosures
is not driven by a potential difference in firm fundamentals between firms in both
concentrated and non-concentrated industries. If firms in concentrated industries
experience a stronger decline in firm fundamentals and, therefore, initiate fewer
price increases, we should expect that these firms provide more future price decrease
disclosures, all else equal. The results do not indicate that this is the case. To further
alleviate this concern, I report another falsification test in columns (5) and (6). Instead
of relying on a specific firm or industry specific indicator to control for changing
fundamentals, I examine the number of times that analysts question managers about
FPIs. Analysts are informed about the firms’ prospects and presumably have insight
in whether firms are willing to discuss FPI disclosures in conference calls. Thus, if
a confounding event more negatively affects the firm fundamentals in concentrated
industries, one would expect that analysts are aware of this and accordingly enquire
less frequently about FPIs. The results indicate that analysts do not change the
number of questions they ask about future price increases to a different degree for
firms in concentrated industries than for firms in non-concentrated industries after the
Supreme Court decision. Furthermore, they also indicate that the observed changes
in FPI disclosures are not elicited by changes in the questions asked by analysts.
18The fact that retail firms are given more discretion by antitrust authorities does not mean that
firms are fully immune, given numerous antitrust cases targeting firms that directly target consumers
(e.g. U-Haul). Antitrust authorities also might not provide this extra discretion to FPI disclosures
made in conference calls that are more hidden from consumers. It is an empirical question, however,
whether it affects how firms perceive these factors, in particular, in light of changes in antitrust
oversight.
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All evidence taken together, the results indicate that antitrust oversight reduces the
tendency of firms in concentrated industries to provide FPI disclosures.
2.4.3 Antitrust oversight and the information environment
In this section, I examine whether the information environment is affected by the
reduction of FPI disclosures by firms in concentrated industries following the increase
in antitrust oversight. By reducing firms’ ability to provide FPI disclosures, antitrust
oversight may be effective in reducing price coordination through disclosure, but may
also limit the firms’ ability to properly inform the market. However, as argued in
section 2.2.3, investors may consider FPI disclosures as noisy or insufficiently credible.
To see whether the information environment is affected by antitrust oversight, I
investigate whether the spreads change in concentrated industries after the Supreme
Court ruling. I estimate the following model:
(2.4)Spreadi,t = β0 + β1TNIC HHI i,t + β2PostSCt
+ β3TNIC HHI i,t × PostSCt + γXit + αi + τt + i,t
where i indexes firms and t indicates time, which, in these tests, is a fiscal year. αi and
τt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The dependent variable is Spreadi,t,
which equals the average bid-ask spread in the fiscal year. PostSC and TNIC HHIi,t
are the two components of the DiD model. TNIC HHIi,t is an industry concentration
measure based on text based industry classifications and PostSC is an indicator variable
that is one for fiscal year 2007 until 2009. Xit is a vector of control variables in line
with those used in Amiram, Owens, and Rozenbaum (2016).
The results in Table 2.6 show that the information environment in concentrated
industries is negatively affected. Following an increase in antitrust oversight, a one
standard deviation increase in industry concentration is associated with a four percent
increase in the firm’s stock spread, relative to the post-period average spread. This
finding suggests that investors consider FPI disclosures to be informative in concen-
trated industries. Even though firms in these industries could use FPI disclosures
for anticompetitive reasons, investors appear to consider these disclosures sufficiently
credible and not too noisy. In addition, this result implies that firms are unable to
convey the information in a different way. Overall, this result supports the notion
that the antitrust oversight’s effort to limit the usage of FPI disclosures does have
the unintended consequence that it negatively affects capital markets.
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2.4.4 Antitrust enforcement and future price increase disclo-
sures
Prior inferences about the effects of antitrust oversight on FPI disclosures and
the information environment were based on one exogenous shock to civil antitrust
litigation risk. To investigate whether prior inferences for civil antitrust litigation risk
can be generalized to other forms of antitrust oversight, I also examine whether firms’
disclosure of FPIs are affected by a sudden change in antitrust enforcement.
In 2010, the FTC announced that it would start to focus on firms that make
public statements on pricing that could be considered anticompetitive. The FTC, in a
unanimous decision, accused U-Haul of inviting competitors to collude by discussing
future pricing during a conference call. More importantly, the FTC announced in
an accompanying press release that it would start prosecuting similar cases and also
cases with “less egregious” conduct. The move by the FTC was widely criticized by
both lawmakers and lawyers, due to the lack of clear guidance on what firms were
permitted to discuss publicly.19
I examine the effects of this change of enforcement by comparing firms’ disclosure
of future price increases in the three years before the change with the three years
afterward. As the increase in FTC enforcement occurred three years after the increase
in civil antitrust litigation risk, it may not incrementally alter the behavior of firms
in concentrated industries, as they already significantly reduced their FPI disclosures.
I, therefore, perform two different tests: (1) a general pre- and post test across all
firms and (2) a DiD estimation partitioning on industry concentration as performed
in prior tests.
(2.5)Price increase indicatori,t = β0 + β1PostU−Hault + γXit + αi + i,t
Price increase indicatori,t = β0 + β1TNIC HHI i,t + β2PostU-Hault
+β3TNIC HHI i,t×PostU-Hault +γXit +αi + τt + i,t
(2.6)
where i indexes firms and t indicates time, which, in these tests, is a fiscal year.
αi and τt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the
indicator variable Price increase indicatori,t, which equals one if a firm provides an
19E.g., Senator Orrin Hatch stated during a Senate meeting that the “unfair and deceptive”
standard was too vague for companies to know whether their conduct was illegal. The American Bar
Association said in their 2010 antitrust publication that “the Commission should clarify the line
between an advance public announcement of a future price increase and an invitation to collude that
would be actionable under Section 5.”
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FPI disclosure in the fiscal year. Specification 2.5 has a pre and post design, while
Specification 2.6 represents a DiD model where PostU−Haul and TNIC HHIi,t are
the two components. TNIC HHIi,t is a industry concentration measure based on
text-based industry classifications and PostSC is an indicator variable that is one
for fiscal year 2010 until 2013. Xit is a vector of control variables as described in
equation 2.1.
Table 2.7 displays the results for the effect of the increased FTC enforcement
on FPI disclosures. Column (1) shows that firms overall reduce their usage of FPI
disclosures after the increase in FTC enforcement. This result is based on a within-firm
estimation. While I specifically control for changes in the economic conditions and
firm fundamentals, it is still possible that these factors drive some of my results. Given
the time frame, however, the economic environment is more likely to work against me
finding results instead of driving the result. One would expect firms to provide more
FPI disclosures in times of economic growth and inflation, while that is the exact
opposite of what I find.
The results in column (2) and (3) do not indicate that firms in concentrated
industries provide fewer FPI disclosures. This result is consistent with the notion
that the increase in FTC enforcement does not lead to any incremental reduction of
FPI disclosures above and beyond the effect of the earlier increase in civil antitrust
litigation risk. Given that I do find differences in column 1, this provides supporting
evidence for the complaints by the American Bar Association and members of Congress
that argued the FTC did not provide enough guidance as to when firms are, and when
firms are not, permitted to provide FPI disclosures. Firms in both concentrated and
less concentrated industries reduced their usage of FPI disclosures. Strong antitrust
oversight can, therefore, even affect firms and investors in non-concentrated industries.
Given that the reduction in the usage of FPI disclosures is occurring for all firms
in the U.S., there is no clear treatment and control group that can be used to conduct
tests on the information environment to investors.20 As there are many confounding
events that could affect spreads when we compare time periods, an analyses of pre-
and post-spread would be insufficient. Since the FTC accuses firms of using conference
calls to communicate directly to competitors instead of its investors, firms could try
to get the information out in a different way. I, therefore, test whether firms are
providing FPI disclosures more often in conference presentations to analysts. These
20A natural control group would have been firms in the EU. However, this test was not feasible, as
the financial crisis affected the United States and the EU differently with a faster economic recovery
in the U.S., and the relative limited availability of transcripts for European firms in Factset that
have no US operations (i.e. not under FTC jurisdiction).
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conferences are more shielded from the public and include mostly analysts. While
statements in conference presentations could still be used in civil antitrust cases, it does
provide firms plausible deniability to the FTC and argue that they are communicating
with analysts. Column (4), indeed, provides evidence that firms are changing their
disclosure channels and convey FPI disclosures in conference presentations. This does
not mean that the increase in FTC enforcement does not affect investors at all, since
conference calls are much less accessible and create information asymmetry between
sophisticated investors and retail investors.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, I examine the effects of competition and antitrust oversight on disclo-
sures. I develop a new disclosure measure of future price increases and exploit two
institutional changes in U.S. antitrust oversight, namely, an increase in civil antitrust
liability for making price increase disclosures and an increase in FTC enforcement,
resulting in plausibly exogenous variation in antitrust oversight over time.
I find evidence that firms in concentrated industries provide more future price
increase disclosures consistent with the notion that these firms use FPI disclosures
to coordinate prices. The results in my study suggest that antitrust oversight could
be an effective way to limit this behavior by firms. However, it may come with the
unintended consequence that it becomes more difficult for investors to be informed.
Firms may change their disclosure channel in an attempt to have plausible deniability
against claims of collusion, or stop providing this information. While we typically
consider only security regulation and industry specific regulators to affect disclosure
decisions, this study indicates that other regulations could affect disclosure decisions
without considering the impact on shareholders.
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Table 2.1: Sample selection and future price increase disclosures
This table presents the effects of the sample restriction criteria on the number of transcripts
and firms in the sample period 2003-2013. Furthermore, this table provides insight into the
number of transcripts and firms that have FPI disclosures before aggregating to firm-year observations
Panel A
Sample by transcripts:
Total number of conference call transcripts 125,450
Total number of conference call transcripts ex regulated industries and financial
institutions
99,650
Total number of conference call transcripts with GVKEY 94,095
Total number of conference call transcripts with future price increase discussion 8,684
Sample by firms:
Total number of firms with conference call transcripts 5,700
Total number of firms with conference call transcripts ex regulated industries and
financial institutions
4,511
Total number of firms with conference call transcripts and GVKEY link 4,166
Total number of firms with conference call transcripts and future price increase
discussion
2,196
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
This table presents the sample statistics and quartile distribution of FPI disclosures. Each
observation is a firm fiscal year in the period 2004 until 2013. Only mean values are pre-
sented for indicator variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel B shows a per
quartile split in the usage of future price increase and decrease disclosures. The pre and post pe-
riod refer to the 3 year preceding and following the Supreme Court ruling as described in section 2.2.4.
Panel A
N mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Industry concentration variables
TNIC HHI 22,981 0.235 0.207 0.064 0.097 0.163 0.298 0.515
2-digit SIC HHI 22,870 0.655 0.679 0.242 0.311 0.413 0.708 1.244
3-digit SIC HHI 22,870 1.609 1.620 0.445 0.563 1.013 1.953 3.501
4-digit SIC HHI 22,869 2.388 1.901 0.644 1.075 1.876 3.107 4.978
Future price disclosures
Price increase indicator 22,981 0.136 0.343
Log price increase 22,981 0.274 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.099
Price decrease indicator 22,981 0.218 0.413
Price indicator 22,981 0.582 0.493
Margin indicator 22,981 0.447 0.497
Control variables
Log total words press releases 22,981 7.824 0.763 6.829 7.366 7.870 8.347 8.756
Return on assets 22,981 -
0.019
0.221 -
0.227
-
0.023
0.036 0.078 0.127
Market to Book 22,981 2.870 4.645 0.746 1.285 2.123 3.595 6.283
Stock return during fiscal
year
22,981 0.007 0.524 -
0.648
-
0.225
0.075 0.313 0.564
Log total assets 22,981 6.598 1.813 4.327 5.306 6.515 7.781 9.009
Industry GDP 22,981 5.809 0.915 4.699 5.093 5.727 6.513 7.011
Industry GDP Growth 22,981 -
0.009
0.214 -
0.191
0.005 0.048 0.081 0.116
Capital market variables
Spread 22,908 0.408 0.702 0.047 0.086 0.162 0.372 1.001
Log market cap 23,195 6.743 2.121 4.401 5.414 6.571 7.796 9.114
Trading volume 22,996 1.354 4.195 0.048 0.131 0.355 1.014 2.877
Log stock price 22,996 2.727 1.043 1.252 2.055 2.887 3.512 3.940
Standard deviation of returns 22,996 0.031 0.018 0.015 0.020 0.027 0.037 0.051
Stock turnover 22,996 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.019
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Panel B
TNIC concentration quartiles
1 2 3 4
Future price increase disclosures overall 12% 12% 15% 16%
pre 11% 13% 15% 17%
post 11% 11% 14% 12%
Future price decrease disclosures overall 23% 20% 22% 22%
pre 21% 18% 19% 18%
post 25% 21% 23% 23%
30 Disclosure and antitrust oversight
Table 2.3: Effects of industry concentration on price disclosures
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the association between industry
concentration and disclosures of future pricing in conference calls. Panel A examines whether
industry concentration is correlated with future pricing disclosures. Panel B investigates whether the
results for future price increase disclosure are robust to different measures of industry concentration.
Price increase indicator is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager discusses future price
increases at least once during the fiscal year. Price decrease indicator is an indicator variable that
equals one if a manager discusses price decreases at least once during the fiscal year. Price indicator
is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager discusses price at least once during the fiscal
year, but does not discuss either an increase or decrease. Margin indicator is an indicator variable
that equals one if a manager discusses future margins at least once during the fiscal year. The sample
period for these tests is 2004-2013 and the other variables are as defined in Appendix A. T-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are robust to within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC), with the exception
of Panel B column (1) & (3) that are robust to respectively within 2 and 4 digit SIC industry
correlation. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price
increase
indicator
Price
decrease
indicator
Price
indicator
Margin
indicator
TNIC HHI 0.073*** 0.023 0.005 0.034
(3.268) (0.881) (0.173) (0.498)
Log total words press releases 0.004 0.012** -0.004 -0.018**
(0.892) (2.187) (-0.592) (-2.290)
Return on assets 0.055*** 0.056** 0.106*** 0.193***
(3.960) (2.364) (3.535) (3.496)
Market to Book 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.336) (-0.964) (0.503) (1.206)
Stock return during fiscal year 0.005 -0.053*** 0.023*** -0.014
(1.104) (-6.907) (3.141) (-1.474)
Log total assets 0.025*** 0.043*** -0.011* 0.021***
(7.166) (12.089) (-1.673) (3.135)
Industry GDP 0.003 -0.016* -0.004 -0.031
(0.456) (-1.929) (-0.431) (-1.477)
Industry GDP Growth -0.103** -0.130*** 0.101*** -0.041
(-2.113) (-5.115) (2.898) (-0.654)
Observations 22,929 22,929 22,929 22,929
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.055 0.006 0.022
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price increase indicator
Top Quartile TNIC HHI 0.034***
(3.517)
2-digit SIC HHI 0.027**
(2.059)
3-digit SIC HHI 0.019***
(4.458)
4-digit SIC HHI 0.012***
(4.112)
Log total words press releases 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005
(0.870) (1.082) (1.205) (1.226)
Return on assets 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.054***
(4.090) (2.935) (3.477) (4.128)
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.343) (0.293) (0.557) (0.466)
Stock return during fiscal year 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.067) (0.985) (1.109) (1.021)
Log total assets 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(7.044) (5.890) (6.450) (8.022)
Industry GDP 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.452) (0.571) (0.289) (0.509)
Industry GDP Growth -0.103** -0.080 -0.090* -0.101**
(-2.111) (-1.385) (-1.655) (-1.977)
Observations 22,929 22,940 22,940 22,939
Adjusted R-squared 0.033 0.034 0.039 0.036
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.4: Effect of Supreme Court on price increase disclosures
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the effects of the Supreme Court ruling in
the case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on future price increase disclosures. Panel A presents the
main treatment effect and Panel B provides a robustness test with different treatment and control
groups. The sample period is 2004-2009 where the postSC period is defined as the period 2007-2009.
Price increase indicator is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager discusses future price
increases at least once during the fiscal year. Log Price increase is a natural log of the total mentions
of price increases by a manager in the fiscal year. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are robust to within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC). ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price increase indicator Log price increase
TNIC HHI × PostSC -0.107*** -0.105*** -0.091* -0.086*
(-3.713) (-3.643) (-1.922) (-1.836)
PostSC 0.007 -0.002
(0.583) (-0.110)
TNIC HHI 0.066** 0.064* 0.077 0.074
(1.990) (1.918) (1.577) (1.497)
Log total words press releases -0.010* -0.010* -0.018** -0.018**
(-1.796) (-1.795) (-2.123) (-2.140)
Return on assets 0.029 0.024 0.058** 0.048*
(1.619) (1.322) (2.083) (1.652)
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.182) (0.109) (0.345) (0.222)
Stock return during fiscal year -0.016** -0.004 -0.029** -0.002
(-2.278) (-0.552) (-2.520) (-0.156)
Log total assets -0.002 0.003 0.013 0.022
(-0.160) (0.221) (0.721) (1.202)
Industry GDP 0.042 0.051 0.038 0.045
(0.962) (0.893) (0.572) (0.514)
Industry GDP Growth 0.148*** 0.077 0.274*** 0.127
(2.607) (1.138) (2.931) (1.189)
Observations 13,863 13,863 13,835 13,835
Adjusted R-squared 0.276 0.277 0.341 0.343
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Increase indicator
Top quartile TNIC HHI × PostSC -0.055*** -0.054***
(-4.093) (-4.072)
Top Quartile TNIC HHI 0.023** 0.023**
(2.011) (1.978)
Non-retail firm × PostSC -0.068** -0.077**
(-2.196) (-2.355)
PostSC -0.003 0.041
(-0.283) (1.355)
Log total words press releases -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* -0.010*
(-1.770) (-1.768) (-1.844) (-1.817)
Return on assets 0.029 0.024 0.027 0.021
(1.631) (1.330) (1.475) (1.118)
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.195) (0.116) (0.224) (0.109)
Stock return during fiscal year -0.017** -0.004 -0.016** -0.003
(-2.310) (-0.584) (-2.236) (-0.391)
Log total assets -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.004
(-0.168) (0.213) (-0.091) (0.320)
Industry GDP 0.040 0.049 0.064 0.089
(0.917) (0.875) (1.412) (1.460)
Industry GDP Growth 0.149*** 0.076 0.129** 0.038
(2.623) (1.129) (2.287) (0.535)
Observations 13,863 13,863 13,874 13,874
Adjusted R-squared 0.276 0.277 0.276 0.278
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.5: Falsification test
This table presents the results of the falsification test for the effects of an increased burden of proof
by the Supreme Court on other types of future price disclosures. The sample period is 2004-2009
where the postSC period is defined as the period 2007-2009. Price decrease indicator is an indicator
variable that equals one if a manager discusses future price decreases at least once during the fiscal
year. Price indicator is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager discusses price at least
once during the fiscal year, but does not discuss either an increase or decrease. Price increase
indicator analyst is an indicator variable that equals one if analysts ask at least one question on
future price increases during the fiscal year. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are robust to within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC). ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price decrease
indicator
Price indicator
Price increase
indicator analyst
TNIC HHI × PostSC 0.014 0.003 0.078 0.082 -0.015 -0.010
(0.281) (0.062) (1.290) (1.401) (-0.436) (-0.281)
PostSC -0.006 -0.006 -0.015
(-0.315) (-0.298) (-1.153)
TNIC HHI -
0.101**
-
0.101**
0.033 0.035 0.015 0.013
(-2.174) (-2.158) (0.602) (0.644) (0.396) (0.340)
Log total words press re-
leases
-0.006 -0.007 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.006
(-0.902) (-1.086) (1.190) (1.187) (1.076) (1.144)
Return on assets -0.026 -0.001 -0.008 -0.022 -0.015 -0.026
(-0.902) (-0.036) (-0.198) (-0.585) (-0.670) (-1.115)
Market to Book 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.680) (1.380) (-0.077) (-0.415) (-0.268) (-0.552)
Stock return during fiscal
year
-
0.031***
-
0.052***
0.014 0.027** -0.010* 0.002
(-4.011) (-5.208) (1.356) (2.176) (-1.711) (0.350)
Log total assets 0.043** 0.037** 0.037** 0.038** 0.014 0.018*
(2.591) (2.201) (2.379) (2.387) (1.421) (1.882)
Industry GDP 0.135** 0.064 -0.071 -0.090 -0.015 0.021
(2.587) (0.912) (-0.959) (-1.068) (-0.344) (0.391)
Industry GDP Growth -
0.338***
-0.025 0.149* -0.030 0.179*** 0.036
(-4.218) (-0.316) (1.748) (-0.275) (2.976) (0.578)
Observations 13,863 13,863 13,863 13,863 13,835 13,835
Adjusted R-squared 0.258 0.264 0.188 0.190 0.195 0.197
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
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Table 2.6: Information asymmetry and price increase disclosures
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the effects of the Supreme Court ruling in
the case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on information asymmetry for firms with differing amounts
of industry concentration. The sample period is 2004-2009 where the postSC period is defined as the
period 2007-2009. Spread is the average daily spread in percentage points during the fiscal year.
Log Price increase is a natural log of the total mentions of price increases by a manager in the
fiscal year. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are robust to
within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Spread
TNIC HHI × PostSC 0.137*** 0.141***
(2.618) (2.719)
TNIC HHI -0.016 -0.022
(-0.328) (-0.472)
PostSC -0.022
(-1.000)
Log market cap -0.057*** -0.048***
(-2.826) (-2.823)
Trading volume -0.013*** -0.013***
(-2.881) (-2.824)
Standard deviation of returns 10.399*** 10.144***
(6.461) (5.293)
Stock turnover -11.629*** -11.439***
(-2.694) (-2.667)
Log stock price -0.355*** -0.365***
(-7.772) (-7.183)
Observations 15,321 15,321
Adjusted R-squared 0.735 0.740
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes
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Table 2.7: Price increase disclosures after increased enforcement
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the effects of increased enforcement by the
FTC (after its U-Haul enforcement action) on future price increase disclosures. The sample period is
2006-2013 where the post period U-Haul is defined as the period 2010-2013. Price increase indicator
is an indicator variable that equals one if a manager discusses future price increases at least once
during the fiscal year. Price increase indicator conference presentation is an indicator variable that
equals one if a manager discusses future price increases at least once in a conference presentation
during the fiscal year. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (reported in parentheses)
are robust to within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price Increase indicator
Price increase
indicator conference
presentation
Post period U-Haul -0.013** -0.005 0.128***
(-2.065) (-0.557) (8.444)
TNIC HHI × Post period U-Haul -0.033 -0.033
(-1.280) (-1.268)
TNIC HHI 0.004 0.009
(0.182) (0.387)
Log total words press releases -0.009** -0.009** -0.008* -0.015
(-2.061) (-2.072) (-1.954) (-1.610)
Return on assets 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.024 0.059
(2.782) (2.798) (1.639) (1.439)
Market to Book 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(1.219) (1.272) (1.214) (-0.777)
Stock return during fiscal year -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.005 -0.025**
(-4.980) (-4.955) (-0.894) (-2.269)
Log total assets -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.007
(-0.904) (-1.033) (0.055) (0.475)
Industry GDP -0.057** -0.057** -0.028 -0.258***
(-2.136) (-2.135) (-0.863) (-4.179)
Industry GDP Growth 0.161*** 0.161*** 0.051 0.166***
(5.738) (5.730) (1.358) (3.165)
Observations 18,098 18,080 18,080 9,672
Adjusted R-squared 0.227 0.227 0.230 0.108
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Data Source
Price increase
indicator
Indicator equals one for firms with a conference call in
the fiscal year where they discuss future price increases.
Self-constructed
Log price
increase
Log count of number of times managers discuss future
price increases in conference calls in the fiscal year.
Self-constructed
Price decrease
indicator
Indicator equals one for firms with a conference call in
the fiscal year where they discuss future price decreases.
Self-constructed
Price indicator Indicator equals one for firms with a conference call in
the fiscal year where they discuss future prices without
a discussion of price increase or decrease.
Self-constructed
Margin indicator Indicator equals one for firms with a conference call in the
fiscal year where they discuss future margins (unsigned).
Self-constructed
TNIC HHI HHI score for the Hoberg and Philips 3-digit Text-based
Network Industry classification.
Hoberg-Phillips
website
Log total words
press releases
Log of the total number of words used in press releases
that particular year.
Edgar
Return on assets Net income (NI) scaled by the total assets (AT) of the
company.
COMPUSTAT
Industry GDP Log of the yearly industry specific GDP. U.S. Bureau of
Economic
Analysis
Industry GDP
Growth
Percentage change in year-to-year industry specific GDP. U.S. Bureau of
Economic
Analysis
Market to Book Share price (PRC) multiplied by shares outstanding
(SHROUT), scaled by shareholder equity (SEQ) minus
Preferred stock redemptions (PSTKRV). Alternatively,
the denominator book value of equity was calculated as
total assets (AT) minus total liabilities (LT) and minority
interest (MIB).
CRSP &
COMPUSTAT
Stock return
during fiscal year
Cumulative return of the firm’s stock during fiscal year CRSP
Log total assets Log of total assets (AT) Compustat
Log market cap Log of price times shares outstanding at fical year end CRSP
Trading volume Average trading volume in fiscal year in millions CRSP
Standard
deviation of
returns
Standard deviation of daily returns in fiscal year CRSP
Stock turnover Average of dollar volume scaled by market value in fiscal
year
CRSP
Log stock price Log of average stock price in fiscal year CRSP
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Appendix B: Parallel Trends
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the effects of the Supreme Court ruling in
the case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on future price increase disclosures. The sample period is
2004-2009 with 2006 being the reference year. Column (1) & (2) display the coefficients for TNIC
HHI interacted with year indicators Column (3) & (4) display the coefficients for Top Quartile
TNIC HHI interacted with year indicators. Price increase indicator is an indicator variable that
equals one if a manager discusses future price increases at least once during the fiscal year and the
dependent variable in all specifications in this table. Log Price increase is a natural log of the total
mentions of price increases by a manager in the fiscal year. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are robust to within-industry correlation (3 digit SIC). ***, **,
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
TNIC HHI Top Quartile TNIC HHI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price increase indicator
t-3 0.020 -0.000 0.009 0.002
(0.543) (-0.012) (0.497) (0.102)
t-2 0.065* 0.072* 0.016 0.016
(1.914) (1.885) (0.951) (0.861)
t-1 (reference year) 0 0 0 0
t -0.053 -0.068* -0.039*** -0.045***
(-1.569) (-1.732) (-2.700) (-2.725)
t+1 -0.041 -0.038 -0.026 -0.025
(-1.315) (-1.053) (-1.630) (-1.368
t+2 -0.071** -0.080** -0.048*** -0.055***
(-2.300) (-2.231) (-3.107) (-3.100)
Log total words press releases -0.008 -0.009*
(-1.620) (-1.652)
Return on assets 0.027 0.027
(1.579) (1.570)
Market to Book 0.000 0.000
(0.205) (0.220)
Stock return during fiscal year -0.003 -0.003
(-0.476) (-0.525)
Log total assets -0.000 -0.001
(-0.053) (-0.068)
Industry GDP 0.047 0.047
(1.169) (1.163)
Industry GDP Growth 0.093* 0.089*
(1.887) (1.827)
Observations 15,530 13,418 15,530 13,418
Adjusted R-squared 0.274 0.280 0.274 0.280
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chapter 3
Do Firms Strategically
Announce Capacity
Expansions to Deter Entry?
3.1 Introduction
Ample prior literature examines the causes and consequences of voluntary disclosure
from a capital markets perspective. Recently, there’s been a push to understand the
role disclosures play as strategic devices that firms can use to improve their competitive
positions (e.g., Tomy, 2017; Bloomfield, 2018; Burks et al., 2018; Bourveau et al.,
2019; Glaeser and Landsman, 2019; Kepler, 2019). In that vein, we explore firms’ use of
voluntary disclosures as part of their entry deterrence strategies, and provide evidence
that firms issue capacity expansion announcements (hereafter “CEAs”), strategically,
to ensure that potential entrants are aware of ongoing capacity investments—a
necessary condition for a successful capacity-based approach to entry deterrence.
Analytical work on industrial organization suggests that firms can deter entry
by investing in capacity expansions (e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980; Tirole, 1988;
0This is joint work with Matthew Bloomfield (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania).
We greatly appreciate all the helpful feedback we have received from: Salman Arif, Robert Bloomfield,
Thomas Bourveau, Stephen Glaeser, Joa˜o Granja, Wayne Guay, Mirko Heinle, John Kepler, Anya
Kleymenova, Christian Leuz, Miao Liu, Erik Peek, Chad Syverson, Anastasia Zakolyukina and Frank
Zhou as well as workshop participants at Baruch College, Columbia University, University of Chicago
Booth School of Business, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Mannheim, The University
of Graz, and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
40 Do Firms Strategically Announce Capacity Expansions to Deter Entry?
Ellison and Ellison, 2011). Moreover, survey and archival evidence supports the
notion that firms actually employ this strategy (e.g., Smiley, 1988; Cookson, 2017a,b).
However, by themselves, strategic capacity expansions are unlikely to be broadly
effective at deterring product market entry, because investments in capacity are not
necessarily immediately observable to potential entrants. Such expansions can only
be an effective deterrent when the investments are observable before the potential
entrants make their own (initial) investments and decision to enter the market. If
potential entrants are unaware of an incumbent’s capacity expansion efforts, they are
likely to be undeterred, leaving the incumbent with suboptimal excess capacity, a lot
of wasted capital expenditure costs, and new rivals to contend with.
We posit that this weakness can be substantially remedied by accompanying vol-
untary disclosures. By voluntarily announcing their capacity expansions, incumbents
can make potential entrants aware their investment plans more quickly—perhaps even
before the expansion begins—thus making voluntary disclosures a vital component of
firms’ capacity-based entry deterrence strategies. Accordingly, we examine whether
firms are more likely to use voluntary disclosures to announce their current and future
capacity expansion plans when facing increased threats of entry. We find that, for a
given level of investment, greater entry threats are associated with a greater likelihood
that an expansion is preceded by a voluntary CEA. Moreover, CEAs appear to be
effective at deterring entry; holding the underlying capacity investments fixed, CEAs
are associated with a 13% reduction in subsequent entry. Absent an accompanying
disclosure, we find no evidence to suggest that investments in capacity beget reduced
subsequent entry. Collectively, our results suggest that voluntary disclosures—CEAs,
in particular—are an integral part of firms’ capacity-based entry deterrence strategies.
While CEAs can be beneficial by signaling the firm’s aggressive stance to potential
entrants, they can also be costly to the disclosing firm. Any such disclosure can
carry significant proprietary costs, revealing the firm’s private information to both
incumbent and potential rivals (e.g., Wagenhofer, 1990). In particular, a CEA could
backfire by signaling excellent industry prospects (e.g., strong future demand), thereby
encouraging greater entry from potential entrants. Thus, we do not believe that all
firms would benefit by responding to entry threats in this way. We posit that firms
rationally weigh the strategic benefits against the proprietary costs, when making
their disclosure decisions, and will only issue a CEA if they believe the net benefits
are positive.
We begin our empirical investigation by identifying CEAs. We use a text-mining
approach to construct a novel measure of voluntary disclosure reflecting firms’ CEAs.
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Our algorithm analyzes all US public firms’ press-releases, over the period of 1995-
2016, and codes them as CEAs if they include explicit forward-looking statements
about capacity increases. We find that CEAs comprise about 2% of all press releases.
Roughly 4.5% of firm-years includes one such disclosure, and over 20% of firms issue
at least one CEA during our sample period. We validate our measure by showing that
CEAs are informative about firms’ future capacity expansions. After controlling for
firm and industry-year fixed effects, CEAs are associated with 15% year-over-year
increases in CAPEX, and 4% year-over-year increases in PP&E.
To assess the strategic intent behind these voluntary disclosures, we look to Chinese
imports as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in the threat of entry. Prior
work shows that changes in Chinese exports are largely driven by exogenous increases
in China’s productivity (e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013). Accordingly, several
recent studies examine the effects of competition by using Chinese exports to the other
developed countries as an instrument for exports to the own-country (e.g., Autor et al.,
2013; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song, 2014; Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu,
2018; Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang, 2014; Hombert and Matray, 2018).
Under similar intuition, we use Chinese exports to the developed world (excluding
the US) as a source a plausibly exogenous variation in entry threats. Our empirical
strategy differs from the prior work in one key aspect. Rather than using Chinese
exports to non-US countries to instrument for contemporaneous Chinese exports to
the US (i.e., current competition faced by US firms), we instead use a reduced form
approach and include Chinese exports to non-US countries directly as our regressor
of interest. This alteration allows us to control for contemporaneous Chinese exports
to the US, and interpret the Chinese exports to non-US countries as potential, but
not currently realized, competition from China—i.e., the level of entry threat.
We identify these threats at the industry-year level and find that firms respond
to them by announcing capacity expansions. Consistent with our predictions, larger
firms (whose capacity investments have more serious implications for an entrant’s
profitability, further discouraging entry) are more likely to respond in this fashion,
while more opaque firms (whose disclosures are more likely to convey private in-
formation about industry demand, potentially encouraging entry) are less likely to
respond in this fashion. The magnitude of the effect is substantial. Holding the firm
fixed, and controlling for actual investments in capacity, a one standard deviation
increase in the threat of entry is associated with a roughly 5% to 7% increase in
the likelihood of a CEA. Moreover, the likelihood of a CEA is not associated with
contemporaneous imports into the US, suggesting that neither domestic demand
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conditions, nor incumbent competition can explain our results.1 Jointly, we interpret
these facts as evidence that CEAs are, in part, intended to serve a strategic purpose:
entry deterrence. Any alternative interpretation of our results must explain why US
firms’ CEAs are associated with Chinese exports into other developed countries, but
not Chinese exports to their own country.
Our research design is intended to mitigate the potentially confounding effects
of domestic demand shocks. Another possibility is that common supply shocks, in
the US and China, affect both Chinese exports to the developed world, and US firms’
need for capacity. Our setting will not be as effective at combating this confound.
As a sensitivity analysis, we control for US exports to the developed world, and
confirm that our results continue to hold. The robustness of our results bolsters the
notion that strategic considerations (i.e., entry deterrence), and not supply shocks,
are responsible for our findings.
An alternative concern could be that US investors simply demand more information
from firms, when entry threats are greater. Since CEAs are the primary disclosure
variable that we are testing, CEAs may be proxying for overall changes in disclosures.
That is, perhaps the observed increase in CEAs is not a strategic response to entry
threats, but rather a byproduct of a secular increase in disclosure, in response to
investors’ demand for transparency. To assess this possibility, we examine whether
aggregate levels of disclosure increase in response to entry threats. We find no evidence
that overall disclosure levels increase in response to entry threats. Our evidence
suggests that overall transparency remains constant or decreases in response to entry
threats; the increase disclosure we document seems to be specific to CEAs. Thus, it
appears unlikely that investor demand for information can explain our findings.
As a final analysis, we examine whether CEAs appear to be effective at deterring
entry. We find evidence to suggest that they are. Controlling for China’s current
exports to the US and the Developed World, issuing a CEA is associated with about
a 1.2 basis point reduction in future Chinese imports. This corresponds to about a
13% reduction, relative to the base-rate of entry. However, we caution that even if
our measure of entry threat is perfectly exogenous, firms’ responses to entry threats
are endogenous. Therefore, one cannot interpret the association between CEAs and
subsequent entry as a cleanly identified causal effect. If firms are more likely to
issue a CEA when entry threats are more severe, then the estimated association
will underestimate the true causal effect. Conversely, if there is heterogeneity in the
1Even if Chinese exports to the developed world are incrementally informative about US demand,
it is highly improbable that Chinese exports to the developed world are a better signal of US demand
than exports to the US.
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effectiveness of such disclosures, it is likely that the firms which choose to issue CEAs
are precisely those firms for which their effectiveness is greatest. Thus, the estimated
association may reflect the average deterrence effect among those firms who chose
to issue CEAs, and not necessarily the average effect for the typical firm. For these
reasons, we offer these analyses only as supplemental descriptive evidence regarding
the effectiveness of CEAs as entry deterrence tools.
One might wonder whether our results attain because firms are truly using CEAs,
strategically, to respond to entry threats. Perhaps firms respond to entry threats by
strategically expanding capacity (as suggested by prior literature), and then make
the non-strategic choice to voluntarily disclose their plans, purely for the sake of
transparency. We use three different methods to address this concern. First, we control
for firms’ actual capacity expansion activities (as captured by increases in CAPEX
and PP&E) in both the contemporaneous and subsequent fiscal year. We find that,
even holding fixed the underlying capacity expansion actions, firms are more likely
to issue a CEA when they face a greater threat of entry. Second, we conduct our
tests on a subsample of firms that substantially expanded capacity, and document the
same pattern: the firms facing greater entry threats are the ones that are more likely
to issue an accompanying (or preceding) CEA. Third, when we examine subsequent
entry decisions, we find that it is the CEAs, rather than the underlying capacity
expansion actions, that are best able to explain reduced subsequent entry. Collectively,
our results suggest that the disclosure choice itself (i.e., the decision to issue a CEA)
is an economically important strategic tool that firms use in response to heightened
entry threats.
Lastly, one might be concerned that CEAs are mechanically driven by regulatory
disclosure requirements. To this end, we offer two important remarks. First and
foremost, we emphasize that regulation does not compel firms to provide CEAs.2
Second, we note that the vast majority of capacity expansions are not accompanied
(nor preceded) by CEAs. Thus, it appears that the decision to issue a CEA is
2Securities regulation requires the disclosure of material information and agreements such as
lease contracts or financing, and as such seem relevant to firms issuing CEAs. However, prior rulings
by the courts and guidance by the SEC make it reasonable to assume that CEAs are not material
and thus not mechanically driving our results. CEAs seem unlikely to affect shareholders’ decision
making and therefore do not meet the supreme court’s definition of material information, as clarified
in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc (1976). They define material information to be information
that “a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”. It also does not
fit the SEC’s definition of material as it has stipulated material agreements to be those that are not
made in the “ordinary course of business” and it even explicitly mentions that the opening a new
store is not material if it already has stores (see https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/readan8k.pdf).
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economically distinct from the decision to expand in the first place; no mechanical
relation appears to exist between the two.
This study makes multiple contributions. First and foremost, we contribute to
the voluntary disclosure literature, by developing and validating a new measure of
voluntary disclosure—the capacity expansion announcement—and providing evidence
that firms use such disclosures as strategic devices, designed to discourage product
market entry. The vast majority of the voluntary disclosure literature examines the
causes and consequences of disclosure from a capital markets perspective.3 The role
of the product market is typically—though not always—considered only as a way to
justify non-disclosure through a proprietary costs channel (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983).
We depart from this perspective by providing evidence that firms issue voluntary
disclosures, not only in spite of product market concerns, but also because of them.
In so doing, we contribute to the budding literature on the role of account-
ing/disclosure decisions in facilitating strategic product market goals (e.g., Li, 2010;
Tomy, 2017; Bloomfield, 2018; Burks et al., 2018; Bourveau et al., 2019; Glaeser and
Landsman, 2019). Ours is not the only study to examine accounting-based entry
deterrence strategies. Prior accounting literature examines whether firms attempt to
deter entry by using downwards earnings manipulations and negatively toned press
releases to create the impression of poor industry prospects, in a practice known as
‘profit hiding’ (e.g., Tomy, 2017; Burks et al., 2018). We study a different channel
through which firm disclosures might discourage entry and show that firms use vol-
untary disclosures to deter entry by making explicit announcements about future
capacity expansions, a la the Spence-Dixit model. This behavior is especially pro-
nounced among larger and more transparent firms, for which the net entry deterrence
benefits of such disclosures are predicted to be greater. These findings complement
and extend upon those of Li (2010), who documents that firms are less pessimistic
in their investment forecasts when barriers to product market entry are lower (i.e.,
industries with low capital intensity). Our study further complements concurrent
work by Glaeser and Landsman (2019), who examine firms’ choices to voluntarily
accelerate their patent application disclosures, finding that timelier disclosures are
more successful in carving out a product market niche, by pushing potential rivals to
purse less similar product offerings.
3See, for example: Lang and Lundholm (1993); Botosan (1997); Core (2001); Healy and Palepu
(2001); Lambert et al. (2007); Francis et al. (2008); Bischof and Daske (2013); Balakrishnan et al.
(2014); Leuz and Wysocki (2016); Dyer et al. (2016); Guay et al. (2016); Schoenfeld (2017); Gow
et al. (2019).
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Lastly, we contribute to the industrial organization literature on strategic entry
deterrence by being the first to provide evidence that firms use voluntary disclosures of
their capacity expansion plans as an integral component of their capacity-based entry
deterrence strategies. We find that firms respond to a plausibly exogenous increase
in the threat of entry by preannouncing capacity expansions, and document that
such disclosures appear to be effective at deterring entry. These findings complement
existing analytical, survey and archival work in the industrial organization literature
which shows the use of capacity investments to deter entry (e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit,
1980; Smiley, 1988; Tirole, 1988; Cookson, 2017a,b). Existing work in this area relies
predominately on the Spence-Dixit model of entry deterrence, which assumes that
potential entrants become [exogenously] aware of capacity expansions, prior to making
their own entry decisions. We provide evidence of a mechanism through which this
revelation occurs: incumbents’ voluntary disclosures of their capacity expansion plans.
3.2 Motivation/Hypothesis Development
In imperfectly competitive product markets, incumbents can sustain positive economic
profits. However, these profit opportunities can encourage entry, which pushes the
industry closer to perfect competition, reducing incumbents’ profits. Accordingly,
incumbents often seek ways to deter entry, in order to sustain their stream of rents (e.g.,
Salop, 1979). Decades of analytical work in the industrial organization literature
shows that investments in capacity can be used to deter entry (e.g., Spence, 1977;
Dixit, 1980; Tirole, 1988; Ellison and Ellison, 2011). In the context of a monopolistic
incumbent, Ellison and Ellison (2011) summarize these models as follows:
“The prototypical model of strategic entry deterrence is a three-stage game. . . In
the first stage, the incumbent firm 1 chooses an investment level A. . . Before the
second stage, the potential entrant (firm 2) observes the incumbent’s choice of A. Firm
2 then chooses whether to enter the market, which requires paying a sunk cost of
entry. In the third stage, either the incumbent is a monopolist or the incumbent and
entrant compete as duopolists” (Ellison and Ellison, 2011, emphasis added).
Most important, for our purposes, is the italicized portion—that the potential
entrant becomes aware of the incumbent’s actions before making an entry decision
(and incurring the associated entry costs). This assumption is ubiquitous throughout
the extant industrial organization literature on capacity-based entry deterrence. Our
motivating question is simple: how does this revelation occur? While some expansions
may be immediately obvious to potential entrants, prima facie, this is unlikely to be
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the case, generally. Thus, in order to deter entrants, firms have a strategic incentive to
ensure that potential entrants are aware of their capacity expansion plans. Voluntary
CEAs are a natural avenue for firms to achieve this goal.
These voluntary disclosures can both accelerate and improve the dissemination of
a firm’s investment plans. By making potential entrants aware of a capacity expansion
plan, firms can deter entry, even if the CEA has no real effect on the investment itself.
A non-disclosed capacity expansion may not evidence itself in an annual report (or
other outlets) for an extended period of time, at which point the potential entrant
may already have incurred the sunk costs of entry. Once the potential entrant incurs
these costs, entry becomes almost inevitable. Thus, entry deterrence strategies depend
crucially on preventing potential entrants from incurring these initial costs. Publicly
pre-announcing an expansion plan (i.e., issuing a CEA) helps in this regard by making
potential entrants aware of an investment more quickly and directly—perhaps even
before the investment occurs—thereby mitigating the possibility that a potential
entrant will decide to enter.
It is also conceivable that a CEA could function as a commitment device, alleviating
the constraints of sequential rationality, and/or serving as a costly signal (a` la Spence,
1973). Such a commitment could push an incumbent firm to make larger investments
than would otherwise be rationalizable, and/or help firms stick to a capacity expansion
plan, further pushing potential entrants to stay out of the marketplace. If deviating
from an announced plan is costly,4 a firm can garner a “first-mover advantage” by
preannouncing an investment decision (see Stackelberg, 1934; Schelling, 1960; Corona
and Nan, 2013). By gaining such an advantage, an incumbent could prevent entry or
soften competition among incumbent rivals.
In motivating our study, we consider the role of CEAs as conveyors of information,
and not as commitment devices. However, we remain agnostic as to the true strategic
purpose of the CEA as our analysis is unable to distinguish between these non-
mutually exclusive possibilities. We do not view this as a concern for our findings,
as the purpose of our study is to document whether firms use CEAs strategically in
response to entry threats. The exact specifics of their strategic function (i.e., signaling
versus commitment, etc.) lies beyond the intended scope of our study. Future work
4There are several costs to firms and managers when not completing previously announced
expansions. First, firms could face legal liability for providing incorrect statements to shareholders.
Second, managers lose some of their credibility which consequently reduces the efficacy of any future
disclosures. Third, both the firm and manager may face reputation harm for not being able to meet
prior commitments.
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could determine the extent to which CEAs have any ‘real effects’ on the disclosing
firms’ competitive actions.5
We examine whether firms respond to entry threats by voluntarily disclosing plans
to increase capacity through a CEA. Our analysis is predicated on the notion that
such disclosures are credible signals regarding future expansion plans, and that when
a firm discloses a capacity expansion, the firm follows through. Accordingly, our first
prediction is:
P1: Capacity expansion disclosures are associated with increases in capac-
ity.
An affirmative test of this prediction would jointly serve to validate our measure of
CEAs and provide support for the notion that such disclosures are credible. We caveat
that an affirmative test of P1 would not prove that deviations from an announced
expansion plan are costly, but simply show that such disclosures are informative
about future investment actions. Most importantly, an affirmative test of P1 would
not speak to the strategic intents (or lack thereof) behind such disclosures. We look
to Chinese imports as a setting in which we can identify firms’ strategic intents by
exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the threat of entry. Our second prediction
is:
P2: Firms respond to entry threats by announcing capacity expansions.
Not all firms are equally likely to respond in this fashion. For example, small
firms would not be as able to materially alter an entrant’s industry prospects and
would therefore be less likely to attempt a capacity-based approach entry deterrence.
Alternatively, CEAs could ‘backfire’ by signaling strong future demand, which could
entice potential entrants—the opposite of the desired effect. This possibility is likely
more salient for opaque firms, which may have more private/proprietary information
about future industry prospects. Accordingly, we predict:
P2a: P2 is stronger for larger firms.
P2b: P2 is weaker for more opaque firms.
Lastly, we examine the relation between CEAs and subsequent entry, predicting:
P3: Capacity expansion disclosures are associated with reduced subse-
quent entry.
5‘Real effects’ of disclosure refer to the causal effect of a disclosure on the disclosing party’s
behavior. In the context of our study, ‘real effects’ would be the causal effect of issuing a CEA on
the disclosing firms’ investment decisions. Absent a change in regulatory requirements, such an effect
would be difficult to estimate given the endogenous nature of the choice to disclose investment plans.
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For our last prediction, we caveat that the choice to issue a CEA is endogenous.
We cannot observe the counterfactual level of entry, under a different disclosure
policy, so we are unable to cleanly identify the causal effect of a CEA on entry. For
example, if firms issue CEAs in response to omitted entry threats, our analysis will
understate the true causal effect of the disclosure on subsequent entry. Conversely, if
[as predicted] only the firms which stand to benefit the most decide to issue CEAs,
then the observed effect would likely be an overestimate of the average causal effect
of a CEA on entry.
3.3 Measure of capacity expansion announcements
This study utilizes a novel, text-based measure that reflects whether firms have
announced that they will increase their production in the future. We use an algorithm
based on regular expressions (Regex) to search for such announcements in press
releases. Specifically, we classify a press release as containing a capacity expansion
announcement if it contains the words increase or expand in combination with the
words production or capacity and/or the words open or build in combination with the
words factory, facility, store or production (including its plural forms) in a sentence.
Examples of announcements identified by our algorithm include:
“During the third quarter, GrafTech purchased building and land in Northeast
Ohio for $3 million, which will be used to expand Engineered Solutions’ manufacturing
capacity for our advanced consumer electronics.”
“The multi-million-dollar shredder project, when completed, will expand processing
capacity, offer specialty grades of scrap and improve end-product quality”
“We plan to expand the capacity of our GTN pipeline by at least 500 million cubic
feet per day by the end of 2004. We expect the first phase of this expansion, 200
million cubic feet per day, to be completed by the end of 2002.”
We provide more examples of such disclosures in our Appendix A.
We make several refinements to our algorithm described above to improve its
quality. First, we ensure that the algorithm only classifies current and forward-looking
announcements of production increases and not past increases. We therefore exclude
capacity expansion announcements in sentences that contain regular verbs in the past
tense (words ending with -ed) or the commonly used irregular verbs such as was, had
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and were. The verbs in the announcements can also not be preceded by the words
continue to. Second, we are careful not to include a CEA that is precluded by the
negation term not. Third, we only identify CEAs made in the main text as opposed
to the safe harbor statements where these word combinations may occur to limit legal
liability. Fourth, we specifically exclude a few word combinations that were found
in the press releases, but do not directly indicate an increase in production. The
following word combinations are specifically excluded: credit facility, loan production,
production efficiency, increase in earnings, increase(d) price, production cost, capacity
cost, builder, building and build on.
To ensure that our measure picks up only voluntary disclosures, our algorithm
searches for CEAs in press releases6 that are released separately or in combination
with an earnings announcement. Our algorithm has found 4,209 CEAs in 203,591
analyzed press releases (2.1%) as depicted in Table 2.1 Panel A. We further note that
both the identified press releases and the CEAs are well spread over all industries and
firms as depicted in panel B. The only exception is the Petroleum and Gas industry
(21.6% of the number of CEAs), which is likely due to investors’ demanding more
frequent updates on capacity changes as these changes occur more frequently and
directly affect firm profits. On average, firms’ press releases contain CEAs between
0.5% and 8.9% of the time. Moreover, we do not find systematic differences in the
types of press releases that include CEAs and those that do not. In our final sample,
firm-years with no CEAs are coded as a zero, while firm-years with one or more CEAs
are coded as a one.
We have opted to use a ‘bag-of-words’ approach to obtain CEAs, as opposed
to machine learning, as it offers several advantages. First, our procedure is fully
transparent and replicable with regards to what it classifies as a CEA and what does
not. Second, our algorithm can also be seamlessly applied to other types of disclosures,
such as annual reports and conference calls. Third, there is no reduction in our sample
size as it does not require a training dataset. A limitation of this approach is that
the functioning of the algorithm depends on the inclusions and exclusions of word
combinations that we programmed. We note that the inputs for our algorithm are
based on studying thousands of randomly selected press releases. All alterations,
however, are subject to the tradeoff between type 1 and type 2 errors and we have
chosen to prioritize limiting type 1 errors. That is, our approach is intended minimize
the possibility that press releases get incorrectly coded as CEAs. It seems unlikely
however that the design choices for our measure are in any way driving the results
6Press releases are defined as any exhibit added to an 8-k filing that has press or news release in
the title or an exhibit that starts with a city name, date or “for immediate release.”
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as the firm fixed effect resolve any differential sensitivity of firms. Any measurement
error arising from the CEA classification algorithm will likely manifest as attenuation
bias, biasing against finding results.
With respect to our research question, CEAs offer several specific advantages when
compared to other types of voluntary disclosures (e.g., management earnings forecasts).
First, CEAs could function as strategic commitment devices, whereby disclosing firms
are obliged to complete their expansions or else be subject to costs such as the loss
of reputational capital, or even shareholder lawsuits in extreme cases. By exposing
themselves to such costs, firms can alleviate the constraints of sequential rationality,
making credible otherwise untenable investment strategies. Second, CEAs can provide
a direct and clear signal to the product market before the expansion is completed
(or even begun). CEAs are therefore timely signals which allow potential entrants to
obtain this information quickly, and without incurring high search costs; when using
disclosures to deter entry, it is vital that the disclosed information reaches the potential
entrants before they make their own (initial) investments and decision to enter the
market. Another benefit of CEAs compared to other types of voluntary disclosures
(e.g., issuance of additional management forecast and/or disclosing customer contracts)
is that it does not require firms to alter their long-term disclosure policies. CEAs
therefore do not create a commitment toward increased levels of disclosure in the
future as the issuance of an (additional) management forecast for example would (see
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005).
However, CEAs also carry potential costs. For example, if a CEA is [relatively]
binding, preannouncing an investment could become inefficient if circumstances
change such that the investment is no longer profitable, ex post. Furthermore, such
disclosures may reveal private information about favorable industry prospects that the
firm would prefer to keep secret (e.g., Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough and Stoughton,
1990; Darrough, 1993; Graham et al., 2005).
3.4 Empirical setting
Finding the correct setting is essential for a study on entry deterrence as it is not
possible to observe threats of entry within industries directly. We use the international
trade setting to provide plausibly exogenous variation in entry threats. Specifically,
we use the changes in exports from China to the Fama & French 48 industries in eight
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developed countries7 (not including the U.S.) as our industry-year measure of entry
threats faced by US firms. We deflate the changes in exports by the sum of firms’
sales in a Fama & French 48 industry to make the changes in exports comparable.
We focus on Chinese exports because prior literature shows that the increase in
exports from China were driven primarily by exogenous increases in China’s produc-
tivity (Autor et al., 2013). To further bolster the claim of plausible exogeneity, we use
Chinese exports to other developed countries (not the US) to capture entry threats
facing US firms. Chinese exports to other developed countries are strongly predictive
future of Chinese exports to the US, even after controlling for contemporaneous
exports to the US. Accordingly, we expect that an uptick in Chinese exports to other
developed countries would be threatening to economically similar domestic firms, who
would worry about imminent potential exports to the US.
Our setting and measure allows us to circumvent the problems associated using
regulatory changes (for example: import tariffs) as instruments. Such regulatory
changes are not exogenously determined, and are often driven in large part by
demand-side factors. In contrast, our measure of entry threat is not dependent on the
composition and importance of the domestic incumbents nor by supply/demand in
the United States.
Our identification strategy is very similar to those of Autor et al. (2013, 2014);
Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2017); Hombert and Matray (2018).
We differ in that these prior studies use Chinese exports to developed countries
(excluding the US) as an instrument for contemporaneous Chinese exports to the
US (i.e., current competition from China). In contrast, we use Chinese exports to
developed countries (excluding the US) as a measure of potential future competition
from China. By controlling for contemporaneous Chinese exports to the US, we can
rule out the possibility that CEAs are issued in response to current competition from
China, but instead in response to potential, but not yet realized competition (i.e., the
level of entry threat).
3.5 Sample and variable definition
Our main sample includes all U.S. firm years in the period 1995-2016. We exclude firm-
year observations when there has not been a press releases issued in the current year
7We use the Chinese exports to Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain, and Switzerland as our proxy for threats of entry, which is consistent with the countries used
by Autor et al. (2013).
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or the past to reduce the likelihood of type 2 errors affecting our results.8 We further
narrow our sample by only including firms that can potentially face competition
of Chinese goods. We therefore exclude firms operating in pure service industries9,
utilities and banks. An overview of the effects of these choices on our sample size can
be found in Table 3.1 (Panel A).
We combine our CEA dataset with Compustat for firm and industry fundamentals
and with CRSP for our measures of opacity/private information. Our measure of
entry threats, THREAT, relies on Chinese export data that is obtained from the UN
Comtrade database. This database contains the total value of all exports between
countries on a 6-digit product level. We therefore use the classification by Schott
(2008) to convert exports to 4 digit SIC industries. In the case that one product
code corresponds to multiple SIC codes, we allocate the exports per product code
proportionately based on the U.S. imports two year earlier .10 As described more
in section 3.4, our measure of threats of entry is based on the changes in exports
from China to the Fama & French 48 industries in eight developed countries. We
therefore aggregate all Chinese exports to Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzerland by SIC code and then calculate the
year-to-year difference. As this year-to-year difference is likely strongly related to the
size of the industry, we deflate it by the total sales of all firms in the corresponding
industry. This makes our estimates comparable across industries, but does have the
disadvantage that it leads to relatively small data points because the year-to-year
differences are deflated by very large numbers.
In some tests we also explicitly control for changes in the imports from China to
the U.S. with the variable PRESENCE. This variable is constructed in a similar way
as threats of entry, but instead uses the year-to-year changes in exports from China
to the U.S. instead of exports to other developed countries. Similarly, in some of our
analyses we examine ex post entry, using the variable ENTRY. This variable is similar
in construction to PRESENCE, but reflects one-year-ahead changes in exports from
China to the U.S. In some of our robustness tests, we also control specifically for the
8Our algorithm is not always able to detect press releases correctly due to for example firms not
uploading their press releases to EDGAR or doing so in a format that is unreadable by our scraper.
If our scraper has not identified a press release for a firm before, we cannot be certain whether firms
made a CEA or not. We therefore exclude these firm years as we may mistakenly assign a 0 for our
CEA measure when managers did in fact make a CEA.
9We exclude Fama and French industry codes: 31 (Utilities), 33 (Personal Services), 42 (Retail),
43 (Restaurant, hotel), 44 (Banking), 45 (Insurance), 46 (Real Estate). In additional robustness
checks we include all 48 industries and find that our results are not contingent on this design choice.
10Taking the proportion of U.S. import two years earlier reduces the likelihood that a U.S.
based demand shocks drive our results in the export setting while at the same time ensuring the
classification is relevant.
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exports from the U.S. to the developed countries with the variable US EXPORTS.
Like THREAT, this variable is defined as the year-to-year difference in exports to
eight developed countries from respectively the United States. A definition of all
variables can be found in Appendix B. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in
the analysis can be found in Table 3.2.
3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Relation Between CEAs and Capacity Expansions
The first step of our empirical analysis is to document, descriptively, whether CEAs
associate with actual capacity expansions. The purpose of these analyses is two-
fold: (1) provide confirmatory evidence to bolster the construct validity of our CEA
measure, by showing that CEAs can explain actual capacity expansions; and (2)
provide evidence to suggest that CEAs are credible. If CEAs were unassociated with
firms’ real capacity expansions, it would suggest that such disclosures are cheap
talk, which would likely diminish their usefulness in deterring entry. We test for the
association between CEAs and capacity expansions using variants on the following
regressions specification:
(3.1)∆CAPACITY i,t = β1CEAi,t + µi + θj,t + τt + i,j,t
Our two primary measures for the dependent variable: year-over-year percentage
increase in CAPEX, and year-over-year percentage increase in PP&E. We further
include three additional measures: year-over-year percentage increases in Sales, COGS,
and Inventories. We use these last three as supplemental measures, rather than
primary measures, because they are equilibrium outcomes over which the firm has
less direct control; investments in PP&E and CAPEX are explicit choices the firm
makes. For each outcome variable, we present two specifications, which differ only
with respect to fixed effect structure. The two different structures are: (1) firms fixed
effects; and (2) firm and industry-year fixed effects, jointly. We present results in
Table 3.3.
We find that CEAs are strongly associated with real capacity expansion behavior.
Holding the firm and industry-year fixed, a CEA is associated with a 15% (4%) increase
in CAPEX (PP&E), and a 3% (3%) [6%] increase in sales (COGS) [inventories]. These
effects are economically significant, but not so large as to be implausible. We note that
these results, in and of themselves, do not indicate that firms are choosing to make
CEAs strategically, nor that the CEAs have any causal effect on capacity expansions.
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Rather, these results validate our measure of CEAs, and provide evidence to suggest
that such disclosures are credible signals of firms’ capacity expansion plans.
We find comparable (untabulated) results when we Winsorize our dependent
variables at the 1% level instead of the 5% level currently used, control for growth
trends by including lagged values of the dependent variables, and when we loosen
restrictions on the sample to include announcements made in non-press release 8K
filings.
3.6.2 CEAs and Entry Threats
In the next set of tests, we examine whether firms make these announcements, in
part, as a strategic response to entry threats. In order to assess the causal effect of
entry threats on CEAs we look to Chinese exports as a source of plausibly exogenous
variation in the threat of entry. Prior literature finds that increases in Chinese exports
are largely driven by supply-side productivity increases. While trade to the US is
endogenous to US demand, we use Chinese exports to the rest of the developed world
as a proxy for the threat of entry into the US (see Autor et al., 2013).
We test for the effect of entry threats on CEAs using variants on the following
regression specification:
(3.2)CEAi,t = β1THREAT j,t + β2PRESENCE j,t + β3∆CAPACITY i,t
+ β4∆CAPACITY i,t+1 + µi + τt + i,j,t
The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on THREAT, which reflects the relation
between Chinese imports to the rest of the developed world on domestic firms’ CEAs.
In specifications two and five, we include PRESENCE as a control variable, to hold
fixed the current intensity of Chinese imports to a firm’s industry. In specifications
three through five, we also include controls for actual changes in capacity, in the
current and subsequent year, to show that the importance of a CEA is not subsumed
by a firm’s real actions. In all specifications, we include firm and year fixed effects.
Results from these regressions can be found in Table 3.4.
We find that Chinese exports to the rest of the developed world are significantly
associated with CEAs. The statistical and economic significance of the effect remains
stable if we control for actual changes in capacity, as captured by contemporaneous
and one-year-ahead changes in PP&E and CAPEX. This suggests that the disclosure
of the capacity expansion is an important component of a firm’s entry deterrence
strategy. That is, firms do not appear to respond to entry threats by expanding
3.6 Empirical results 55
capacity, and then non-strategically disclose the decision. Rather, for a given capacity
expansion, a firm is much more likely to issue a CEA if they face a credible entry
threat.
These patterns continue to hold if we further control for the current level of imports
into an industry (PRESENCE). When we control for PRESENCE, the magnitude
of the coefficient on THREAT grows larger by about 16%. However, the statistical
significance falls somewhat, likely driven by the high degree of correlation between
THREAT and PRESENCE variables (correlation > 0.8). When we control for both
PRESENCE and the underlying investment behavior, the coefficient on CEA falls
just below the 10% significance threshold (t-stat equals 1.453). However, we note that
the sample size is significantly reduced in this specification, and reiterate that the
coefficient is actually larger than without the control for PRESENCE (0.94 versus
0.81). Moreover, we do not expect all firms engage in this type of strategic behavior;
our results become more robust in the next set of tests, which exploit cross-sectional
variation in the viability of this deterrence strategy.
Notably, we find no evidence that CEAs are associated with current imports to
the US (PRESENCE)—we only find that CEAs are associated with imports to the
rest of the developed world. This makes it even more unlikely that our results can be
driven by demand shocks in the US; if demand shocks caused both the CEAs and
the increases in Chinese exports, then we would expect to see a strong association
between PRESENCE and CEAs. We interpret our results as evidence that firms use
CEAs, in part, as a strategic entry deterrence tool. Any alternative explanation for
our results must explain why US firms’ CEAs are associated with Chinese exports to
non-US developed countries, but are not associated with Chinese exports to the US.
In the last two specifications, we limit our sample to include only those firm
years with large increases in capacity (i.e. firm-year observations with at least 5%
increases in PPE and/or 10% increases in CAPEX compared to the previous year).
This approach allows us to focus on the disclosure behavior of firms conditional on
have made large investments and reduces the impact of potential cheap talk. It also
further strengthens the power of the firm fixed effects as it now averages out firms’
normal disclosure behavior during large investment periods. These tests also provide
further evidence that CEAs are not mandatory and therefore mechanical, as there is
a lot of variation in the dependent variable, even within the subsample of expanding
firms.
In line with our previous results, we find that CEAs are correlated with threats
of entry, even when we condition the sample on firms that are making substantial
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investments. The coefficients on THREAT are in fact higher than our previous
estimates (1.50 compared to 0.94 in our most stringent specification).
3.6.3 Threat Response Variation in the Cross-Section
In the preceding analyses, presented in Table 3.4, we find evidence that, on average,
firms respond to the threat of Chinese entry in their product markets by issuing
CEAs. However, we do not expect all firms would be equally likely to respond in this
fashion. For example, small firms’ capacity expansions would not have a significant
enough effect on an industry to deter entry. Therefore, such firms would be unlikely to
respond to the threat of entry by releasing a CEA. Conversely, for more opaque firms
with substantial private information, a CEA could backfire by signaling excellent
industry prospects, which could encourage entry. Therefore, such firms would be less
likely to make such a disclosure. Accordingly, we examine whether cross-sectional
variation in these characteristics can explain variation in responses to entry threats
in a predictable manner.
For our first cross-sectional split, we look at how entry threat responses vary
with firm size. Larger firms are better able to deter entry through their capacity
investments, and would therefore be much more likely to use strategic disclosures
to ensure potential entrants are aware of their ongoing investments. Smaller firms
typically do not control enough of the market for an capacity-based entry deterrence
strategy to be viable, and we would therefore not expect to observe such firms
responding to entry threats with CEAs. Accordingly, we examine whether larger firms
(as captured by average total assets, and revenues) are differentially likely to respond
to entry threats by making a CEA, testing for the interactive effect of THREAT and
SIZE using variants on the following regression specification:
CEAi,t = β1THREAT j,t × SIZE i,t + β2THREAT j,t + β3SIZE i,t + β4PRESENCE j,t
+ β5∆CAPACITY i,t + β6∆CAPACITY i,t+1 + µi + τt + i,j,t
(3.3)
Our regression specification differs slightly from the specification used in our
previous analyses, since we are interested specifically in the interactive effect of SIZE
with THREAT and therefore requires additional controls for confounding effects.
Expansions initiated by larger firms could be of different relative size, thereby also
triggering CEAs at different levels of investments. For example, a large firm might
issue a CEA for an abnormal 1 or 2% increase in capacity, while such an increase may
be barely noteworthy for a smaller firm in our sample. Furthermore, firms may make
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(potentially differently sized) investments when faced with more threats of entry that
may trigger CEAs at higher rates. We therefore also include the interaction of both
THREAT and SIZE with actual changes in capacity in our regression specification.
Results from these regressions can be found in Table 3.5. In Panel A (Panel B),
we proxy for SIZE using GAAP revenues (average total assets). Consistent with our
predictions, we find significant variation in how firms of different sizes respond to
entry threats. The relation between entry threats and CEAs is much stronger for
larger firms. As before, this result is robust to including controls for actual increases
in capacity, as well as a control for current Chinese imports. In untabulated analyses,
we examine whether firms of different sizes respond differentially to current Chinese
imports (PRESENCE), and find no evidence that they do. The fact that these patterns
are specific to Chinese exports to non-US countries, and absent for Chinese exports
to the US, bolsters the notion that we are capturing firms’ strategic attempts at entry
deterrence. Economic forces other than entry deterrence would mostly likely make
firms more responsive to current conditions, at home, rather than current conditions
elsewhere—in stark contrast to our findings.
One potential drawback of using a CEA to deter entry is that it could reveal
private information about future demand. If an incumbent firm has a lot of private
information about the future evolution of demand, then a CEA could easily (and
perhaps correctly) be interpreted as a strong positive signal about future industry
prospects. Such a signal would reduce the net benefits of the CEA, and in some
cases could even make a CEA entry-encouraging. Thus, firms with ample private
information about industry prospects would likely be much more judicious about
using CEAs as part of an entry deterrence strategy. Such firms would be more likely to
engage in profit hiding, or pessimistic disclosures to deter entry (e.g., Li, 2010; Tomy,
2017; Burks et al., 2018). Accordingly, we examine whether firms’ private information
moderates the relation between entry threats and CEAs. We test for the interactive
effect of THREAT and INFO using variants on the following regression specification:
(3.4)CEAi,t = β1THREAT j,t × INFO i + β2THREAT j,t + β3PRESENCE j,t
+ β4∆CAPACITY i,t + β5∆CAPACITY i,t+1 + µi + τt + i,j,t
It is difficult to identify exactly how much private information a firm has about
future industry prospects. In order to parse this variation, we rely on information
asymmetry variables typically used in the accounting and finance literatures: bid-ask
spreads and trading volume (both in shares and dollars). With this in mind, we
note two caveats: these measures reflect information asymmetry among investors,
58 Do Firms Strategically Announce Capacity Expansions to Deter Entry?
and do not necessarily correspond to how much private information firm insiders
have; and (2) these measures do not allow us to pinpoint the source of information
asymmetry, and it need not necessarily stem from private information regarding future
industry prospects. Therefore, our cross-sectional splitting variables used in Table 3.6,
include measurement error. As long as this measurement error is uncorrelated with
omitted drivers of entry threat reaction, it will bias away from finding any significant
results, due to attenuation. Importantly, our measures of private information are
at the firm-level (not firm-year), so the main effects of any measurement error is
mechanically suppressed by the fixed effect structure. Our analyses identify only the
interactive effects of entry threats and private information. Thus, in order to leads to
spurious inferences, measurement error in our proxies for private information must
interact with entry threats in such a manner as to explain CEAs. It is not obvious
how such a confound might arise.
3.6.4 Robustness: Controlling for US exports
Our identification strategy is designed to shield our analyses from the potential
confounding effects of US-side demand. The idea is the following: Chinese exports to
the US (the variable PRESENCE) subsumes the information content that Chinese
exports to the rest of the developed world (the variance THREAT) contains about
US demand. At the very least, we must only assume that Chinese exports to the
US are a better measure of US demand than are Chinese exports to the rest of the
developed world. We find that Chinese exports to the US are not associated with US
firms’ CEAs, but Chinese exports to the rest of the developed world are associated
with CEAs. Therefore, it is unlikely that our results can be driven by US demand.
However, our identification strategy is not as effective at guarding against the
potential confounding effects of supply shocks. Suppose China and the US both
experienced positive supply shocks, making it cheaper for them to produce. China and
the US would both respond to the shock, by exporting more to the developed world,
and building up capacity. In the context of our analysis, this could lead capacity
expansions to be correlated with Chinese exports to the developed world, for entirely
nonstrategic reasons.
First and foremost, we note that our study is about capacity expansion announce-
ments, and not capacity expansion investments. We control for the underlying capacity
expansion investments, and find that THREAT is incrementally informative about the
choice to disclose the expansion. While the supply shock story provides a non-strategic
explanation for a correlation between THREAT and capacity expansion investments,
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it would not explain why firms would be differentially likely to publicly disclose
their expansions, when facing greater entry threats. That said, we attempt to further
mitigate this concern by incorporating US exports as a control variable, to better
capture supply-side confounds. US EXPORTS is constructed in a similar way as
our main dependent variable THREAT, but then uses the year-to-year difference in
exports from the US to developed countries in each Fama & French industry deflated
by total sales in that industry.
We find that our inferences are not affected by this alteration. Even after controlling
for US EXPORTS, firms are more likely to make CEAs when facing greater entry
threats. Moreover, this result is more prevalent among larger firms, and less prevalent
among firms with more private information about industry prospects. We present
these results in Table 3.7.
3.6.5 Robustness: Overall disclosure quantity
Thus far, we have not specifically looked at the overall disclosure environment of
a firm and relied on firm fixed effects to investigate whether firms provide more
CEAs when faced with threats of entry. However, concurrent changes in the overall
disclosure environment could potentially affect our results. For example, if entry
threats represent a source of uncertainty about which investors are uneasy, firms may
respond to these entry threats by becoming more transparent overall, simply to allay
investors’ fears. As CEAs are a dimension of firm transparency, such behavior might
give rise to our findings, but this would not be a matter of strategic entry deterrence,
but rather a response to capital market pressure.
To assess this possible alternative explanation for our results, we conduct two
additional sets of tests. First, we replicate our analyses with a control for overall
disclosure quantity (Table 3.8 Panel A). Second, we re-run our analyses with overall
disclosure quantity as the outcome variable (Table 3.8 Panel B). We find that con-
trolling for overall disclosure does not adversely affect our results; higher levels of
entry threats are associated with a greater likelihood of a CEA. Moreover, we find no
evidence that overall disclosure increases in response to entry threats.
We tabulate results using the total number of words in firms’ press releases as a
firm-year level of disclosure quantity. Our inferences remain unchanged if we use the
number of 8-k’s, or the number of earnings forecasts, instead.
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3.6.6 Supplemental analysis: Effectiveness of Capacity Expan-
sion Announcements at Deterring Entry
As the final step of our analysis, we examine how successful firms’ CEAs appear to be
at deterring entry. We test for the association between CEAs and subsequent entry
using variants on the following regressions specification:
(3.5)ENTRY i,t = β1CEAi,t + β2THREAT j,t + β3PRESENCE j,t
+ β4∆CAPACITY i,t + β5∆CAPACITY i,t+1 + µi + τt + i,j,t
Results from these specifications can be found in Table 3.9. The coefficient of
interest is on CEA, and reflects the extent to which CEAs are associated with a
subsequent change in Chinese imports.
We find that issuing a CEA is associated with about a 1.2 basis point reduction in
subsequent entry, which is about 13% of the average annual base-rate of entry. This
association arises even when controlling for actual capacity expansion actions, indicat-
ing that the disclosure itself seems to be important in deterring entry. Furthermore,
we find a significant positive coefficient on THREAT, which corroborates the notion
that Chinese trade to the rest of the developed world constitutes a heightened threat
of entry into the US.
We caveat that CEAs are endogenous firm choices. Thus, the regressions described
by specification (3.5) do not necessarily reflect the causal effect of CEAs on subsequent
entry. As noted by Burks et al. (2018), exogenous variation in entry threats is
insufficient to identify the causal effect of an entry deterrence strategy. To identify the
causal effect of an entry deterrence strategy on subsequent entry requires exogenous
variation in the strategy itself. Such variation cannot be obtained in our setting.
Given the endogeneity of the choice to issue a CEA, our estimates are likely to be
underestimates of their true effectiveness, as we discuss below.
If firms disproportionately issue CEAs in response to the most severe entry threats,
then our analysis is likely to understate their true effectiveness. Such a confound
would bias the estimated coefficient downward, creating the false impression that
CEAs are less effective than they truly are at deterring entry. Moreover, if CEAs
are effective as entry deterrents, then they yield spillover benefits to other firms in
the same industry—those who free-ride on their peers’ successful entry deterrence
strategies. Such a spillover will result in further understatement of the causal effect of
a CEA (Armstrong and Kepler, 2018).
In addition to the above concern, we further caveat that our analysis identifies the
effectiveness of CEAs for those firms who choose to use them. If, as predicted, there is
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heterogeneity in the effectiveness of a CEA (e.g., due to different firm sizes or different
amounts of private information), then our analysis will fail to reflect the average effect
of a CEA on subsequent entry. That is, even if we accurately identify how effective
the observed CEAs were (i.e., their unbiased causal effect on entry), it would not be
appropriate to infer that other firms—those that chose not to issue CEAs—would
have enjoyed the same level of entry deterrence success, had they chosen to issue
them. It is perhaps precisely because their CEAs would not have been as effective
that they chose not to issue them in the first place. This caveat does not imply that
our estimates are overstated (as mentioned before, they are likely understated due to
omitted sources of entry threats), but rather suggests that one should interpret them
cautiously as the estimated effectiveness for the firms who chose to use them.
3.7 Conclusion
We construct and validate a novel measure of firms’ voluntary disclosures, that
captures explicit forward-looking statements about capacity expansion plans. Our
measure associates with substantial real changes in firm investment (e.g., CAPEX
and PP&E), suggesting that it does indeed reflect firms’ actual capacity expansion
plans.
Using plausibly exogenous variation in entry threats, we further provide evidence
that firms strategically preannounce capacity expansions in order to deter entry into
their product markets. Consistent with our predictions, larger firms are more likely
to respond in this fashion, while more opaque firms—that that plausibly have more
private information—are less likely to respond in the fashion. Finally, CEAs appear
to be effective at deterring entry.
More broadly, our study provides novel evidence that firms make accounting choices
strategically, with the aim of conferring competitive advantages to themselves in their
product markets. CEAs could provide strategic value by functioning as strategic
commitment devices, and/or by accelerating and improving the dissemination of
relevant information to potential entrants. Our analysis does not allow us to distinguish
between these two channels. Further research is needed to assess the exact mechanism
through which CEAs discourage through which CEAs discourage entry.
We cannot definitively rule out the possibility that [for some firms] CEAs are cheap
talk. While we view CEAs as fairly credible, our inferences would remain valid even if
CEAs were cheap talk, so long as firms are using them, strategically, in response to
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entry threats. We welcome future work to identify the extent to which firms follow
through on (or back out of) their disclosed expansion plans.
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Table 3.1: Sample selection and number of identified press releases and CEAs by
industry
Panel A shows the impact of our sample selection on our final sample and provides insight into the
issuances of press releases and CEAs on both 8k-filing and firm level. Panel B outlines the number
of press releases and CEAs per industry.
Panel A
By filings: Total number of 8-K 657,228
Total number of press releases 290,560
Total number of 8-K with GVKEY link 513,940
Total number of 8-K with GVKEY link excl. banking, utilities and non-importing
industries
384,293
Total number of press releases excl. banking, utilities and non-importing industries 215,754
Total number of CEAs (excl. banking, utilities and non-importing industries) 4,388
By firms:
Total number of firms with GVKEY link 15,292
Total number of firms with GVKEY link excl banking, utilities and non-importing
industries
11,204
Total number of firms with press releases excl. banking, utilities and non-importing
industries
9,357
Total number of firms with at least one CEA (excl. banking, utilities and non-
importing industries)
1,809
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Panel B
Fama & French Industry
Nr of
CEAs
% of total
CEAs
Nr of
press
releases
% of press
releases
with CEA
Agriculture 38 0.9% 766 5.0%
Aircraft 26 0.6% 986 2.6%
Almost Nothing 62 1.5% 1542 4.0%
Apparel 97 2.3% 2296 4.2%
Automobiles and Trucks 151 3.6% 3591 4.2%
Beer & Liquor 14 0.3% 574 2.4%
Business Services 201 4.8% 28593 0.7%
Business Supplies 79 1.9% 2357 3.4%
Candy & Soda 6 0.1% 645 0.9%
Chemicals 219 5.2% 5210 4.2%
Coal 74 1.8% 941 7.9%
Communication 84 2.0% 8547 1.0%
Computers 36 0.9% 7507 0.5%
Construction 32 0.8% 2803 1.1%
Construction Materials 134 3.2% 3285 4.1%
Consumer Goods 77 1.8% 2701 2.9%
Defense 5 0.1% 559 0.9%
Electrical Equipment 79 1.9% 3676 2.1%
Electronic Equipment 232 5.5% 13094 1.8%
Entertainment 65 1.5% 3708 1.8%
Fabricated Products 16 0.4% 438 3.7%
Food Products 98 2.3% 3359 2.9%
Healthcare 55 1.3% 4915 1.1%
Machinery 174 4.1% 6,326 2.8%
Measuring and Control Equip. 56 1.3% 4,052 1.4%
Medical Equipment 83 2.0% 8,084 1.0%
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Min-
ing
118 2.8% 1,328 8.9%
Petroleum and Natural Gas 910 21.6% 13,629 6.7%
Pharmaceutical Products 178 4.2% 22,888 0.8%
Precious Metals 82 1.9% 1,197 6.9%
Printing and Publishing 22 0.5% 1,659 1.3%
Recreation 17 0.4% 1,421 1.2%
Rubber and Plastic Products 40 1.0% 1,519 2.6%
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip. 23 0.5% 490 4.7%
Shipping Containers 11 0.3% 604 1.8%
Steel Works Etc 176 4.2% 3,250 5.4%
Textiles 36 0.9% 618 5.8%
Tobacco Products 3 0.1% 310 1.0%
Trading 125 3.0% 18,872 0.7%
Transportation 140 3.3% 7,317 1.9%
Wholesale 135 3.2% 7,934 1.7%
Total 4,209 100% 203,591
Average 2.1%
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the variables used in the analyses. Variables are as defined in
Appendix B.
Variable N Mean σ p25 Median p75
CEAfy 73,163 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000
CEAcy 73,529 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000
COGS increaset 68,965 0.143 0.414 -0.060 0.071 0.245
SALES increaset 68,994 0.144 0.399 -0.057 0.071 0.244
PPE increaset 66,486 0.142 0.315 0.002 0.066 0.189
CAPEX increaset 65,617 0.346 1.147 -0.344 0.040 0.567
INVENTORY increaset 48,069 0.111 0.477 -0.129 0.040 0.237
THREAT 73,737 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
PRESENCE 73,737 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001
ENTRY 73,301 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001
US EXPORTS 73,737 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
log(AVGAT) 72,412 5.303 2.664 3.627 5.481 7.156
log(REVT) 70,036 5.019 2.741 3.460 5.312 6.879
PPE increaset+1 59,028 0.123 0.290 0.000 0.061 0.169
CAPEX increaset+1 58,265 0.314 1.113 -0.351 0.028 0.526
log(SPREAD) 53,488 -4.591 1.212 -5.320 -4.562 -3.724
log(TRADEVOL) 53,593 12.249 1.713 11.137 12.324 13.365
log(TOTAL WORDS) 59183 7.375 1.052 6.688 7.520 8.148
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Table 3.4: CEAs and threats of entry
This table presents the results of a OLS regression of CEAs on a proxy for threats of entry. The
sample consists of all Compustat firm years in non-service industries that have issued at least one
press release in the past in the period 1995-2016. CEAcy is an indicator variable that is 1 when
a firm issues at least one press release that contains a capital expansion announcement in that
particular calendar year. The definition of all other variables can be found in Appendix B. All
regressions are clustered by Gvkey and Industry-Year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES CEAcy
THREAT 0.864** 1.015* 0.800** 0.939 0.905** 1.501*
(2.512) (1.739) (2.042) (1.441) (2.184) (1.779)
PPE increaset 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(5.278) (5.282) (4.626)
CAPEX increaset 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(2.703) (2.701) (2.646)
PPE increaset+1 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014**
(3.102) (3.104) (2.416)
CAPEX increaset+1 -0.002** -0.002** -
0.004***
(-2.064) (-2.065) (-2.943)
PRESENCE -0.185 -0.174 -0.602
(-0.377) (-0.329) (-0.868)
Observations 72,027 72,027 53,949 53,949 51,655 37,616
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.155 0.165 0.165 0.166 0.175
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Expansion Expansion
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Table 3.5: Moderating effect of size
This table presents the results of a regression of CEAs on firm size. The sample consists of all
Compustat firm years in non-service industries that have issued at least one press release in the
past in the period 1995-2016. CEAcy is an indicator variable that is 1 when a firm issues at least
one press release that contains a capital expansion announcement in that particular calendar year.
We use two different measures of firm size. In Panel A (Panel B), we measure firm size using the
natural logarithm of annual revenues (average total assets). The definition of all other variables can
be found in Appendix B. All regressions are clustered by Gvkey and Industry-Year. ***, **, and *
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES CEAcy
log(REVT) × THREAT 0.380*** 0.379*** 0.412** 0.411** 0.429*** 0.512**
(2.845) (2.857) (2.416) (2.428) (2.672) (2.405)
THREAT -1.088* -1.022 -1.580* -1.510 -1.274* -1.768
(-1.715) (-1.360) (-1.792) (-1.600) (-1.663) (-1.501)
log(REVT) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(6.048) (6.050) (3.939) (3.939) (4.908) (2.870)
PPE increaset 0.013* 0.013* 0.019**
(1.712) (1.714) (2.162)
CAPEX increaset -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(-1.602) (-1.602) (-0.845)
PPE increaset+1 0.008 0.008 0.009
(1.134) (1.134) (0.964)
CAPEX increaset+1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(-0.574) (-0.575) (-1.321)
PRESENCE -0.074 -0.080 -0.542
(-0.154) (-0.153) (-0.780)
Observations 68,397 68,397 52,804 52,804 48,789 36,856
Adjusted R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.177
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Expansion Expansion
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES CEAcy
log(AVGAT) × THREAT 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.388** 0.387** 0.408** 0.473**
(2.609) (2.614) (2.152) (2.165) (2.324) (2.122)
THREAT -1.076 -0.922 -1.513 -1.456 -1.177 -1.554
(-1.557) (-1.171) (-1.597) (-1.463) (-1.383) (-1.270)
log(AVGAT) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(6.269) (6.272) (4.241) (4.241) (4.964) (2.724)
PPE increaset 0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.231) (0.232) (0.733)
CAPEX increaset -
0.006***
-
0.006***
-0.005**
(-3.155) (-3.155) (-2.277)
PPE increaset+1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(-0.429) (-0.428) (-0.226)
CAPEX increaset+1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
(-0.713) (-0.713) (-1.161)
PRESENCE -0.171 -0.065 -0.539
(-0.359) (-0.125) (-0.776)
Observations 70,670 70,670 53,949 53,949 50,307 37,616
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.156 0.167 0.167 0.168 0.176
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Expansion Expansion
70 Do Firms Strategically Announce Capacity Expansions to Deter Entry?
Table 3.6: Moderating effect of Information Asymmetry
This table presents the results of a regression of CEAs made during the calendar year on information
asymmetry variables. The sample consists of all Compustat firm years in non-service industries that
have issued at least one press release in the past in the period 1995-2016. CEAcy is an indicator
variable that is 1 when a firm issues at least one press release that contains a capital expansion
announcement in that particular calendar year. We use two different measures of information
asymmetry. In Panel A (Panel B), we measure information asymmetry using the natural logarithm
of the average bid-ask spread (the average daily trading volume). The definition of all other variables
can be found in Appendix B. All regressions are clustered by Gvkey and Industry-Year. ***, **, and
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES CEAcy
log(SPREAD) × THREAT -0.629** -0.628** -0.600* -0.601* -0.723** -0.721*
(-2.167) (-2.165) (-1.896) (-1.896) (-1.964) (-1.771)
THREAT -1.947 -1.791 -1.957 -1.915 -2.481 -2.335
(-1.537) (-1.338) (-1.397) (-1.317) (-1.513) (-1.246)
PPE increaset 0.022 0.022 0.024
(1.325) (1.326) (1.265)
CAPEX increaset -0.003 -0.003 0.001
(-0.682) (-0.682) (0.240)
PPE increaset+1 -0.013 -0.013 -0.027
(-0.654) (-0.654) (-1.101)
CAPEX increaset+1 0.006 0.006 0.007
(1.502) (1.501) (1.121)
PRESENCE -0.191 -0.054 -0.261
(-0.360) (-0.098) (-0.362)
Observations 52,537 52,537 41,766 41,766 38,181 29,591
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.167 0.167 0.171 0.179
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Expansion Expansion
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Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES CEAcy
log(TRADEVOL)× THREAT 0.388** 0.392** 0.372* 0.373* 0.525** 0.572**
(1.997) (2.014) (1.796) (1.797) (2.001) (2.014)
THREAT -3.856* -3.714 -3.790 -3.745 -5.623* -6.027*
(-1.652) (-1.569) (-1.508) (-1.480) (-1.785) (-1.758)
PPE increaset 0.021 0.021 0.047
(0.597) (0.599) (1.102)
CAPEX increaset -0.014 -0.014 -
0.020**
(-1.550) (-1.549) (-1.979)
PPE increaset+1 -0.024 -0.024 -0.041
(-0.561) (-0.561) (-0.762)
CAPEX increaset+1 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.207) (0.204) (0.049)
PRESENCE -0.237 -0.084 -0.329
(-0.449) (-0.153) (-0.456)
Observations 52,642 52,642 41,839 41,839 38,260 29,650
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.159 0.167 0.167 0.171 0.179
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interacted controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Full Expansion Expansion
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Table 3.7: Robustness to common economic shocks
This table presents the results of a regression of CEAs on a proxy for threats of entry (Column
1-5) and Entry on CEA’s (Column 6). All columns correspond to the first specification of each
table (3.4-3.6) with the addition of US exports as a control variable. Please refer for an elaborate
description to the corresponding table. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels (two-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CEAcy
THREAT 0.629* -1.411** -1.363** -2.360* -4.438*
(1.721) (-2.182) (-1.971) (-1.859) (-1.900)
US exports 0.783* 0.933** 0.865** 1.133** 1.183**
(1.947) (2.312) (2.114) (2.217) (2.310)
log(REVT) × THREAT 0.388***
(2.914)
log(REVT) 0.007***
(6.062)
log(AVGAT) × THREAT 0.377***
(2.651)
log(AVGAT) 0.007***
(6.301)
log(SPREAD) × THREAT -0.646**
(-2.232)
log(TRADEVOL) × THREAT 0.407**
(2.087)
Observations 72,027 68,397 70,670 52,537 52,642
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.157 0.156 0.159 0.159
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.8: Robustness to overall firm disclosures and falsification test
This table presents the results of a regression of CEAs on a proxy for threats of entry. All columns
correspond to the first specification of each table (3.4-3.6). Panel A controls explicitly for the log
of total number of words in press releases during the calendar firm year that is a proxy for overall
disclosures. Panel B depicts a falsification tests where CEAs are replaced by the log of total number
of words in press releases during the calendar firm year that is a proxy for overall disclosures. Please
refer for an elaborate description to the corresponding table. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CEAcy
log(TOTAL WORDS) 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(17.609) (17.341) (17.257) (16.532) (16.536)
THREAT 1.059*** -0.874 -1.034 -1.259 -3.369
(2.664) (-0.994) (-1.045) (-0.840) (-1.315)
log(REVT) × THREAT 0.368**
(2.137)
log(REVT) 0.004***
(2.630)
log(AVGAT) × THREAT 0.385**
(2.052)
log(AVGAT) 0.003
(1.583)
log(SPREAD) × THREAT -0.492
(-1.469)
log(TRADEVOL) × THREAT 0.355*
(1.699)
Observations 57,309 55,141 56,386 45,077 45,143
Adjusted R-squared 0.172 0.174 0.172 0.178 0.178
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES log(TOTAL WORDS)
THREAT 0.090 -5.443 -6.096* -6.753 -8.583
(0.057) (-1.626) (-1.724) (-1.468) (-0.985)
log(REVT) 0.098***
(13.255)
log(REVT) × THREAT 0.805
(1.411)
log(AVGAT) × THREAT 0.880
(1.389)
log(AVGAT) 0.161***
(18.833)
log(SPREAD) × THREAT -1.578*
(-1.666)
log(TRADEVOL) × THREAT 0.736
(0.996)
Observations 57,309 55,141 56,386 45,077 45,143
Adjusted R-squared 0.492 0.497 0.503 0.473 0.473
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.9: Relation between CEA and subsequent entry
This table presents the results of a regression of entry on CEAs, threat of entry and firm investments.
The sample consists of all Compustat firm years in non-service industries that have issued at least
one press release in the past in the period 1995-2016. CEAcy is an indicator variable that is 1 when
a firm issues at least one press release that contains a capital expansion announcement in that
particular calendar year. Entry is defined as Chinese exports to the US in the next year minus
Chinese exports to the US in the current year divided by total sales of firms in Compustat Universe
operating within the Fama and French Industry. The definition of all other variables can be found
in Appendix B. All regressions are clustered by Gvkey and Industry-Year. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Entry
CEAcy -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
(-1.947) (-1.864) (-1.981) (-2.159) (-2.126)
THREAT 0.238** 0.024 0.232** 0.212** 0.017
(2.226) (0.132) (2.196) (2.070) (0.095)
PPE increaset 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.252) (1.318) (1.188)
CAPEX increaset -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.383) (-0.286) (-0.035)
PPE increaset+1 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.338) (-0.674)
CAPEX increaset+1 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.664) (-0.488)
PRESENCE 0.263 0.243
(1.514) (1.395)
Observations 71,596 71,596 62,474 53,573 53,573
Adjusted R-squared 0.486 0.505 0.486 0.498 0.515
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix A: Examples of capacity expansion announce-
ments
Stage Stores - 10 October 2002
“With respect to store-based activity, the Company reconfirmed that it plans to open
seven additional stores on October 24th. Five of the stores will be opened in Texas,
while one each will be opened in Louisiana and Arkansas.”
Helen of Troy Ltd. - 14 July 2005
“We are currently building a 1,200,000 square foot distribution center in Southaven,
Mississippi, that will expand our eastern United States capacity to accommodate the
distribution needs of OXO International.”
Texas Industries – 29 March 2007
“We continue to make progress toward our goal of expanding TXI’s annual cement
capacity from today’s 5.0 million tons to 7.5 million tons – all in three projects in a
little over three years.”
IJNT Net Inc. – 19 January 2000
“Mary Blake, IJNT’s CEO, indicated that the Company will announce within the
month the site of another major switching facility that IJNT will build with Nortel
as well as expansion of the Company’s wireless broadband facilities in [. . . ] ”
Graftech International Ltd. – 25 Oct 2012
“During the third quarter, GrafTech purchased building and land in Northeast Ohio
for $3 million, which will be used to expand Engineered Solutions’ manufacturing
capacity for our advanced consumer electronics.”
Clarcor - 19 March 2004
“We will make investments this year to expand our production facilities at several
of our filtration companies. We will also expand technical and research facilities in
our Industrial/Environmental filtration segment at our environmental air filtration
and process liquid filtration companies. We plan this year to invest in areas which
we believe will grow strongly in the future, such as process liquid filter applications,
and also to complete various restructuring programs to drive improved operating
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profitability.”
Alcoa - 08 July 2005
“The company also began work to expand its global aerospace heat-treated sheet and
plate production by approximately 50 percent over the next 18 months in response to
orders from its aerospace customers, such as the nearly $2 billion high-performance
sheet and plate supply agreement it signed with Airbus.”
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Variable Name Definition Level
CEA fy
CEA cy
Indicator variable that is 1 when a firm issues at least
one press release that contains a capital expansion
announcement in the fiscal(fy)/calendar (cy) year.
Firm-year
PPE increaset Percentage increase in the firm’s PP&E from the
previous to the current fiscal year, winsorized on 5%
level.
Firm-year
PPE increaset+1 Percentage increase in the firm’s PP&E from the
current to the next fiscal year, winsorized on 5%
level.
Firm-year
CAPEX increaset Percentage increase in the firm’s capital expenditures
from the previous to the current fiscal year, winsorized
on 5% level.
Firm-year
CAPEX increaset+1 Percentage increase in the firm’s capital expenditures
from the current to the next fiscal year, winsorized
on 5% level.
Firm-year
COGS increase Percentage increase in the firm’s cost of goods sold
from the previous to the current fiscal year, winsorized
on 5% level.
Firm-year
SALES increase Percentage increase in the firm’s sales from the pre-
vious to the current fiscal year, winsorized on 5%
level.
Firm-year
INVENTORY increase Percentage increase in the firm’s inventories from the
previous to the current fiscal year, winsorized on 5%
level.
Firm-year
log(REVT) Log of the GAAP revenues Firm-year
log(AVGAT) Log of the average total assets. Firm-year
Log(SPREAD) Log of the average spread of a firm’s main stock for
the whole period.
Firm
log(TRADEVOL) Log of the average trading volume of a firm’s main
stock for the whole period.
Firm
log($TRADEVOL) Log of the average dollar trading volume of a firm’s
main stock for the whole period.
Firm
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International trade setting
THREAT Chinese exports to eight developed countries in the
current year minus Chinese exports to eight developed
countries last year divided by total sales of firms in
Compustat Universe operating within the Fama and
French Industry.
Industry-Year
PRESENCE Chinese exports to the US in the current year minus
Chinese exports to the US last year divided by total
sales of firms in Compustat Universe operating within
the Fama and French Industry.
Industry-Year
ENTRY Chinese exports to the US in the next year minus Chi-
nese exports to the US in the current year divided by
total sales of firms in Compustat Universe operating
within the Fama and French Industry.
Industry-Year
US Exports U.S. exports to eight developed countries in the cur-
rent year minus U.S. exports to eight developed coun-
tries last year divided by total sales of firms in Compu-
stat Universe operating within the Fama and French
Industry.
Industry-Year
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Chapter 4
Financial Intermediation
through Financial
Disintermediation: Evidence
from the ECB Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme
4.1 Introduction
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of an economy. They
account for a vast majority of firms and contribute heavily to output and employ-
0This is joint work with Aytekin Ertan (London Business School) and Anya Kleymenova
(University of Chicago). We thank Karthik Balakrishnan, Tim Baldenius, Tobias Berg , Phil Berger,
Matthias Breuer, Charles Calomiris, Indraneel Chakraborty, Qi Chen, Francesca Cornelli, Douglas
Diamond, Yadav Gopalan, Joao Granja, Kinda Hachem, Rainer Haselmann, Lisa Hillmann, Raffi
Indjejikian, Martin Jacob, Sudarshan Jayaraman, Dirk Jenter, Anil Kashyap, Urooj Khan, Randall
Kroszner, Christian Leuz, Scott Liao, Andrew Likierman, Elena Loutskina, Miao Liu, Stefano Lugo,
Garen Markarian, Mike Minnis, Steve Monahan, Max Mueller, Stefan Nagel, DJ Nanda, Valeri
Nikolaev, Erik Peek, Elias Papaioannou, Raghuram Rajan, Lucrezia Reichlin, Helene Rey, Felix
Rutkowski, Haresh Sapra, Catherine Schrand, Adi Sunderam, Jake Thomas, James Traina, Irem Tuna,
Rahul Vashishtha, Florin Vasvari, Stephane Verani, Vikrant Vig, Franco Wong, Frank Zhang for their
helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to the six national central banks for providing us
with a subset of the CSPP data. We thank the European Central Bank for the data on the EC/ECB
Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) and the European DataWarehouse for the
loan-level data and Diana Saakyan for excellent research assistance.
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ment.1However, SMEs have comparatively limited access to credit, are highly depen-
dent on bank financing, and are therefore disproportionately more exposed to credit
market fluctuations (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1995, 1998; Petersen and Rajan, 1994a;
Rice and Strahan, 2010). SMEs’ dependence on bank lending impedes their potential
for growth and remains an important concern that academics and regulators have
studied for decades (e.g., Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; DeYoung,
Gron, Torna, and Winton, 2015; Carbo´-Valverde, Rodr´ıguez-Ferna´ndez, and Udell,
2016). Moreover, SME credit access contracted substantially during the financial crisis
and did not fully recover in the aftermath (Ferrando et al., 2017; Bord et al., 2018;
Corte´s et al., 2018). Accordingly, policymakers and regulators search for policy tools
that can increase the supply of bank credit to SMEs.
Typically, these tools aim to increase banks’ willingness to lend to small businesses
by making this type of lending more attractive to banks. For instance, regulatory
authorities might engage in risk-sharing or provide direct credit guarantees to stimulate
bank lending (Beck et al., 2010). Likewise, policymakers may choose to extend long-
term financing to lenders under the explicit conditions that banks pass on these funds
to designated borrowers, such as consumers and small businesses (as reported in the
ECB Economic Bulletin, no 7, 2015). Despite the appeal of these measures, they do
not monitor banks or provide them with direct economic incentives to engage in new
lending (Duchin and Sosyura, 2014; Stern and Feldman, 2014). Furthermore, these
actions do not seem to create the desired boost to the supply of bank credit to SMEs.
In this paper, we examine whether regulator-led financial disintermediation in
non-SME credit enhances financial intermediation in the SME sector. Banks could
extend more credit to small businesses if large corporate loans become less attractive
and the opportunity cost of lending to SMEs decreases. To investigate how finan-
cial disintermediation in large corporate credit markets affects the availability and
cost of bank financing to SMEs, we exploit a major monetary policy intervention
by the European Central Bank (ECB). In particular, we study the ECB’s latest
outright asset purchase program, the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP),
launched in June 2016. Under this program, member central banks purchase non-
1Ninety nine percent of U.S. and European companies are SMEs. SMEs are also
responsible for two-thirds of employment and an even larger fraction of new jobs.
https://web.archive.org/web/20180212010528/https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes˙en.
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financial investment-grade corporate bonds in the primary and secondary markets,
thus circumventing the banking channel of financial intermediation.2
Why would financial disintermediation for a group of borrowers facilitate financial
intermediation for another group of borrowers? The ECB argues that the CSPP would
increase the supply and liquidity of credit in the economy, reducing the cost of debt for
eligible firms and allowing them to rely (more) on bond financing.3 As a result, banks
with affected corporate borrowers would experience a reduction in demand for their
loans from the corporate sector and smaller yields. The reduced demand by corporate
customers could increase banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. As SMEs are typically
a part of banks’ commercial lending portfolio, they provide a natural substitute to
large corporate loans. On the other hand, banks might not respond to a decline in
large corporate lending by enhancing the credit supply to SMEs. Instead, they might
resort to distributing dividends, investing in non-loan assets, or steering toward other
types of loans, such as mortgages (Chakraborty, Goldstein, and MacKinlay, 2018).
Thus, it is unclear a priori whether regulator-led financial disintermediation is an
effective tool that can induce banks to increase lending to SMEs.
The CSPP setting offers several unique advantages for testing our research question.
First, unlike other unconventional asset purchase programs and refinancing operations
pursued by the ECB or other central banks, the CSPP is a novel example of direct
centralbank lending to nonfinancial corporations.4 Second, with total bond purchases
of more than e178 billion as of 2019, the program is an economically significant
intervention in the commercial credit markets, potentially affecting the population
of firms rather than a few specific borrowers. Third, we can examine a variety of
data essential to study rigorously credit supply and spillover effects of financial
disintermediation. For example, in contrast to other monetary policy interventions, in
which identities of targeted banks and firms often remain undisclosed, the Eurosystem
makes information on bonds purchased under the CSPP public.
As a starting point, we investigate whether affected banks respond to the program
by reallocating funding towards SMEs. We utilize the European Banking Associa-
tion’s (EBA) Transparency Exercise disclosures, whose granular details on banks’
asset composition allow us to distinguish SME lending from large corporate lending.
2The official decision can be found at
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/celex 32016d0016 en txt.pdf. For details, see the Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Dialogue with Mario Draghi (November 28, 2016, and
November 20, 2017). Also, see Mr. Draghi’s letter to the European Parliament dated November 2017:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.mepletter171108˙S&D˙Members.en.pdf
3See, for example, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.mepletter170626 several meps.en.pdf.
4We discuss the ECB’s and other central banks’ unconventional monetary policy programs in
Section 4.2.2
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Consistent with the Eurosystem’s direct lending to corporations, which enhances
financial intermediation in the SME sector, we find that, relative to a control group,
banks directly affected by financial disintermediation—i.e., banks whose borrowers
benefited from the CSPP purchases in the primary market—increase their SME
exposures by 12 percent relative to the sample standard deviation.
Next, we investigate why banks might have refrained from lending to SMEs before
the CSPP. We observe that our main results are stronger for banks that did not have
enough loanable funds (i.e., liquidity-constrained banks) in the pre-CSPP period.
This inference is consistent with the interpretation that an exogenous decline in large
corporate borrowing frees up the balance sheet of constrained banks and induces them
to switch to SME lending (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Corte´s et al., 2018; Schwert, 2018;
Jime´nez, Mian, Peydro´, and Saurina, 2019). It could also be the case that the enhanced
post-CSPP lending to SMEs is not a positive NPV project for banks. This concern
is consistent with Heider, Saidi, and Schepens (2018), who find that the negative
policy rates recently observed in the EU resulted in banks offering loans to overly
risky borrowers. We find, however, that the subsequent level of nonperforming SME
loans of affected banks is no different from that of unaffected banks. Our findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that various frictions in the pre-CSPP period prevented
banks from lending to SMEs.5
The bank-level analysis provides evidence of a link between affected banks and
SME borrowing. However, realized lending or borrowing numbers lead to incomplete
inferences. A positive association between ECB bond purchases and ineligible firms’
access to financing could be driven by local economic trends or demand shocks rather
than the CSPP. We overcome this simultaneity problem by examining the EC/ECB
Survey of Access to Financing by Enterprises (SAFE, or the Survey, hereafter).
The Survey has been conducted semi-annually since 2009 and includes a series of
questions to small businesses to understand their financing conditions and expectations,
as well as operational decisions.6 It also has anonymized firm identifiers but does not
include links between banks and borrowers. Due to this limitation and because the
effects of the CSPP are likely to extend beyond relationship lending, as the basis
of our analysis, we posit that the benefits of financial disintermediation accrue to
5The EBA transparency tests apply to the largest banks operating in Europe, allowing us to
construct a sample of relatively comparable banks. We also use bank fixed effects to control for other
unobservable bank characteristics (Jime´nez et al., 2019). Our results are also robust to controlling
for the choice of the regulatory capital model for banks using model-based internal ratings approach
(IRB) or the standard approach (SA) with fixed rates (Behn, Haselmann, and Wachtel, 2016). We
find that our results continue to hold when we explicitly account for the differences in the choice of
the regulatory capital model.
6For more details, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb surveys/safe/html/index.en.html.
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small businesses in a given industry-region.7 Our analysis of a sample of more than
11,000 SME-half-year observations provides inferences consistent with the CSPP’s
positive effects spilling over to small businesses: SMEs in affected country-industry
grids receive more bank credit, conditional on applying for a loan. Economically, the
likelihood of SMEs obtaining full financing conditional on applying for a loan increases
by about 3 percent, which represents 8 percent of the sample standard deviation.
Another crucial problem that remains even after we focus on a loan application
dataset is the channel through which financial disintermediation operates. The aim of
our study goes beyond a policy evaluation; therefore, we need to establish that the
enhanced credit access by SMEs is driven by banks’ increased willingness to lend to
SMEs, rather than omitted demand-side factors (Khwaja and Mian, 2008). These
confounding effects could be two-fold. First, if CSPP purchases merely target booming
country-industry grids, the policy does not have a causal effect on SMEs and might
be susceptible to a selection bias. Alternatively, the CSPP might indeed have a causal
effect on SMEs, but this effect operates through the strengthening of the corporate
sector. The following example clarifies this explanation. Suppose the CSPP purchases
have been large in the German automobile manufacturing industry, and suppose we
find a relative increase in the access to credit by German SMEs in the automotive
sector. According to this narrative, financing to SMEs increases not because banks
are more willing to lend but simply because large German auto manufacturers’ access
to additional cheaper capital increases the investment and growth opportunities of
German automotive sector SMEs, which do business their large counterparts. These
two issues remain a concern since in these cases, banks increase SME lending not
because they are more willing to lend but because the average applicant SME has
better fundamentals.
To address these issues, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we examine
SMEs’ perceptions on non-bank financing, including trade credit and leasing. If SMEs
affected by the corporate-sector financial disintermediation also enjoy improvements
in fundamentals and get more bank credit as a result, then these SMEs should be
confident about all types of external financing.8 Our tests, however, show this not to be
the case. Second, we also isolate the effect of financial disintermediation incremental to
bond issuance. If our inferences are an artifact of regional or sectoral dynamics rather
7This definition is consistent with local features of SMEs and is supported by prior work, which
documents that companies in the same industries and regions compete for funds (e.g., Cetorelli and
Strahan, 2006).
8These tests examine SMEs’ perceptions, not actual financing. This is an important distinction,
since realized financing decisions may be insufficient evidence as they are affected by the pecking
order of external financing.
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than the ECB’s actions, CSPP purchases should have no impact on SME credit access
once we account for the amount of corporate bond issuance in that country-industry
grid. After all, bond issuances in a particular region or sector should be a better
indicator of improved economic conditions than the ECB’s primary market purchases.
We find, however, that purchases under the CSPP continue to explain a significant
amount of variation in SME credit access after controlling for bond issuance.9 This
result also allows us to rule out that the increased access of SMEs to financing is
only due to decreasing bond yields, and consequently increased reliance and issuance
of bonds.10 Finally, in additional analyses, we also provide direct evidence that our
inferences are not driven by other policies implemented by the ECB (e.g., TLTRO)
or banks’ choice of the regulatory capital model.
We supplement our inferences on credit supply by using a novel dataset that
contains bank–borrower links and borrower financials from the Bureau van Dijk’s
Amadeus database. We find that SMEs, whose relationship banks are affected by the
CSPP, get on average e77,750 more credit, compared to SMEs in the same country
and industry and over the same period. This crucial analysis does not only eliminate
lingering concerns about confounding economic trends and developments that might
vary within-country and across-industries, but it also exploits a direct link between
banks and SMEs that we are unable to use in the EBA and Survey tests.
Utilizing a large sample of SME loan-level data, we also document that SMEs
in the industry-regions that are more exposed to disintermediation are also more
likely to report a reduction in interest costs. SMEs are also less likely to refuse a
loan because the offered interest rate is too high. Overall, our results indicate that
financial disintermediation in the corporate sector leads to a reduction in the cost of
borrowing for SMEs, which is in line with an exogenous decline in the cost of credit
in the corporate bond markets inducing banks to reduce their interest margins.
Finally, we shift our focus to real effects. Prior literature documents that when
banks deny credit to borrowers, this often leads to negative consequences for firms
and ultimately for the overall economy (Bernanke, 1983; Berg, 2018). Our setting
allows us to measure whether SMEs use increased access to financing to fund their
real activities. We find that affected SMEs are more likely to use newly obtained
9Our additional placebo tests focusing on the period prior to the CSPP’s implementation also
confirm our conclusions that it is CSPP purchases rather than other trends in the data that drive
our results.
10Our focus on the primary market bond purchases within a country-industry-gird captures the
supply effect. We also conduct several robustness tests to take into account the shocks to supply and
demand for financing (in the spirit of Khwaja and Mian, 2008; Behn et al., 2016). For a subset of
SMEs that appear multiple times in the Survey data we include firm fixed effects and find similar
results.
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bank financing to increase capital investment and hire more employees, rather than to
finance working capital or refinance their existing debt. These inferences are consistent
with central bank lending in the large corporate sector boosting the real activities of
SMEs.11
Even though our inferences suggest that financial disintermediation increases
banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs and affects the latter positively, we draw these
conclusions based on the time right after the policy shock. However, are these changes
due to banks’ short-term portfolio reallocations or a longer-term structural change
in bank lending relationships with SMEs? To shed some light on this question, we
examine whether the effect of financial disintermediation changes over time. We find
that in the longer term, financial disintermediation has an insignificant effect on
banks’ SME exposures and a substantially smaller influence on the likelihood of SMEs’
credit access. Likewise, the impact of financial disintermediation on employment
and investment disappears over time. Overall, these findings suggest that while the
effects we document are positive, they are somewhat short-lived and do not have a
structural impact on SME access to credit and ability to invest into real activities in
the long-run.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. The inferences we
present shed new light on the financing and operating activities of small businesses.
SMEs are a crucial engine of economic growth and are heavily bank-dependent,
yet they face considerable obstacles to access financing (World Bank, 2013).12 Our
conclusions extend the literature on SMEs by suggesting that regulator-led financial
disintermediation in the corporate sector could be an effective short-term solution
for SMEs’ credit access problems by inducing banks to increase lending to small
businesses, which remains (or becomes) an attractive investment option for banks.
Furthermore, we document the formation of new borrowing relationships for SMEs
and the impact that credit access has on their real activities (Petersen and Rajan,
1994b; Berger and Udell, 1995; Amore, Schneider, and Zˇaldokas, 2013).
11We also investigate the real effects of financial disintermediation on banks. In keeping with
enhanced SME lending entailing greater lender-borrower interaction and more monitoring, we find a
relative increase in affected banks’ number of branches and employees.
12Prior studies offer a variety of solutions to the SME financing problem: public credit guaran-
tees (Beck et al., 2010), lenders’ information sharing (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), stronger property
rights (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008), more effective collateral regulations (Campello
and Larrain, 2016; Calomiris, Larrain, Liberti, and Sturgess, 2017), and more efficient technologies,
which facilitate transactional lending (de la Torre, Mart´ınez Per´ıa, and Schmukler, 2010). Berger and
Udell (2006) identify asset-based lending, factoring, small business credit scoring, and trade credit as
potential remedies to bridge the SME financing gap.
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In the specific context of the CSPP, Grosse-Rueschkamp, Steffen, and Streitz (2019)
and Arce, Gimeno, and Mayordomo (2017) show empirically that ECB purchases
of eligible bonds lead to affected corporate borrowers substituting bank lending
with bond issuances. The authors argue that banks then increase lending to private
firms and report some compelling evidence relating to evaluating the CSPP as a
policy intervention. The difference between our work and these papers is that we
identify the bank-lending channel by investigating loan applications, by holding credit
demand constant, and by removing confounding factors that could have improved
the fundamentals and investment opportunities of applicant firms. Our empirical
research design and data allow us to go this extra mile and shed light on the underlying
mechanism. This endeavor is a critical contribution in this setting because both supply
and demand factors could explain the changes in SME financing, yet the implications
of these channels would be completely different.13 Indeed, possibly due to tighter
identification, our conclusions are different from the papers studying the same policy
shock. For example, despite the promising short-term trends, our inferences cast doubt
on the structural effects of financial disintermediation. Also, unlike the other work
on the CSPP, we find no effect for capital-constrained banks. This result is intuitive
because CSPP-ineligible borrowers, like SMEs, would require a much larger risk weight
allocation than investment-grade corporates, rendering an increase in lending to SMEs
particularly difficult for capital-constrained banks. In this sense, our findings are in
line with Corte´s et al. (2018), who find that capital-constrained banks reduce their
lending to SMEs, and with Schwert (2018), who shows that bank-dependent borrowers
are more likely to borrow from well-capitalized banks.
We also show that this increase in lending to SMEs comes directly from the ECB’s
primary market bond purchases and not from the general rise in liquidity in the
secondary bond market or from increased bond issuances overall. This important
difference is another novel feature of our research. The aforementioned papers investi-
gate primary and secondary market purchases together, which allows a comprehensive
evaluation of the CSPP as a policy intervention. In contrast, our investigation of
financial disintermediation focuses exclusively on primary market purchases because
secondary market purchases do not constitute an example of financial disintermedia-
tion. In fact, the CSPP’s secondary market purchases are quite similar to the ECB’s
then-existing asset purchase programs (i.e., PSPP, ABSPP, and CBPP3).
13Similar to Ferrando et al. (2017); Ferrando, Popov, and Udell (2018), our identification approach
allows us to measure supply effects directly from the firm-level Survey dataset designed for this
purpose and to be representative for the overall Eurozone economy. This type of data has been used
in other studies, which analyze the credit crunch in Europe during the financial crisis (Beck et al.,
2008; Popov and Udell, 2012; Ferrando et al., 2017).
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Finally, from a broad macroeconomic perspective, a number of studies have
investigated the efficacy of unconventional monetary policy tools.14 Related to this
line of work, we document that financial disintermediation in the corporate sector
enhances financial intermediation in the SME sector by leading banks to rebalance
their portfolios. We also observe that SMEs experience higher availability of bank
funding at a cheaper cost, which they utilize to invest in real activities. However, we
also show that the positive effects we observe are short-lived, which questions the
structural efficacy of financial disintermediation. Collectively, we contribute to the
emerging literature on the impact of unconventional monetary policy interventions.
More generally, our findings on the impact of financial disintermediation extend the
theoretical and empirical work that studies substitution between bank and bond
financing (e.g., Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek, 2014a,b; Bolton and Freixas, 2000;
Crouzet, 2018; de Fiore and Uhlig, 2011, 2015; Diamond, 1991; Santos and Winton,
2008).
4.2 Institutional Background
4.2.1 Description of the CSPP
Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, the Governing Council of the European Central
Bank (ECB) has taken extraordinary steps to stabilize prices and stimulate the
economy and job creation in the Eurozone. By January 2016, the ECB had lowered
the nominal interest rates to negative values and started to purchase marketable debt
instruments from banks. With very few other tools left at its disposal, on March
10, 2016, the ECB announced a novel program to increase inflation aimed directly
14These papers mostly focus on quantitative easing (QE) in the US or asset purchases in Europe.
Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch (2019) find that the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions
helped to stabilize European periphery countries but did not have any meaningful positive real effects
likely because of banks’ zombie lending and borrowers’ cash hoarding. In this regard, the conclusions
of Acharya et al. (2019) echo the importance of our tests on SMEs’ relationship formation and
investment undertakings. Studying the impact of QE in the US, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017)
find that large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve have a positive effect on banks most
exposed to the QE programs (i.e., banks with significant holdings of mortgage-backed securities).
These banks in turn also significantly increase their lending.
90 Financial Intermediation through Financial Disintermediation
at the corporate sector (ECB, 2016a).15 Launched on June 8, 2016, the Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) allows designated central banks in the Eurozone
to purchase corporate bonds in the primary and secondary markets. Corporate
debt instruments are eligible for the CSPP if they satisfy the following criteria: 1)
denominated in euros; 2) have investment-grade credit rating (as determined by
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch Ratings, or DBMS); 3) have remaining maturity
longer than six months, but shorter than 31 years at the time of purchase; 4) satisfy
eligible collateral requirements under the Eurosystem collateral framework for credit
operations; 5) issued by a company incorporated in the euro area, but may have a
parent company outside of the Eurozone; and 6) issued by a non-bank corporation,
whereby both the issuer and its parents are not subject to banking supervision.16
While the ECB supervises the bond purchase program, the actual purchases are
carried out by Belgian, Finnish, French, German, Italian and Spanish central banks.
These six national central banks are responsible for purchases based on the geographic
location of the borrower. The amount of purchases from the overall allocated volume
is based on these banks’ contribution to the Eurosystem. Central banks are instructed
not to differentiate among securities whose parent operates in the Eurozone, nor favor
local securities over foreign securities that are under the responsibility of a particular
central bank.
The ECB refrains from announcing in advance the total volume it intends to
purchase in a given week to allow for flexibility in providing additional liquidity to
bond markets if needed. In addition, national central banks are only allowed to buy
up to 70 percent of the outstanding amount, and on the issuer-group level, there
is an unspecified cap to ensure “a diversified allocation of purchases across issuers”
(ECB, 2016b). The six national central banks do not provide a direct overview of the
securities purchased on both the primary and secondary market, but instead, offer
15We choose the CSPP as our setting because of its economic significance and because it provides
us with the necessary data to examine our research question. We note, however, that the CSPP is
not the only corporate bond purchase program in history. In fact, the Bank of England (BOE) and
the Bank of Japan (BOJ) have conducted similar operations. These activities, however, were limited
to the secondary market purchases and were significantly smaller in magnitude (BOE’s cumulative
purchases amount to some 11 billion euros, while BOJ’s monthly purchases are less than 1 billion
euros). As for other programs pursued by central banks to date, the CSPP is fundamentally different
from the ECB’s SMP and the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases, which targeted financial
entities only.
16See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/cspp-qa.en.html for details on
CSPP eligibility criteria.
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weekly updates on these securities. In Section 4.3 below, we discuss how we infer the
volume of corporate bond purchases under the CSPP.17
4.2.2 The CSPP and the ECB’s Other Monetary Policy Inter-
ventions
To maintain price stability in the post-financial and sovereign crises Eurozone, the
ECB has followed several strategies, including open market operations, standing
facilities, minimum reserve requirements, and asset purchase programs. The CSPP is
an example of an asset purchase program—a category that also includes the ECB’s
purchase of covered bonds, asset-backed securities, and public sector securities.18
These other asset purchase programs provide a significant amount of liquidity to
Eurozone banks. However, their initiation does not overlap with that of the CSPP;
these policies have been in place for at least a few years.19 For covered bonds, asset-
backed securities, and public sector securities purchase programs to confound our
inferences, their initiation or changes in amounts purchased should coincide with the
introduction of the CSPP. As Online Appendix Figure OAI shows, this is not the
case.20 Likewise, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements do not directly
target private sector credit and seldom vary in the cross-section of banks.
As for the open market operations, the ECB pursues two types of such actions,
which differ from one another in terms of procedure, clauses, frequency, and objectives.
“Main refinancing operations” have short maturity (typically a week) and aim for
regular liquidity provision. Administered by national central banks, these activities
provide the majority of refinancing to Eurozone banks. The second type of refinancing
efforts pursued by the ECB is “longer-term refinancing operations.” Whereas regular
long-term refinancing operations have a maturity of about one to three months,
17European Union countries also have specific credit guarantee schemes to address SMEs credit
gaps. Since these schemes were in existence before the CSPP intervention, we use the CSPP as a
setting to identify an incremental effect of financial disintermediation in the presence of existing
credit guarantee schemes (see Chatzouz, Gereben, Lang, and Torfs, 2017, for more information on
credit guarantees in Europe).
18Other outright asset purchases by the ECB are the currently active Public Sector Purchase
Programme (PSPP), Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP), and the third Covered
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3), as well as the terminated Securities Market Programme
(SMP) and the first two Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (CBPP and CBPP2). By refinancing
operations, we mean the ECB’s non-traditional repo activities, including the Long-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTRO) and the targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO I and II).
19The ABSPP started in November 2014, the CBPP3 commenced in October 2014, and the PSPP
began in March 2015. These dates are included in the pre-treatment period of our tests; therefore,
the effects of these programs are already included in our baseline.
20For details, see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
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targeted longer-term refinancing operations, or TLTROs, could have maturities of up
to 48 months.
Unlike in its regular refinancing operations with liquidity objectives, through
TLTROs, the ECB aims to enhance credit to the private sector by providing banks
with stable funding at affordable prices (i.e., negative rates). The first TLTRO series
was conducted in 2014, while TLTRO II was announced in March 2016, launched in
June 2016, and performed quarterly over the following 12 months. Under TLTRO II,
which allowed banks to borrow an amount of up to 30% of their outstanding eligible
loans, the ECB allotted about 235 billion euros to 474 banks.21
TLTROs are related to the CSPP for two main reasons. First, the TLTRO period
(the second wave) overlaps with the CSPP period. Second, the ECB’s targeted lending
to the Eurozone banks requires recipient banks to use these funds only for lending
to non-financial corporations and households, including SMEs. Similar to the CSPP,
the effects of TLTROs vary highly in the cross-section of banks, with certain banks
obtaining funding under these programs. We note that target refinancing could interact
with or confound the effects of the CSPP. Accordingly, in Section 4.4 and the Online
Appendix, we discuss the implications of TLTROs (and, to a lesser extent, of other
monetary policy interventions) on our inferences.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Measuring CSPP Exposures
We use two main independent variables in our study. Disintermediation is the total
amount of corporate bonds that the ECB has purchased in the primary market in
a particular country-industry and Affected Bank is an indicator variable taking the
value of one for banks with clients whose corporate bonds have been purchased on the
primary market by the ECB.22 The ECB does not release the specific trade-level data
for CSPP but instead provides an overview of new securities purchased on a bi-weekly
basis as well as the total purchase amounts for securities acquired in both the primary
and secondary markets. This allows us to estimate which securities were purchased
on the primary market and the ECB investment amount per security under the
assumption that the ECB buys the same percentage of all bonds it purchased on the
primary market in a given month. More precisely, the ECB investment in a particular
21For more details, please see:
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ebbox201704 03.en.pdf?4c92fdae71b53a5515155bd2678e8157.
22In the robustness tests, we use a continuous measure based on the value of corporate bonds
purchased relative to the affected banks overall corporate loan portfolio.
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bond is defined as the bond tranche value divided by the total tranche values of
all securities purchased by the ECB in the primary market during a given month
and multiplied by the total monthly amount of all ECB purchases in the primary
market (see Section 4.2 for more details on the CSPP’s primary and secondary market
purchases.).
We extract all weekly updates on security lending from the participating national
central banks’ websites starting from May 9, 2017. For prior periods, we obtain our
data directly from the six national banks. All weekly overviews begin in the third week
of July 2016, which corresponds to the initial coverage of the CSPP by the media. As
the CSPP started its operations on June 8, 2016, we cannot accurately determine
whether bonds were purchased in the primary or secondary markets between June 8
and the first public reporting of bond purchases in July and hence exclude from our
analyses the 13 bonds issued during this period. We compare the date that securities
appear for the first time on the securities lending overview with their issue date to
classify the bond as a primary or secondary market purchase. We categorize a central
bank purchase as a primary market purchase if the security’s ISIN appears on the
central bank’s security lending overview within eight days of the issue date. This
approach allows us to account for bonds that are not settled on the issue date.
We aggregate all primary market purchases by the ECB at the country-industry-
time level and deflate them by the total of all bonds outstanding in that specific
country-industry grid as of June 1, 2016 (i.e., before the start of the CSPP) to compute
our main variable of interest (Disintermediation). The total bonds outstanding data is
from Dealogic and used to make our dependent variable comparable across countries
and industries. Our second dependent variable, Affected Bank, is an indicator that
takes the value of one when a bank has at least one client with corporate bonds
purchased by the ECB in the primary market. We obtain the bank-client relationships
from Dealogic and Amadeus.
We make several important design choices in our study. First, we focus specifically
on the ECB’s primary market purchases as the capital market effects of CSPP
purchases in the primary and secondary markets differ. In particular, for this study,
purchases in the primary market represent directly affected eligible borrowers’ ability
to raise new financing in the public debt market. Secondary market purchases, on the
other hand, have a more indirect effect through increased bond market liquidity and
therefore decreased marginal cost of new debt issuance in the public debt market.
Second, we perform our test of affected banks on the bank level instead of the
bank-parent level. The main advantage is that this allows us to better control for
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country-specific trends that affect SME lending through country fixed effects. We
have conducted our tests also on the bank-parent-level and find similar results.
4.3.2 Sample Construction
We use several data sources in our study. We start our analyses by examining the
effect of the CSPP on large EU bank exposures to corporate and SME borrowers
using the exposures data from the EBA regulatory disclosures related to the 2016
and 2017 Transparency Exercises. The transparency exercises and stress tests cover
the largest banks in the European Union and include bank-level information from
2015 to 2017. We then combine this data with the Dealogic syndicated loan dataset
and CSPP purchases to identify which banks lent money to companies that received
a direct investment by the ECB when they issued corporate bonds.23
To study the impact of financial disintermediation on SMEs more directly, we rely
on the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE). The critical role of the
Survey for our study is that it allows us to hold constant any confounding demand
effects and focus directly on the supply of bank credit to SMEs.24 It is crucial to
highlight that the Survey is the source used by the ECB itself for the evaluation of
the impact of its monetary policy interventions on small businesses.25 The Survey
also allows us to study the effects of the CSPP on a very timely basis—before the
real actions are observable in financial statements—and for a group of firms that
are typically not well covered by financial databases.26 The Survey is a collection
of sensitive information about small businesses, which, for privacy reasons, masks
company identities and is not very granular about industry information (providing
23The Dealogic dataset contains 75,183 outstanding loans and credit facilities in the EU with
a maturity later than June 1, 2016, and issued before June 1, 2016. Dealogic also provides full
firm-parent and bank-parent hierarchy structures with identifiers that are fully compatible across
the DCM bond and Loan datasets. This allows us to link firms that issue bonds purchased by the
ECB via their loans and bank subsidiaries to the banks included in the EBA regulatory disclosures.
We exclude a handful of banks that appear in the EBA regulatory disclosures but not in Dealogic
DCM or Loans datasets. Most of these banks are subsidiaries of foreign banks from outside of the
EU. We believe this is a conservative assumption allowing us to focus on banks that we can identify
with a high degree of certainty as being directly affected by the CSPP.
24To sidestep this problem, one can resort to cross-sectional analyses by linking eligible borrowers
to non-eligible borrowers in various ways, including sharing the same bank, industry, or geographical
region. Since these links would also be affected by changes in credit demand, any such inferences
would remain confounded and misleading.
25See, for example, https://www.bis.org/review/r160623b.pdf.
26See Balakrishnan and Ertan (2018) and Ferrando et al. (2017) for a description of the Survey
data and its geographical coverage.
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industry information on the aggregate level of six sectors). For this reason, we exploit
the industry variation in CSPP purchases at a somewhat coarse level.27
We gather information on firms’ bank relationships through two different data
sources. First, we use the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Bankers dataset that contains
all bank relationships between banks and private and public firms. This dataset
includes rich information on countries and industries; however, Amadeus does not
report this data historically. In our tests, therefore, we compare a snapshot of this
dataset containing bank relationships as of 2014 and 2015 to a snapshot of banking
relationships as of 2016 and 2017. We also manually match banks from the EBA
data to Amadeus bank relationship data to identify directly affected SME borrowers.
We use borrower-level financial information from the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus
Financials Dataset.28
We supplement our analysis using the detailed data provided by the ECB Loan-
Level Disclosure (LLD) Initiative (Ertan, Loumioti, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2017).
The contract-level data comes from the ECB member banks’ disclosures of loan-
level details of the SME-loan-backed securities they offer as collateral to borrow
from the ECB standing facilities programs. These disclosures include information
on the performance and structure of individual loans and have been reported in a
standardized format every quarter since 2013. We focus on loans issued during the
CSPP period and identify a sample of 327,452 individual SME loan contracts, which
we use to analyze the impact of the program on loan characteristics, such as interest
rates. We also use SNL Financial data for bank-specific characteristics.
4.4 Empirical Methodology and Results
In this section, we introduce our empirical research design and discuss how we use the
combined data to study the spillover and real effects of financial disintermediation for
27According to the ECB, in the most recent waves of the survey, the typical response rate was
12–14 percent, with country-specific rates 7–19 percent for wave 17. The ECB also conducts validity
checks to ensure accurate responses to questions. In particular, validity and consistency checks are
run both by the survey company and by the ECB. Some additional quality checks are performed,
for example, on the variable on interest rates (Q8b), which is also checked against official interest
rates statistics. Finally, the ordering of questions in the survey is respected by the interviewers and
questions always appear in the same order.
28For a more frequently updated but smaller sample, we use (syndicated) loan data from the
Dealogic Loans database. This option allows us to create a panel dataset on a quarterly basis and to
determine whether firms (1) obtain a new loan, (2) establish a new bank relationship or (3) have a
new bank as a contributor on a new syndicated loan. A new relationship in this context is defined as
a bank with whom the company has not had an active borrower relationship in the prior six months.
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large borrowers on bank lending to SMEs using banks’ and industry exposure to the
CSPP as our setting.
4.4.1 Banks’ Exposure to SMEs
We first examine whether large European banks change their exposure to corporate
and SME borrowers following the introduction of the CSPP. To do so, we estimate
the following standard differences-in-differences (DiD) model at the bank-half-year
level:
(4.1)SME Exposurebt = β1Affected Bank b × Post CSPP t + γXbt + αb + δt + bt
where b indexes banks and t indicates time, which, in these tests, is a half-year,
as per the frequency of the EBA data αb and δt are bank and time fixed effects,
respectively. Affected Bank and Post CSPP are the two components of the DiD model.
Affected Bank is an indicator that equals one if the bank in question has at least one
large corporate borrower with bonds purchased by the Eurosystem under the CSPP.29
(We use a continuous version of this variable as a robustness check.) Post CSPP
switches on for the two half-year data points after the implementation of the CSPP:
2016H2 and 2017H1. This data is from the results of the 2017 Transparency Exercise.
(The two data points from the pre-CSPP period are 2015H2 and 2016H1 and are from
the results of the 2016 Transparency Exercise.) SME Exposure is bank b’s exposure
to SMEs relative to its total exposures at time t. Xbt is a vector of control variables,
consisting of banks’ exposures to the corporate sector (CORP Exposure) measured
as bank b’s relative exposure to the corporate borrowers (excluding SMEs) at time
t. We obtain SME and corporate sector exposures from the regulatory disclosures
because information on European banks’ asset composition, and especially details of
commercial lending, is not available in other publicly available databases. Given our
reliance on the EBA’s regulatory disclosures, which encompass the biggest banks in
Europe, both affected and non-affected banks are all relatively large entities and have
a statistically indistinguishable size of SME portfolios relative to their total assets.
29We have also conducted our tests with an alternative definition for affected banks, where the
affected bank indicator is one for banks that had at least one lender-borrower relationship end in a
half-year in which that particular borrower received CSPP financing from the Eurosystem. These
results are similar to those in Table 4.2. There are two reasons to rely on the current definition.
First, Dealogic does not provide much detail on discontinued loans, which forces us to rely simply on
maturity dates or estimate which deal has replaced which other deal. Second, we believe that a bank
is also affected when a borrower that receives CSPP financing reduces its borrowing or would not
borrow money it would have absent CSPP financing.
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Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample used in our empirical
analyses. As shown in Panel A, almost half of the observations are from the post-CSPP
period, while half of the sample banks are affected by the CSPP (Affected Banks).
SME lending constitutes 8.2 percent of banks’ total exposures. By comparison, bank
exposures to large corporate borrowers are bigger, with an average of about 13 percent
of total exposures.
We present the estimation results of equation (4.1) in Table 4.2, which shows
that the sample banks affected by financial disintermediation (i.e., banks whose
borrowers have benefited from direct purchases of their bonds by the ECB) increase
their exposures to SMEs relative to unaffected banks.30 Columns (1) through (6) of
Table 4.2 show the results of three specifications for SME exposures, all of which
exhibit significant positive increases. We find that on average, exposures to SMEs
at affected banks increase by a relative 2.28 percent if we take into account time
fixed effects, 2.03 percent if we also use country fixed effects, and 0.95 percent if we
also use bank-specific fixed effects.31 These results are economically meaningful as
well, respectively representing 28 percent, 25 percent and 12 percent of the sample
standard deviation of SME exposures.
Next, we control for banks’ exposures to the corporate sector. Columns (4) to
(6) of Table 4.2, Panel A show that banks with corporate exposures are also more
likely to have exposures to the SME sector. In specifications (5) and (6), we also
control for the pre-treatment trend by introducing an interaction variable of Affected
Bank × Pre CSPP, which takes the value of one for banks exposed to corporate
borrowers affected by the CSPP in the period before 2016H2. We find no evidence of
a differential trend before the introduction of the CSPP. In specification (6), we use
Affected Bank as a continuous variable, which equals the natural logarithm of banks
percentage exposure to corporate borrowers whose bonds are purchased under the
CSPP. This estimation model also supports our main inferences. Overall, our first set
of findings suggests that the large EU banks with borrowers who have benefited from
financial disintermediation appear to increase their exposures to SMEs following the
introduction of the CSPP.
Thus far, we find that banks increased their lending to SMEs following the
commencement of financial disintermediation in the corporate sector. However, this
might not be sufficient to address the concerns regarding why banks were not lending
30In our models, we take into account the within-bank correlation by including clustering of
standard errors by banks.
31Each model includes individual indicators for Affected Bank and Post CSPP as well. The
coefficients on these terms are not identified in the presence of bank and time fixed effects, respectively.
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to SMEs before the introduction of the CSPP. If lending to SMEs is profitable and
represents a positive NPV opportunity for a given level of risk and funding costs, we
would have expected banks to lend to SMEs prior to the CSPP intervention in the
absence of economic frictions. We therefore investigate whether banks that might have
been relatively liquidity- or capital-constrained before financial disintermediation in
the corporate sector were less likely to lend to the SME sector prior to the CSPP
intervention. We measure liquidity as a ratio of liquid assets relative to deposits in
2015 (i.e., before the start of our pre-period). Similarly, capital corresponds to the
regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio at the end of 2015. We multiply both of these ratios by
minus one for ease of interpretation.
Column (1) of Panel B in Table 4.2 shows that, among affected banks, those with
greater liquidity constraints become significantly more likely to lend to SME borrowers
following the introduction of the CSPP. Column (2) shows that relatively capital-
constrained banks do not incrementally increase their lending to SMEs following the
introduction of CSPP. This is not surprising as SME loans tend to be relatively riskier
and hence might result in a higher capital charge for banks, therefore, suggesting
that capital-constrained banks are less likely to increase lending to SMEs even in the
presence of financial disintermediation.32 Our findings on capital-constrained banks
are also consistent with Corte´s et al. (2018), who document that capital-constrained
banks reduce their lending to SMEs relative to unconstrained banks.
To validate our inferences, we conduct two sets of robustness analyses, the results of
which are included in the Online Appendix. First, we test the sensitivity of our choice
of the dependent variable (i.e., SME exposure as a proportion of total exposures).
To minimize the concern that a decline in corporate exposures may mechanically
trigger a relative increase in SME exposures as a fraction of total exposures, we define
this dependent variable in raw values (billions of euros). As can be seen from Online
Appendix Table OAI, our conclusions continue to hold.
The second robustness test we undertake relates to the concurrent monetary policy
interventions conducted by the ECB. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, TLTRO II appears
to be the most relevant program because it overlaps with the CSPP, affects the
cross-section of banks differently, and requires banks to lend to non-financial entities,
including SMEs. We tackle this problem by controlling for TLTRO (an indicator
variable that switches on only if Bloomberg records include a TLTRO borrowing by
32Another potential friction that might create constraints on banks’ lending choices is government
intervention through liquidity support, recapitalization and full nationalization prior to and during
our sample period (see, for example, Kleymenova, Rose, and Wieladek, 2016; Rose and Wieladek,
2014). We find that banks that received government support were less likely to increase lending to
SMEs than banks that received no government support.
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the bank). The estimates presented in column (1) of Online Appendix Table OAII
show that our main inferences do not change, in that Affected Bank × Post CSPP has
a positive and significant coefficient after controlling for TLTRO. (We also note that
TLTRO banks increase SME lending, consistent with the objectives of the program.)
In columns (2) and (3), we present our findings from a subsample that is limited
to banks that borrow (column 3) or do not borrow (column 2) under TLTRO. In
both cases, we continue to find that exposure to the CSPP and resulting financial
disintermediation in the corporate sector enhances bank lending to SMEs. Finally,
TLTRO programs provide access to long-term financing for banks at a fixed rate based
on existing funding available through the Eurosystem. While the amount that banks
could borrow is indeed derived from their lending portfolio to the non-financial sector,
the fact that the CSPP was introduced alongside TLTRO suggests that the former
is complementary to the existing programs (including TLTRO). Hence, financial
disintermediation via the CSPP represents a separate macroeconomic policy tool
aimed at strengthening the pass-through of asset purchases to ease corporate financing
conditions and credit growth ultimately creating financial disintermediation in the
corporate sector and providing positive spillover effects to credit access for SMEs.
In addition to the robustness analyses above, we also perform tests on banks’
non-SME exposure levels. This investigation helps us provide a fuller picture of the
affected banks’ portfolio decisions and shed light on the substitution effect we propose.
Here, we estimate the regression in equation (4.1) with corporate assets and all other
non-corporate, non-SME exposures on the left-hand side. The results shown in Online
Appendix Table OAIII provide economically meaningful insights. Column (1) includes
our main result on SMEs shown in Tableekt˙dynamic. Consistent with our prediction
that financial disintermediation reduces commercial bank lending to corporations, we
observe a decrease in affected banks’ corporate exposures post-CSPP (column (2)).
We do not find a significant fluctuation in banks’ other exposures post-CSPP (column
(3)).
The EBA’s regulatory exercises apply to the largest banks operating in Europe,
leading to a sample comprising relatively similar banks. Unobserved bank effects,
therefore, do not pose a significant threat to our inferences, especially once we account
for bank fixed effects (Jimenez et al., 2014). However, we perform two additional tests
to ensure that time-varying bank confounds do not drive the effect that we attribute
to financial disintermediation in line with Behn et al. (2016). First, we identify banks
that rely on internal ratings-based (IRB) approach and then interact this indicator
variable with each half year. Second, we repeat the same exercise for bank size, as we
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create a dummy for large banks (i.e., entities with above-median total euro exposures
every half-year). These two additional sets of regressors help us verify whether our
conclusions are an artifact of banks’ size or risk-modeling practices. Untabulated tests
alleviate this concern. Specifically, we find coefficients of 0.94 and 1.39 for our DiD
estimator (both statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance) when we
control for IRB-time and bank-size-time fixed effects, respectively.
4.4.2 SME Credit Access
Next, we examine the effects of the CSPP corporate bond purchases on SMEs’ ability
to access bank financing. Specifically, we estimate the following cross-sectional model:
SME Credit Accessit+1 = β1Disintermediationcjt + γXit + νcj + λct + σjt + it+1
(4.2)
where i indexes firms, t indicates half-year survey data frequency (survey waves),
c corresponds to a country and j to an industry. νcj are country-industry fixed effects,
λct are country-time fixed effects and σjt are industry-time fixed effects. Xit is a
vector of control variables. SME Credit Access corresponds to SMEs’ responses to the
Survey question 7b a, which asks companies about the outcome of their application
for bank loans in the prior six months. One key contribution of our paper is that
we keep the demand for credit constant, which we do by concentrating exclusively
on companies that apply for a bank loan. In particular, SME borrowing could be
cyclical, which may coincide with the implementation of unconventional monetary
policy. Examining the survey and focusing on the subset of SME borrowers seeking
credit help us address this concern.
We define SME Credit Access as an indicator variable that takes the value of one
if applicants receive the full amount of the loan they apply for and zero if they receive
less than the full amount or if their application is unsuccessful. Since not all firms
apply for credit, we observe this variable for 11,180 observations. Panel B of Table 4.1
presents the summary statistics of the Survey variables we use in our analyses. SME
Access to Bank Credit has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.802 (0.398) and median
of 1, suggesting that the average SME firm in our sample obtains a full amount of
the loan it seeks.
Our primary variable of interest, Disintermediation, is the intensity of the CSPP
impact in a given country and industry. More specifically, Disintermediation is
measured as the aggregate corporate bond purchases by the ECB in the primary
market within a country-SAFE industry during the corresponding wave period and
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deflated by the total value of all bonds outstanding in the country-SAFE industry.
This variable is zero for the survey observations before June 2016 and the country-
industry grids without eligible corporate bond purchases in the post-June 2016 Survey
waves. For ease of interpretation, we express this amount in percentage points. Panel
B of Table 4.1 shows that the average share of CSPP purchases for industries and
countries represented in the Survey is 0.09 percent of total bonds outstanding at the
time of the Survey (including zeros).
An important innovation of this paper is that our disintermediation variable
captures the actual purchases of corporate bonds by the Eurosystem and allows us
to exploit the variation in purchases over time, across targeted industries and in the
magnitude of purchases relative to the country-industry size. Our fixed effects structure
also allows us to estimate the effect of CSPP purchases on SME financing much more
precisely than if we were to do this on a country level, as we can control for the
changing economic fundamentals in that particular country or industry. Furthermore,
given that the ECB has the goal to provide the same relative amount of quantitative
easing per country, a country-level analysis would therefore be less desirable as it
relies solely on mistiming of this principle and would lack clear controls for changing
economic fundamentals.
We also control for SME characteristics based on the demographic information
available in the Survey. In particular, we control for SME size, measured as one
if annual sales are up to e2 million, two if annual sales are between e2 and 10
million, three if sales are between e10 and 50 million, and four if sales are over e50
million. Table 4.1, Panel B shows that the average size of SMEs in our sample is
2.18, corresponding to firms with annual sales of between e2 and 10 million. SME
age measures the age of the company and varies between one (one to two years)
and four (older than 10 years). The average SME firm in our sample ranges in age
from five to older than 10 years. We also control for the change in credit quality
over the prior six months (SME credit quality) and change in profitability (SME
profitability growth). These ordinal variables range in values from one (credit quality
deteriorated) to three (credit quality improved) and one (profitability decreased) to
three (profitability increased). Panel B of Table 4.1 indicates that, on average, SMEs’
credit quality and profitability growth remained the same. We also control for overall
bond issuances in a given country-industry grid (Bond issuance). Panel B of Table 4.1
shows that on average, 2.58 percent of bonds were issued during our sample period
relative to all bonds outstanding in the same country-industry and time.
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We estimate SMEs’ credit access model in the post-CSPP period after June
2016, as well as during the full period from 2015 to 2017. While the post-CSPP
period analysis focuses on the cross-sectional variation, the full period is effectively
a difference-in-differences (DiD) specification, in which we compare SMEs’ access
to financing before and after the introduction of the CSPP. In this estimation, the
Disintermediation, which is a continuous variable, captures the heterogeneous intensity
of the CSPP impact.
In additional tests, we also examine SMEs’ views on external financing. We do so
to address the lingering concern that even if we hold the demand for credit constant,
some of our inferences might be driven by increasing credit quality or fundamentals
of SMEs. This could be a problem, especially if the Eurosystem targets booming
industries.33 Even though there is no reason to believe that CSPP purchases are
statistical artifacts of country-industry performance, we deal with this potential
problem by comparing the variation in Bank Loan Availability to that in Trade Credit
Availability and Lease Financing Availability. If the CSPP has a genuine impact,
we should observe that SMEs perceive an increase in the supply of bank funding
but not trade credit. As before, we observe Bank Loan Availability and Trade Credit
Availability at the SME-half-year level and define them as indicator variables. Some 26
percent (19 and 21 percent) of the respondents state that they believe the availability
of bank financing (trade and lease credit) has improved (Panel B of Table 4.1).
Table 4.3 presents our findings for credit availability for SMEs following the
introduction of the CSPP. Models (1) through (3) of Panel A show availability of
bank credit in the full period (i.e., DiD setting) controlling for time-varying SME
attributes, including firm size, age, employees, credit quality, and profitability growth.
Model (1) does not include fixed effects while model (2) incorporates wave, industry,
and country fixed effects to take into account unobserved heterogeneity at the time,
industry, and country dimensions. Model (3) uses the multi-dimensional fixed effects
structure of industry and survey waves (i.e., time), country and wave, as well as
industry and country. We find positive and statistically significant results across
all specifications. Economically, a 1 percentage point increase in CSPP intensity
increases SMEs’ access to full bank financing between 2.4 percent (model 2) and
4.1 percent (model 1). Columns (4) through (6) in the same table show the results
of CSPP intensity on SME bank credit in the period following the introduction
33We focus our analysis on the direct impact of the CSPP by identifying the ECB’s purchases of
corporate bonds in the primary market. We find that more than 80 percent of eligible bonds issued
in the primary market are purchased under the program. In addition to our empirical identification
strategy, this fact also gives us some comfort that the ECB is not cherry-picking bonds in a particular
sector or region of the European Union.
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of financial disintermediation using the same specifications as the previous three
models. Consistent with the earlier results, we find that in the post-CSPP period, a 1
percentage point increase in Disintermediation results in an increase in SMEs’ access
to bank credit by 2.1 to 3.0 percent.34
We substantiate our finding that the CSPP’s primary market purchases have
contributed to an increase in SME lending by performing several robustness checks in
Panel B of Table 4.3. First, we utilize the survey population weights, which allow us to
scale our findings to the overall populations of European SMEs and take into account
any potential oversampling of smaller SMEs by the Survey (Ferrando et al., 2017).
We find that using survey weights in the full DiD setting (column 1) as well as in the
post-CSPP period only (column 2) results in similar findings as before, namely SMEs
access to credit increases in their exposure to CSPP. This is not surprising as the
Survey is created using randomized sampling and even if oversampling were to occur
it is likely to be at the country level, which is subsumed by our use of country-level
fixed effects (Ferrando et al., 2017). Next, we also introduce SME-fixed effects for
a subsample of SMEs that appear multiple times in the survey (columns 3 and 4).
Controlling for unobserved SME heterogeneity, we continue to find similar results
that exposure to CSPP increases their ability to obtain bank financing.35
4.4.3 Ruling out Alternative Hypotheses
Thus far, we find that SME access to bank financing increases with their exposure
to the CSPP. To rule out alternative explanations that overall improvement in
macroeconomic conditions and not CSPP might drive our findings, we conduct a
number of tests. Another lingering concern is that our results might be driven by the
positive effects that financial disintermediation might have had on bond issuances
through increased liquidity (instead of the CSPP’s primary market purchases).36
As new bond issuances are a necessary condition for the ECB to purchase bonds
in the primary market, these variables could be correlated and therefore drive our
main results. In Table 4.4, Panel A, models (1) and (2), we replace CSPP purchases
by new bond issuances within a particular country-industry-time period. We find
that bond issuances do not explain the increase in SME lending, as the coefficients
are neither statistically nor economically different from zero, while CSPP purchases
34We also examine SMEs’ applications to bank credit lines. The results from these tests are
statistically and economically comparable to those on term loans (not tabulated).
35The observations count in the table includes singletons. In total, we have 8,030 distinct SMEs
for a sample of 11,180 firm-years.
36See, for example, the findings of Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018) on the impact of the CSPP on
yields and bond issuances of the eligible large corporates.
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have a significantly positive effect on SME lending.37 As bond issuances are highly
correlated with CSPP purchases (with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.64), we
also orthogonalize our variables. However, orthogonalizing our variables does not alter
our prior conclusions, as we find similar results.
We also conduct several placebo tests to confirm the robustness of our results and
to alleviate further any concerns that the increase in SME lending may be driven
by a correlation between the CSPP’s primary market purchases and issuance of
investment-grade bonds. If instead of the CSPP’s primary market purchases, the
correlation between the CSPP and the issuances of investment-grade bonds is driving
our results, we should see similar results in the period that directly precedes our
pre-treatment period.38 We therefore use the eligibility criteria for CSPP corporate
bond purchases to estimate the choice and the value of the bonds that the ECB likely
would have purchased in the placebo period. We first determine which bonds would be
eligible to be bought by the ECB in both our regular sample period and the placebo
period and then calculate the percentage of all eligible bond issuances that were
purchased by the ECB on the primary market every half year. We then multiply these
semi-annual country-industry percentages with the corresponding value of eligible
bonds in the placebo period to generate a placebo amount of CSPP purchases.
We find no economically or statistically significant results of our placebo tests
presented in column (3) of Table 4.4, Panel A. This strengthens our interpretation
that the CSPP’s primary market purchases indeed represent an important driver
of SMEs’ access to bank credit and are unlikely to be driven by factors related to
CSPP (eligible) bond issuances. In two additional (untabulated) placebo tests, we use
the actual CSPP purchase amounts of our regular sample period in the period that
directly precedes our pre-treatment period and a rescaled version where we rescale
the purchase amounts in that period to match the relative impact of purchases in our
regular sample period. Each of the placebo tests leads to similar results, in which the
placebo CSPP purchases are not statistically significantly related to SME financing.
Next, we examine whether improvements in the overall economic conditions
in region-sector grids affected by financial disintermediation, not bond purchases
themselves, may drive banks’ willingness to lend to SMEs. Holding credit demand
37Additionally, by using the Survey data, we investigate the likelihood of SMEs making a loan
application. We find no increase in SME’ decision to apply in country-industry grids with intense
bond purchases under the CSPP. This inference provides further support that the economic conditions
in treatment grids are not significantly better than that in non-treatment grids.
38The pre-period with no CSPP purchases runs from January 2012 until June 2013, and our
placebo post-period with CSPP purchases runs from July 2013 until December 2014. For all placebo
tests, we use the actual SME lending and control variables as observed in this period.
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constant and including country-time and industry-time fixed effects alleviate this
concern to a significant extent. Nevertheless, because these potentially confounding
effects may not be ruled out entirely even on a dataset focusing on loan applications
or eliminated by our fixed effects structure, we investigate SMEs’ expectations and
views on different types of external financing opportunities after the introduction of
the CSPP. In Panel B of Table 4.4, we present our findings on SMEs’ expectations
of the availability of credit by capturing their perceptions about the likelihood of
getting financing in the future. Model (1) shows the results for SMEs’ perceptions
of whether the availability of bank financing changes, while model (2) presents the
results of SMEs’ perceptions of whether their access to trade credit changes and
model (3) shows the results for SMEs’ perceptions about lease finance availability. We
find that following financial disintermediation in the large corporate sector, SMEs’
perceive that bank loan availability increases by 2.4 percent. However, the coefficients
for Disintermediation for trade credit availability and lease financing availability
are indistinguishable from zero. We therefore interpret these results as providing
additional evidence that CSPP-induced availability of bank credit, and not the overall
market conditions, drives our findings of increased access to financing for SMEs.
4.4.4 Lending Relationships and SME Borrowing
Our results thus far suggest an increase in banks’ SME lending and SMEs’ bank
borrowing; however, despite their identification benefits and granularity, the tests
above explore banks and borrowers in isolation. In this section, we discuss the results
of our investigation that relies on the bank–borrower links. Specifically, we examine
the borrowings of SMEs as a function of the CSPP exposure of their relationship
banks.
To shed more light on the intensive margin, we examine the amount of lending by
affected banks to SMEs in the industry-regions with non-zero CSPP interventions
using Amadeus Financials dataset. Given that Amadeus Bankers dataset provides
us with a snapshot of data before and after the introduction of CSPP, we present
our findings in first differences using the intensity of the CSPP exposure as our
heterogeneous treatment variable from the following model:
Log(Debt)it = β2Post CSPP t+β3Affected SME i×Post CSPP t+γXit+αi+ηcjt+it
(4.3)
where Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of the total debt of an SME firm i in
Amadeus Financials from 2013 to 2018. As before, Post CSPP is an indicator variable
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that equals one for years 2016 onward and zero otherwise. Affected SME is based on
the bank–borrower links obtained from Amadeus Bankers Dataset (2017 vintage).
Since we have information on affected banks, as per our discussion in Section 4.4.2,
we can compare SMEs to one another in terms of their relative exposure to the
CSPP. Specifically, Affected SME is a dummy variable that switches on if an SME’s
relationship bank has corporate borrowers that received funding under the CSPP. By
doing so, we can draw a relatively direct link between disintermediation and SME
borrowers themselves.
Another key advantage of these tests is that, because the main variation comes
from SMEs’ relationship banks, we are able to compare two SMEs in the same
country-industry grid in the same period. We do so by adding ηcjt, which stands for
country-industry-year fixed effects. This additional layer of control is critical to rule
out lingering concerns about local shocks and events that affect industries in a country
heterogeneously. αi denotes SME fixed effects to remove potentially confounding effects
of time-invariant SME characteristics. Finally, Xit is a vector of control variables,
including total assets (natural logarithm), profitability (return-on-assets ratio), and
the number of employees (natural logarithm).
Panel C of Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics for the Amadeus sample. Each
observation is an SME-year. We note that the median SME debt is 3.2 million euros
(= e14.976). The median firm has total assets of 21.7 million euros, 113 employees, and
a return-on-assets ratio of about 4 percent. The inherent skewness in firm size and
firm employment is removed in the logged form.
Our estimates in Table 4.5 indicate an economically and statistically significant
effect on debt issuance by affected SMEs from their relationship banks. Economically,
SMEs with a relationship that was affected by the CSPP increase their outstanding
debt by 3.6 percent (columns (1) and (2)). In monetary terms, given the sample
median of SME debt, this increase corresponds to almost e77,750. We note that the
inferences in column (3) and (4) echo these findings by partitioning the treatment. In
this treatment-intensity setting, we find that more affected SMEs obtain incrementally
larger amounts of bank credit. Finally, as shown in columns (2) and (4), there is no
differential trend between affected and unaffected SMEs before the treatment. Overall,
these findings suggest that SMEs, which borrow from banks affected by the CSPP,
raise more debt relative to other SMEs in the same country and industry over the
same period.
Having established that financial disintermediation in the corporate sector increases
SMEs’ access to financing, in additional tests in the Online Appendix, we investigate
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whether financial disintermediation has increased the availability of credit in a broader
sense. In particular, if banks observe increased availability of funding due to their
borrowers relying more on bond financing as a result of the CSPP, we would expect
banks to be willing to provide access to financing for new borrowers overall. This
implies that banks would be more likely to offer credit to new customers and form
new banking relationships. Even though SME lending falls under the same category as
corporate lending for most banks, it is not clear whether SMEs would be the first point
of substitution for banks affected by the decreased demand for loans from corporate
borrowers affected by the CSPP. In particular, prior research argues that banks may
increase lending to their existing commercial borrowers (Acharya et al., 2017) or
switch to other types of lending such as mortgages or consumer loan (Chakraborty et
al., 2019). To shed light on this empirical question, we investigate the formation of
new relationships for all potential borrowers using the Amadeus Bankers and Dealogic
Deals data (extensive margin).39
We first use the Amadeus Bankers dataset to study the relationship formation
using the information on private firms, most of which fall into the category of SMEs
as defined by the Survey. Given that Amadeus provides us only with a snapshot of
the data, we investigate the following model:
(4.4)New Relationship Formationi = β1Disintermediationcj + γXi + i
where i indexes firms, c corresponds to a country and j to an industry. Xit is a
vector of control variables. New Relationship Formation takes the value of one if a
firm shows a new relationship with a lender after the introduction of the CSPP with
which it does not have a relationship before the program.
Panel A of Online Appendix Table OAIV shows our estimation results. We find
that, following the introduction of financial disintermediation in the corporate credit
market, affected banks form new banking relationships. These firms, on average,
appear to be smaller in size, less profitable and younger. In particular, we find that a 1
percentage point increase in Disintermediation increases the likelihood of establishing
a new lending relationship by about 1 percent, or 20 percent of the sample mean of a
new relationship.40 This inference is significant, statistically and economically.
39Amadeus collects information on SME banking relationships from a limited number of countries.
We are able to perform these tests for borrowers based in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain, because New Relationship is non-missing and non-degenerate only for these
sample countries.
40We also limit our sample to companies with fewer than 250 employees and include additional
controls for changes in size, employment, profitability, and leverage. Our conclusions continue to
hold in this specification (untabulated).
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We also analyze new relationship formation using the Dealogic Loans Database,
which contains bank lending information, including syndicated and private bank loans.
We define several proxies for a new relationship. Log of a Number of New Relationship
Formations is the natural logarithm of the number of banks with whom a company
started a borrower-lender relationship in the current quarter and did not have an active
bank relationship in the prior six months. New Relationship Formation is an indicator
variable that takes the value of one if a company started a new borrower-lender
relationship in the current quarter with a bank with which it did not have a banking
relationship in the prior six months. New Loan Originations is an indicator variable,
which takes the value of one if a company obtains a new loan in a given quarter and
zero otherwise. New Relationship Formation (main bank) is an indicator variable that
switches on only if a company signed a new loan deal in the current quarter with
the main bank, defined as a bank with an important role, and with whom it did not
have an active main bank relationship in the prior six months. Disintermediation is
defined as the aggregate CSPP purchases by the ECB in the primary market within
a country-five-digit NAICS-industry code in a given quarter.
In the Online Appendix, Table OA5, Panel B shows that the number of new
relationships (columns 1 and 2) and new loan originations (columns 3 and 4) increase
significantly following the introduction of the CSPP. In particular, the larger the
exposure to disintermediation in a given country-industry grid, the more likely a firm
to establish a new borrowing relationship with a bank. In particular, a 1 percentage
point increase in Disintermediation results in a 2.7 percent increase in the number of
new relationships and a 1.6 percent increase in the likelihood of forming at least one
new banking relationship.
Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in CSPP intensity also results in a 1.4
percent increase in new loan originations and a 1.5 percent increase in forming
a relationship with a new main (or lead arranger) bank.41 Overall, our findings
using Amadeus Bankers and Dealogic data suggest that banks exposed to the CSPP
increase their lending to SMEs and form new lending relationships with new borrowers,
including SMEs (extensive margin).
41We find that smaller companies are more likely to create new lending relationships in the
post-CSPP period as coefficients on their overall total loans outstanding (as captured by Dealogic
loans data) are negative. We use the natural logarithm of total loans outstanding for a borrower in
the prior period as a proxy for size as we do not directly observe borrower size or other borrower
characteristics in Dealogic.
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4.4.5 Loan Characteristics
Prior literature has identified one potential concern with banks responding to a
macroeconomic stimulus by increasing loans to poorly performing relationship bor-
rowers, the so-called “zombie lending” (e.g., Acharya et al., 2019; Bruche and Llobet,
2014). Using a detailed loan-level data from the ECB’s LLD Initiative, we investigate
whether banks affected by the CSPP, instead of offering new credit to new borrowers,
continue to lend to their existing borrowers at preferential rates. Consistent with
Acharya et al. (2019), we define zombie or forbearance loans as loans to existing
customers which exhibit high loss given default (above the sample median) and low
interest rates (below the sample median). We therefore estimate the following model:
Loan Characteristick = β2Disintermediationrjt +γXk +νrj +λrt +σjt +αi +pip + k
(4.5)
where each observation is an individual loan, indexed by k, i indexes firms, t
indicates half-year, r corresponds to a region, j to an industry, i to a borrower and p
to ABS pools. νrj are region-industry fixed effects, λrt are region-time fixed effects,
σjt are industry-time fixed effects, αi are borrower fixed effects and pip are ABS
pool fixed effects. γXk is a vector of loan control variables consisting of amount and
maturity. The granularity of this data allows us to adopt an even more restrictive
fixed effects structure. In addition to the multidimensional region-time, industry-
region, and industry-time fixed effects, we can include indicators for borrowers and
asset-backed security (ABS) pools, which are a subset of bank fixed effects. Here, the
region dimension is a finer classification than the country dimension, defined as the
European Commission’s nomenclature of territorial units for statistics.
The two dependent variables in these tests are Interest Rate and Zombie Lending.
Interest Rate is the cost of credit charged, with a sample average of 2.156 percent
(Table 4.1, Panel D). Zombie Lending is an indicator variable that switches on if
the spread charged on the contract is low (i.e., below the sample median) while the
bank’s loss given default estimate on the same loan is high (i.e., above the sample
median). This empirical definition captures the spirit of the “extend and pretend”
type of lending behavior, which is also referred to as zombie, forbearance, or evergreen
lending, in keeping with Acharya et al. (2019) and Bruche and Llobet (2014). On
average, we classify about 20 percent of the sample contracts as Zombie Lending.
In Panel A of Table 4.6, we present the results of the CSPP’s impact on loan
pricing. As we do not observe the underlying borrower characteristics, we use a
tight fixed effects structure to take into account any unobserved heterogeneity across
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industry-time, region-time, industry-region, ABS pool, and borrowers. We find that
banks decrease interest rates on new loans following the introduction of corporate-
sector financial disintermediation. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in the
magnitude of CSPP exposure leads to a 0.019 to 0.096 percentage point decrease
in interest rates on new loans for smaller borrowers. These coefficient estimates are
economically meaningful relative to the sample standard deviation of interest charged,
which is 0.44 percentage points. This inference is in line with the ECB’s stated
objectives: financial disintermediation in the corporate sector lowers financing costs
for SMEs by providing extra funds to the commercial credit markets and by enhancing
liquidity.
In Panel B of Table 4.6, we find that the likelihood of zombie lending decreases
following the introduction of the CSPP. In particular, a 1 percentage point increase
in Disintermediation results in an 8.7 to 16.9 percent decrease in instances of zombie
lending. This inference also corroborates our earlier findings on the formation of new
bank-SME relationships.
In addition to the LLD results, we also check whether SMEs report lower interest
rates in their Survey responses following the introduction of the CSPP. Using the same
specification as in equation (4.2) above, we define SME Interest Rate Decreased as an
indicator variable, which takes the value of one if SMEs respond that their interest
rates decreased in the prior six months (question Q2 d of the Survey). As Table 4.1,
Panel B shows, 29 percent of our sample saw a decrease in interest rates over the whole
period. In Table 4.6, Panel C, we find positive and statistically significant results. In
particular, the likelihood of getting a lower interest rate increases in the magnitude of
the industry-country exposure to the CSPP by 3.9 percent in the full period. It also
increases by 2.6 percent if we consider only the post-CSPP implementation period
specification, albeit our results are statistically weaker.
The Survey also allows us to capture whether SMEs refused to take credit because
the offered interest rate was too high. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.6, Panel C
we show that the likelihood of SMEs refusing credit because the offered interest rate
is too high decreases by 0.4 to 0.6 percent, which is economically and statistically
significant. Overall, our findings for loan characteristics suggest that banks extend
new credit on better terms to new borrowers, including SMEs, and reduce rolling over
credit on preferential terms to poor credit quality borrowers.
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4.4.6 Real Effects
Having established that financial disintermediation in the corporate credit market
enhances SMEs’ access to financing, new banking relationships, and improved credit
terms, we turn to our last set of results on spillover effects. In particular, we are
interested in whether increased access to financing leads SMEs to fund real activities
such as increased investment and hiring. In these tests, we rely on the Survey data
and perform a cross-sectional analysis using post-CSPP data and a quasi-DiD using
the full sample data. These approaches are in the spirit of the models for credit access
defined in equation (4.2). Similar to our first set of analyses, we also control for SME
size, age, employment, profitability, and credit quality and include industry-time,
country-time, and industry-country fixed effects.
Our main dependent variables that capture the real effects of CSPP purchases
are based on answers to the variants of the Survey question (Q6a) about the purpose
for which the financing is obtained. In particular, Purpose: capital investment, is an
indicator that switches on only if the purpose of financing is fixed assets. Purpose:
employment, is an indicator that switches on only if the purpose of financing is
hiring. Purpose: working capital, is an indicator that switches on only if the purpose
of financing is working capital. Finally, Purpose: refinancing, is an indicator that
switches on only if the purpose of obtaining financing is to refinance.
These responses are not mutually exclusive, as the borrower can pick multiple loan
purposes. Nor are they commonly exhaustive because the respondents can choose
“other” or “do not know” as alternative options. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 4.1,
investment and employment reasons are given 61.4 percent and 8.3 percent of the
time, whereas 40.6 percent and 16.9 percent of loan applications are for working
capital and refinancing purposes, respectively.
Table 4.7 presents our findings. As with the SMEs’ credit access results in Ta-
ble 4.3, models (1) through (4) investigate the impact of corporate-sector financial
disintermediation using the full sample, while models (5) through (8) focus on the
post-CSPP period. Similar to our tests for credit access, we control for SME size, age,
credit quality and profitability across all specifications. We also consider potentially
unobserved heterogeneity by including a tight fixed-effects structure by industry-time,
country-time, and country-industry.
In both specifications, we observe that SMEs use increased access to financing to
fund their real activities such as capital investments and increasing employment. This
is an important takeaway, as our paper provides a direct link between the CSPP and
real activities by looking exclusively at SMEs that apply for bank credit. Economically,
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a 1 percentage point increase in exposure to the CSPP results in a 4.1–4.3 percent
increase in affected SMEs’ likelihood to invest funds in capital projects and a 2.3–2.7
percent increase in hiring new employees. SMEs, however, are 1.7 to 2.6 percent less
likely to use the new funds to finance their working capital and 2.4 to 2.8 percent less
likely to use the funds to refinance their existing loans. Overall, our findings indicate
that increased access to financing leads to positive real activities for SMEs, suggesting
positive real effects of corporate-sector financial disintermediation on the SME sector.
In the final stage of our analysis, we focus on the real effects of financial disinter-
mediation on banks’ operations. The shock that induced banks to steer toward lending
to the SME sector may have also triggered a change in their lending technology and
operational features. To shed light on this issue, we look at the number of bank
branches and employees by using SNL Financial data. Since we observe this data
on an annual frequency, we conduct our tests on a sample spanning 2014–2017. The
numbers presented in the natural logarithm form in Panel E of Table 4.1 suggest that
the median bank in this sample has 660 branches and 7,772 employees. Table 4.8,
Panel A shows our main findings. The estimates on Affected Bank × Post CSPP vary
between 5.0 and 8.3 percent and are statistically significant. This suggests that the
switch to SME lending necessitates banks to increase their access to small businesses,
which need physical interactions to obtain a loan.
Disintermediation may result in banks’ lending to riskier borrowers, chasing higher
yields and, as a result, decreasing the quality of their loan portfolios. Using EBA
data, we test whether non-performing loans (NPLs) for banks’ SME portfolios have
significantly increased following disintermediation. Using a similar model as in equation
(4.1) and changing our dependent variable to the percentage of SME NPLs relative
to banks’ overall SME loan portfolio (SME NPLs % of SME Loans), we find that
the quality of SME loan portfolios has not changed significantly for affected banks
after financial disintermediation in the corporate sector. Table 4.8, Panel B shows
that following the introduction of the CSPP, the coefficients on loan portfolio quality
for affected banks are statistically insignificant and negative. Finally, we test whether
banks’ default risk changes as a result of their increased exposures to the CSPP and
SME lending. As a timely and market-based metric of credit risk, we examine banks’
credit default swaps (CDS). The estimates in columns (3) and (4) in Panel B of
Table 4.8 suggest no significant changes in banks’ default risk using CDS spreads
following financial disintermediation.
Overall, our findings are consistent with financial disintermediation in the corporate
sector having positive real effects on SMEs through increased access to bank financing,
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as SMEs use new funds to invest into real activities such investments and hiring.
We also find that banks invest in opening more branches and hiring more employees.
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that the quality of the overall SME loan
portfolios or bank default risk deteriorates for affected banks.
4.4.7 Dynamic Effects of the CSPP
Thus far, our findings have focused on the relatively short-term effects of disintermedi-
ation on credit access for SMEs. In this section, we extend our analyses to investigate
whether the changes we document are due to banks’ short-term portfolio reallocations
or a longer-term structural change in bank lending relationships with SMEs. As the
CSPP is still a relatively new program, we focus our analyses on banks’ exposures
tests for which we can get semi-annual data until December 2017 and the Survey
data with waves covering the period until June 2018. Table 4.9 presents our findings
for an extended sample for SME exposures by breaking down the interaction effect
into three components of the first, second and third half-years after the introduction
of the CSPP using the semi-annual EBA transparency exercise data. As Panel A of
Table 4.9 shows, we find that the positive effect on SME exposures for banks affected
by disintermediation is the strongest in the second period after the introduction of
CSPP and dissipates by the third period. These results are statistically and economi-
cally significant and suggest that the increase in lending to SMEs might be a medium
rather than a long-term effect. In untabulated results, we also find that the quality
of affected banks’ loan portfolios (based on our NPL measures) does not change
significantly.
Panel B of Table 4.9 presents the Survey data results and similarly splits out the
interaction effect into two survey waves (first year and second year). Column (1) shows
the results for our main specification for SME access to bank credit. We find that
SME access to bank financing increases in economically and statistically significant
ways for both Survey waves. However, the magnitude of the effect is smaller in the
second wave, which is consistent with our findings for the SME exposures results in
Panel A. We also find that the real effects are predominantly coming from the first
wave of the Survey. Finally, we also observe that the increase in SME borrowing from
banks affected by disintermediation is significant only in the short term (Panel C of
Table 4.9). Overall, these findings suggest that while the effects we document are
positive, they might be somewhat short-lived and not have a structural impact on
SMEs access to credit and ability to invest into real activities in the long run.
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4.5 Conclusion
What is the role of banking regulation in credit creation to small businesses, which
are essential for the economy yet widely regarded as underserved by banks? Could
the shrinking of one credit market for banks (e.g., large corporate bank debt market)
prompt banks to increase lending to small businesses? If so, what are the channels
through which financial disintermediation in one sector facilitates financial inter-
mediation in another? To answer these important economic questions, we examine
the European Central Bank’s Corporate Sector Purchase Programme, as a plausibly
exogenous increase in financial disintermediation in the corporate sector.
We overcome a variety of empirical challenges by utilizing regulatory disclosures,
SME credit access surveys, relationship banking information, and individual SME loan
contracts. Overall, we provide evidence that SMEs affected by financial disintermedi-
ation enjoy a relative increase in the amount of bank credit, especially from lenders
that faced liquidity constraints. We also find that affected SMEs are more likely
to forge new borrowing relationships, use the additional funds for investment and
hiring purposes, and pay lower interest costs, consistent with positive real effects of
corporate-sector financial disintermediation. However, these positive effects disappear
in the long term, casting doubt on the efficacy of financial disintermediation.
Overall, our conclusions contribute to the broader literature on SME financing, as
well as the ongoing debate about the economy-wide effects of financial disintermedia-
tion. We use a specific example of an unconventional monetary policy intervention to
study the impact the large corporate borrowers’ sector has on the financial intermedi-
ation for SMEs. However, it is important to note that not all such interventions have
desirable or long-lasting outcomes. Moreover, our paper does not explore potentially
adverse or unintended consequences of regulator-led financial disintermediation. Future
research could shed light on these important questions and help extend the literature
on the potential regulatory policy tools that aim at enhancing SME financing.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents the sample statistics. Panel A presents summary statistics for the EBA sample
in which each observation is a bank-half-year. Panel B lists the summary statistics for the ECB
Credit Access Survey for SMEs (SAFE), in which each observation is a firm-half-year. Panel C
presents the summary statistics for the Dealogic sample, in which each observation is a firm-quarter.
Panel D includes the summary statistics for the Amadeus sample, in which each observation is a
firm. Panel E shows the summary statistics for the LLD sample, in which each observation is a loan
contract. Panel F includes the summary statistics for the SNL sample, in which each observation is
a bank-year. Only mean values are presented for indicator variables. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.
Panel A. EBA
Mean stdev p10 p50 p90 N
Affected Bank × Post CSPP 0.256 386
Affected Bank 0.500 386
Post CSPP 0.492 386
Affected Bank × Pre CSPP 0.122 386
SME Exposure (%) 8.220 7.982 0.0 7.135 18.488 386
CORP Exposure (%) 12.882 12.237 1.739 9.758 27.560 386
Balance Sheet Illiquidity 2.486 1.115 1.0 2.0 4.0 368
Capital Constraints 2.522 1.127 1.0 3.0 4.0 364
SME NPLs (% of SME Loans) 5.137 7.835 0.017 2.258 13.556 386
Panel B. ECB Credit Access Survey
Mean stdev p10 p50 p90 N
Disintermediation (%) 0.085 0.316 0.0 0.0 0.180 11,180
SME Access to Bank Credit 0.802 0.398 0.0 1.0 1.0 11,180
SME Interest Rate Decreased 0.288 10,927
Borrower Refused Because In-
terest Rate Was High
0.012 12,587
Purpose: capital investment 0.614 11,180
Purpose: employment 0.083 11,180
Purpose: working capital 0.406 11,180
Purpose: refinancing 0.169 11,180
SME size 2.184 1.059 1.0 2.0 4.0 11,180
SME age 3.840 0.478 3.0 4.0 4.0 11,180
SME credit quality 2.264 0.624 2.0 2.0 3.0 11,180
SME profitability growth 2.054 0.815 1.0 2.0 3.0 11,180
Bond issuance 2.583 6.653 0.0 0.0 6.978 11,180
Bank Loan Availability 0.263 5,606
Trade Credit Availability 0.190 5,606
Lease Financing Availability 0.211 3,333
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Panel C. Amadeus
Mean stdev p10 p50 p90 N
Affected SME × Post CSPP 0.160 193,494
Affected SME 0.333 193,494
Post CSPP 0.499 193,494
Affected SME × Pre CSPP 0.087 193,494
Log(debt) 14.585 2.663 11.248 14.976 17.372 193,494
Log(total assets) 17.033 1.347 15.505 16.892 18.816 193,494
Return on assets (%) 5.273 9.010 -2.955 4.052 15.911 193,494
Log(number of employees) 4.651 1.473 2.890 4.727 6.449 193,494
Panel D. ECB Loan-level Data
Mean stdev p10 p50 p90 N
Disintermediation (%) 0.131 0.082 0.096 0.121 0.270 327,452
Interest Rate (%) 2.156 0.444 2.170 2.190 2.240 327,452
Zombie Lending (%) 20.295 327,452
Panel E. SNL Data on Bank Branches and Employees
Mean stdev p10 p50 p90 N
Affected Bank × Post CSPP 0.269 271
Affected Bank 0.520 271
Post CSPP 0.502 271
Affected Bank × Pre CSPP 0.133 271
Pre CSPP 0.258 271
Log(Number of Branches) 6.049 1.812 3.912 6.492 7.826 271
Log(Number of Employees) 9.178 1.224 7.632 8.958 10.759 271
Log(Total Assets) 18.268 1.294 16.705 18.098 20.181 271
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Table 4.2: Effects of the CSPP on banks’ exposures to the SME sector
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the impact of the CSPP on systemically
important European Banks using the EBA Transparency Exercise data, which reports banks’ SME
and corporate exposures. Panel A presents the main treatment effect and Panel B presents the
cross-sectional variation in treatment effects. SME Exposure (CORP Exposure) corresponds to a
given bank’s SME (Corporate) loan assets relative to total exposures. Affected Bank is an indicator
that switches on only if the bank has at least one large corporate relationship borrower (as per
Dealogic), whose bonds are purchased under the CSPP. As a robustness check, Affected Bank is a
continuous variable in column (6) of Panel A and defined as the total primary market purchases
by the ECB of that the bank’s clients divided by the value of this bank’s loans outstanding. Post
CSPP is an indicator variable that switches on for 2016H2 and 2017H1. Pre CSPP is an indicator
variable that switches on for 2015H2 and 2016H1. I corresponds to a quartile rank which takes the
value of one if a bank is in the top quartile of liquidity (capital) and four if the bank is in a lower
quartile, based on the proportion of liquid assets (Tier 1 regulatory capital) before the introduction
of CSPP in June 2016. As denoted in the table, T -statistics (reported in parentheses) are robust to
within-bank correlation and heteroscedasticity. *** , ** , and * denote statistical significance at the
1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. The Main Treatment Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
Affected Bank -2.257 -2.630
(-1.41) (-1.50)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP 2.279*** 2.027*** 0.947** 1.088** 1.442** 0.119*
(2.84) (3.10) (2.20) (2.51) (2.24) (1.79)
CORP Exposure 0.135 0.136 0.131
(1.48) (1.49) (1.43)
Affected Bank × Pre CSPP 0.707 0.294
(1.29) (0.68)
Observations 386 386 386 384 384 384
Adjusted R-squared -0.001 0.381 0.947 0.949 0.949 0.948
Definition of Affected Bank Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator Indicator Continuous
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE N Y N N N N
Bank FE N N Y Y Y Y
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Panel B. Cross-sectional Variation in Treatment Effect
(1) (2)
I = Liquidity
Constraints
I = Capital
Constraints
SME Exposure SME Exposure
Affected Bank × Post CSPP × I 0.396* -0.094
(1.84) (-0.05)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP 1.459*** 0.804
(2.65) (1.13)
Post CSPP × I -0.040 1.445
(-0.44) (0.82)
CORP Exposure 0.191** 0.132*
(2.60) (1.72)
Observations 336 340
Adjusted R-squared 0.950 0.958
Time FE Y Y
Bank FE Y Y
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Panel B: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full
period
Post-CSPP
only
Full
period
Post-CSPP
only
Specification:
Use survey weights
Specification:
Include SME fixed effects
Disintermediation 0.035** 0.031* 0.048** 0.060*
(2.39) (1.89) (2.11) (1.78)
SME size 0.038*** 0.045*** -0.033 0.014
(6.70) (4.99) (-0.98) (0.31)
SME age 0.033*** 0.032 -0.007 -0.013
(2.82) (1.58) (-0.18) (-0.06)
SME credit quality 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.022 0.017
(6.81) (4.53) (1.56) (0.51)
SME profitability growth 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.007 0.007
(5.71) (4.13) (0.60) (0.29)
Observations 11,180 5,632 11,180 5,632
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.106 0.511 0.580
Industry-wave FE Y Y Y Y
Country-wave FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-country FE Y Y Y Y
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Table 4.4: Financial disintermediation vs. changing economic fundamentals
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of SME credit access on the intensity of the
CSPP. The unit of observation is at the firm and Survey-wave level. SME Access to Bank Credit
captures SMEs’ ability to raise financing through loan applications (Panel A). This variable varies
between 1 (full financing received upon application) and 0 (less than the full amount received).
Disintermediation is a continuous variable measured as the aggregate corporate bond purchases by
the ECB in the primary market within a country-SAFE industry during the corresponding wave
period and deflated by the total value of all bonds outstanding in the country-SAFE industry. In
Panel A, Bond issuance is total primary market issuances within a country-SAFE industry during
the corresponding wave time period deflated by the total value of all bonds outstanding in the
country-SAFE industry (columns (1) and (2)). Column (3) presents the results of the placebo test
for the main findings presented in Table 4.3. In Panel B Bank Loan Availability is an indicator
variable, which takes the value of one if SMEs perceive an increase in funding through the availability
of new loans. Trade Credit Availability (Lease Financing Availability) is an indicator variable,
which takes the value of one if SMEs perceive an increase in the availability of trade credit (lease
financing). Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are robust to
within-country correlation and heteroscedasticity. *** , ** , and * denote statistical significance at
the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Main Results after Controlling for Economic Activities and Placebo Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Controlling for Bond Issuance Placebo Test
SME Access to
Bank Credit
SME Access to
Bank Credit
SME Access to
Bank Credit
Disintermediation 0.027* -0.007
(1.88) (-1.66)
SME size 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038***
(8.29) (8.32) (5.76)
SME age 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.048***
(4.89) (4.88) (5.57)
SME credit quality 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.098***
(8.15) (8.15) (11.98)
SME profitability growth 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030***
(6.43) (6.42) (5.77)
Bond issuance 0.001** 0.001
(2.13) (1.16)
Observations 11,180 11,180 10,465
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.091 0.143
Industry-wave FE Y Y Y
Country-wave FE Y Y Y
Industry-country FE Y Y Y
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Panel B. SMEs’ Perceptions on Availability of Funds
(1) (2) (3)
Bank Loan
Availability
Trade Credit
Availability
Lease Financing
Availability
Disintermediation 0.024* 0.006 0.005
(1.70) (0.51) (0.22)
SME size 0.027*** 0.008 0.017*
(4.29) (1.17) (1.82)
SME age -0.031** -0.036*** -0.029*
(-2.30) (-2.86) (-1.71)
SME credit quality 0.100*** 0.082*** 0.076***
(11.06) (9.04) (6.28)
SME profitability growth 0.063*** 0.033*** 0.047***
(7.24) (4.59) (4.78)
Observations 5,606 5,606 3,333
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.052 0.030
Industry-wave FE Y Y Y
Country-wave FE Y Y Y
Industry-country FE Y Y Y
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Table 4.5: Evidence from bank-borrower links
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the variation in SMEs’ borrowing with
their relationship banks around the CSPP. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of the total debt
(Amadeus item totdebt) of the SME. Affected SME is an indicator variable that switches on only if
the SME has at least one relationship bank whose corporate borrowers received ECB funding. In
columns (3) and (4), Affected SME is used as median ranks in the spirit of a treatment intensity
estimation. Post CSPP switches on for years 2016 and after. Pre CSPP switches on for the year of
2015. Controls include SME total assets (log), return on assets (% ), and the number of employees
(log). Country-Industry-Year FE are the three-dimensional fixed effects denoting an SME’s country,
two-digit NAICS industry, and year of financials. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are robust to
within-firm correlation and heteroscedasticity. *** , ** , and * denote statistical significance at the
1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Debt) Log(Debt) Log(Debt) Log(Debt)
Affected SME × Post CSPP 0.036** 0.035** 0.023** 0.025**
(2.54) (2.02) (2.24) (1.99)
Affected SME × Pre CSPP -0.001 0.004
(-0.10) (0.35)
Observations 193,494 193,494 193,494 193,494
Adjusted R-squared 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837
Definition of Affected Bank Indicator Indicator Continuous Continuous
Controls Y Y Y Y
SME FE and Country-Industry-Year
FE
Y Y Y Y
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Table 4.6: Effects of the CSPP on loan characteristics
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the impact of the CSPP on loan characteristics
using LLD data for Panels A and B and Survey data for Panel C. Interest Rate corresponds to the
interest rates charged on the loans (in percentage points). Zombie Lending is an indicator variable
that switches on only if the loan’s Interest Rate is below the sample median, and Loss Given Default
estimate is above the sample median. Consistent with the structure of the ECB loan-level data,
Industry is defined as one-digit Nomenclature of Economic Activities (NACE) codes and the Region
as Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), which vary within countries. Loan
controls include Log (Amount), the natural logarithm of the total amount of loans offered and Loan
Maturity, the number of months until the loan matures. Panel C presents Survey responses to the
question of whether interest rates on new loans changed or SMEs refused credit. SME Interest Rate
Decreased takes the value of one if SMEs respond that their interest rates on new loans decreased in
the past six months and zero otherwise. Borrower Refused Because Interest Cost Was High takes the
value of one if the respondent SME states that it refused the offer of bank credit because the offered
rate was too high. Models (1) and (3) include the full sample of observations in a DiD setting. Models
(2) and (4) include a post-treatment period only. Variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics
(reported in parentheses) are robust to within-ABS-Deal correlation and heteroscedasticity (Panels
A and B) and within-country correlation and heteroscedasticity (Panel C). *** , ** , and * denote
statistical significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. SMEs’ Cost of Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest
Rate
Interest
Rate
Interest
Rate
Interest
Rate
Disintermediation -0.096** -0.094** -0.035*** -0.019**
(-2.65) (-2.77) (-5.21) (-2.66)
Observations 327,452 327,452 327,452 327,452
Adjusted R-squared 0.556 0.566 0.888 0.889
Industry-time FE Y Y Y Y
Region-time FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-region FE Y Y Y Y
ABS Pool FE N Y Y Y
Borrower FE N N Y Y
Loan Controls N N N Y
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Panel B. Recipients of Funds
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zombie
Lending
Zombie
Lending
Zombie
Lending
Zombie
Lending
Disintermediation -0.115* -0.102 -0.087*** -0.169***
(-2.03) (-1.60) (-6.73) (-5.73)
Observations 327,452 327,452 327,452 327,452
Adjusted R-squared 0.293 0.300 0.396 0.396
Industry-time FE Y Y Y Y
Region-time FE Y Y Y Y
Industry-region FE Y Y Y Y
ABS Pool FE N Y Y Y
Borrower FE N N Y Y
Loan Controls N N N Y
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Table 4.8: Real effects of the CSPP on European Banks
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the impact of the CSPP on systemically
important European Banks. Affected Bank is an indicator that switches on only if the bank has at
least one large corporate relationship borrower (as per Dealogic), whose bonds are purchased under
the CSPP. In Panel A, per the frequency of data provided by SNL, each observation is a bank-year,
and the sample period is 2014–2017. Post CSPP is an indicator variable that switches on for years
2016 and 2017. Pre CSPP is an indicator variable that switches on for 2015. Number of Branches
(Number of Employees) corresponds to a given bank’s average annual number of branches (full-time
employees). In Panel B, per the frequency of EBA Transparency Exercise, each observation is a
bank-year. SME NPLs (% of SME Loans) corresponds to a given bank’s non-performing loans in
the SME sector relative to their total SME lending. CDS Spread is the half-yearly average of the
premium charged on a bank’s five-year CDS contract, presented in percentage points. Post CSPP is
an indicator variable that switches on for 2016H2 and 2017H1, and Pre CSPP is an indicator variable
that switches on for 2016H1. T-statistics are robust to within-bank correlation and heteroscedasticity.
*** , ** , and * denote statistical significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Banks’ Operations and Business Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Number
of
Branches)
Log(Number
of
Branches)
Log(Number
of
Employees)
Log(Number
of
Employees)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP 0.050** 0.060* 0.067*** 0.083***
(2.03) (1.75) (2.95) (2.77)
Affected Bank × Pre CSPP 0.019 0.031
(0.73) (1.54)
Observations 271 271 271 271
Within R-squared 0.031 0.038 0.026 0.028
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank
Bank and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B. Loan Portfolio and Credit Quality
SME NPLs
(% of SME
Loans)
SME NPLs
(% of SME
Loans)
CDS
Spreads (in
pct. points)
CDS
Spreads (in
pct. points)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP -0.224 -0.330 0.501 1.475
(-0.15) (-0.21) (0.34) (0.88)
Affected Bank × Pre CSPP -0.212 0.396
(-0.58) (0.55)
Observations 341 341 198 198
Adjusted R-squared 0.953 0.953 0.808 0.875
Controls Y Y Y Y
Bank and Time FE Y Y Y Y
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Table 4.9: Dynamic effects of the CSPP on European Banks
This table presents the results of the OLS estimation of the impact of the CSPP on systemically
important European Banks (Panel A) and on SMEs using the Survey data and the responses that
correspond to the purpose of obtaining new financing (Panel B) over time. Affected Bank is an
indicator that switches on only if the bank has at least one large corporate relationship borrower
(as per Dealogic), whose bonds are purchased under the CSPP. In Panel A, per the frequency of
data provided by SNL, each observation is a bank-year, and the sample period is 2014–2017. Post
CSPP (first half-year) is an indicator variable that switches on for December 2016, Post CSPP
(second half-year) switches on for June 2017 and Post CSPP (third half-year) switches on for
December 2017. In Panel B, Disintermediation is a continuous variable measured as the aggregate
corporate bond purchases by the ECB in the primary market within a country-SAFE industry
during the corresponding wave period and deflated by the total value of all bonds outstanding in the
country-SAFE industry. Post CSPP (first year) is an indicator variable that switches on for 2016H2
-and 2017H1 and Post CSPP (second year) switches on for 2017H2-2018H1. Panel C presents the
results of the OLS estimation of the variation in SMEs’ borrowing with their relationship banks
around the CSPP. Log(Debt) is the natural logarithm of the total debt (Amadeus item totdebt)
of the SME. Affected SME is an indicator variable that switches on only if the SME has at least
one relationship bank whose corporate borrowers received ECB funding. In columns (3) and (4),
Affected SME is used as median ranks in the spirit of a treatment intensity estimation. This variable
used Post CSPP (short term) switches on for years 2016 and 2017. Post CSPP (long term) switches
on for years 2018 and after. Pre CSPP switches on for the year of 2015. Controls include SME
total assets (log), return on assets (% ), and the number of employees (log). Other variables are
defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are robust to within-bank (Panel A), within-country (Panel B),
and within-SME (Panel C) correlation and heteroscedasticity. *** , ** , and * denote statistical
significance at the 1% , 5% , and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A. SME Exposures Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
SME
Exposure
Affected Bank -2.200 -2.727
(-1.36) (-1.53)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP (first half-year) 2.118*** 1.834*** 0.777** 0.830**
(2.73) (3.03) (2.26) (2.38)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP (second half-year) 2.326** 2.123*** 1.059* 1.117*
(2.49) (2.64) (1.73) (1.84)
Affected Bank × Post CSPP (third half-year) 1.659 1.440 0.700 0.668
(1.49) (1.58) (0.93) (0.88)
CORP Exposure 0.067
(1.13)
Observations 484 484 484 484
Adjusted R-squared -0.007 0.390 0.938 0.938
Time FE Y Y Y Y
Country FE N Y N N
Bank FE N N Y Y
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Panel C: Bank-Borrower Links and SME Borrowing Dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Debt) Log(Debt) Log(Debt) Log(Debt)
Affected SME × Post CSPP (short term) 0.037*** 0.036** 0.024** 0.026**
(2.63) (2.09) (2.33) (2.06)
Affected SME × Post CSPP (long term) -0.019 -0.020 -0.027 -0.025
(-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.41) (-0.38)
Affected SME × Pre CSPP -0.001 0.004
(-0.09) (0.35)
Observations 193,494 193,494 193,494 193,494
Adjusted R-squared 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837
Definition of Affected Bank Indicator Indicator Continuous Continuous
Controls Y Y Y Y
SME FE and Country-Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y
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Summary
This dissertation examines how firms and public institutions could use disclosures
and policies in an unconventional way to affect the decision making of other firms.
In particular, I investigate whether firms use public disclosure to investors in order
to improve their competitive positioning and how ECB corporate bond purchases
bolster bank lending to SME’s.
In chapter 2, I investigate how firms use disclosures to their investors as a method
to tacitly collude with their competitors. I show that antitrust oversight can be
effective in limiting this behavior. Specifically, using textual analysis to create a novel
measure, I find that firms in concentrated industries provide more future price increase
disclosures than firms in dispersed industries, presumably to coordinate price increases
with their competitors. Exploiting two separate shocks in U.S. antitrust oversight,
I find that an increase in antitrust monitoring reduces use of future price increase
disclosures. Significantly, I find that this decline in the use of future price increase
reduces the information available to all investors, as reflected in increased bid-ask
spreads. Thus, increased antitrust oversight appears to be effective in reducing the
ability of firms to collude via future price increase disclosures, but it comes with the
unintended consequence that stock markets are less informed.
In another study on the strategic use of disclosure to influence product market
competition (chapter 3), we examine whether firms preannounce capacity expansions
to deter entry into their product markets. Using plausibly exogenous variation in entry
threats and textual analysis to observe capacity expansion announcements, we show
that firms respond to heightened entry threats by announcing capacity expansions.
Consistent with our predictions, larger firms are more likely to respond in this fashion,
while firms with more private information about industry prospects are less likely to
respond in this fashion. Capacity expansion announcements appear to be effective at
deterring entry.
148 Summary
In chapter 4, we examine the spillover effects of financial disintermediation on
the supply of credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). We find that direct
central-bank lending to large firms induces banks to increase lending to SMEs by 8-12
percent and that this effect is stronger for liquidity-constrained banks. SMEs with
affected relationship banks increase borrowing by approximately e77,750. We verify
that these inferences are not due to changing economic fundamentals or selection in
central-bank financing. Despite documenting positive effects, we also find that they
disappear in the long term, casting some doubt on the structural efficacy of financial
disintermediation. This study thus highlights how central banks could use financing to
large corporations as an unconventional tool to induce banks to increase their lending
to SMEs without directly targeting them.
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(Dutch summary)
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik hoe bedrijven en publieke organen op een ongewone
manier gebruik maken van marktcommunicatie en beleid, om zo de belissingen te
beinvloeden van bedrijven. In het bijzonder onderzoek ik of bedrijven gebruik kunnen
maken van publieke toelichtingen om hun marktpositie te verbeteren en of het opkopen
van bedrijfsobligaties door de Europese Centrale Bank (ECB) kan helpen om de de
financiering voor het midden- en kleinbedrijf (MKB) te stimuleren.
In hoofdstuk 2 analyseer ik of bedrijven gebruik kunnen maken van publieke
toelichten om zo impliciet prijsafspraken te maken. Ik toon aan dat mededingings
regelgeving dit top op zeker hoogte kunnnen voorkomen. Met behulp van tekstanalyse
vind ik dat bedrijven in geconcentreerde markten vaker bekendmaken dat zij hun
prijzen gaan verhogen dan bedrijven in niet-geconcentreerde markten, waarschijn-
lijk met als doel prijsafspraken te maken. Gebruikmakend van een verandering in
Amerikaanse mededingingsregelgeving, vind ik dat dit kan leiden tot een verlaging van
het aantal bedrijven dat prijsverhogingen bekend maakt. Daarentegen vind ik wel dat
aandeelhouders minder goed geinformeerd zijn doordat bedrijven minder informatie
geven over toekomstige prijsverhogingen. Mededingingsregelgeving lijkt dus effectief
te zijn in de strijd tegen prijsafspraken door middel van publieke bekendmakingen
van prijsverhogingen, maar heeft ook negatieve bijwerkingen voor aandeelhouders.
In een tweede onderzoek (hoofdstuk 3) naar het strategisch gebruik van publieke
toelichtingen om de marktpositionering van bedrijven te verbeteren, bekijken wij of
bedrijven aankondigingen van een bedrijfsuitbreiding gebruiken om te voorkomen
dat nieuwe bedrijven hun markt betreden. Met behulp van exogene variatie in de
dreiging van nieuwe toetreders tot een markt en tekstanalyse, vinden tonen wij
aan dat bedrijven vaker een uitbereiding van hun bedrijf aankondigen als er een
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grotere kans is dat een nieuw bedrijf hun markt toetreedt. Overeenkomstig met
onze voorspelling, vinden wij dat grotere bedrijven vaker op deze manier reageren,
terwijl bedrijven waarover minder informatie beschikbaar is dit minder vaak doen. De
vooraankondiging van een bedrijfsuitbereiding lijkt effectief te zijn in het voorkomen
dat bedrijven inderdaad toetreden tot een markt.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken wij of geldstromen zonder de tussenkomst van banken
indirect ook kunnen leiden to meer financiering voor het MKB. Wij vinden dat het
opkopen van bedrijfsobligaties door centrale banken ertoe leidt dat banken 8-12
procent meer leningen verstrekken aan het MKB. Dit komt met name doordat klanten
van banken met een liquiditeitsprobleem minder leningen van deze banken nodig
hebben en daardoor meer geld beschikbaar hebben om dit uit te lenen aan het MKB.
MKBs kunnen ongeveer e77,750 meer lenen als zij een bank hebben die op deze manier
indirect beinvloed zijn door het opkoopprogramma. We verifie¨ren dat deze bevindingen
niet worden veroorzaakt door een verandering in het economisch klimaat of door
voorkennis van centrale banken. Toch blijkt dat de langetermijneffecten beperkt zijn.
Er bestaat daarom twijfel of het direct financieren van bedrijven daadwerkelijk een
effectieve manier is om het MKB te stimuleren. Samenvattend, dit onderzoek laat
zien hoe het opkopen van bedrijfsobligaties door centrale banken een onconventionele
manier kan zijn om banken te stimuleren meer uit te lenen aan het MKB zonder
direct geld te geven aan banken.
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